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I. Introduction
Not long ago, scandalous fraud and improper accounting practices
in the private sector forced the collapse of several major corporations,
including WorldCom,1 Enron,2 and Enron's accountant, Arthur An-
dersen.3 Prosecutors have charged firms, as well as individual officers
and executives, with criminal fraud, money laundering, conspiracy,
and obstruction of justice in connection with the accounting scandals.4
1. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, WorldCom's Collapse: The Overview; WorldCom
Files for Bankruptcy; Largest United States Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at
Al (reporting erosion of profits and accounting scandals leading to WorldCom's
July 21, 2002 bankruptcy filing, the largest in United States history). The larg-
est United States bankruptcy previous to WorldCom had been the Enron bank-
ruptcy. See infra, note 2.
2. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Enron's Collapse: The Overview;
Enron Corporation Files Largest U.S. Claim for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2001, at Al (reporting Enron's December 2, 2001 filing for chapter 11 protection
and reorganization in bankruptcy); see also, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034,
2001 Bankr. LEXIS 1564 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2001) (Enron petition for
postpetition financing to permit continuing operations during bankruptcy pro-
ceedings). For a brief summary of events leading to the Enron bankruptcy filing,
see REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 2-3 (William C. Powers et al., eds., Feb. 1,
2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport
020102.pdf [hereinafter POwERS REPORT].
3. After its conviction on obstruction of justice charges on June 15, 2002, see infra
note 4, Arthur Andersen informed the Securities and Exchange Commission that
it would cease practicing before the commission by August 31, 2002. Kurt
Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2002, at Al.
4. In the first criminal charge ever brought against a major accounting firm, Arthur
Andersen was indicted, and later convicted, on obstruction of justice charges.
Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Charged With Obstruction in Enron Inquiry, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at Al (reporting Andersen indictment); Eichenwald,
supra note 3 (reporting on Andersen conviction). Michael Kopper, a former En-
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Led by Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland and Republi-
can Representative Michael Oxley of Ohio, outraged legislators on
both sides of the political aisle quickly responded by adopting the Cor-
porate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency
Act of 2002, often referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.5 The Act
created an independent board to oversee the accounting industry,
amended securities laws to require greater corporate responsibility,
enhanced corporate financial disclosure requirements, and increased
penalties for accounting fraud.6
Even from a Congress not known to be bashful about tough talk,
public comments were especially vitriolic. Senator Chris Dodd, for ex-
ample, reacted to the WorldCom accounting scandal stating, "[t]his
wasn't just cooking the books, this was marinating, sauteing, and gar-
nishing."7 As he conducted hearings on the WorldCom accounting
scandals, Representative Michael Oxley, Chair of the House Financial
Services Committee, contrasted the evils of greedy corporate execu-
tives with the ideals of heroes of the American Revolution and the war
on terrorism. The latter placed heroic virtues "above self-interest and
ron managing director and aide to former Enron Chief Executive Officer, Andrew
Fastow, pleaded guilty to money laundering and fraud charges. The First Dom-
ino at Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at A22. Prosecutors subsequently
charged Andrew Fastow, Enron's former CEO, with fraud, money laundering, in-
sider trading, and conspiracy charges as well. Alexei Barrionuevo, Enron's Fas-
tow Charged With Fraud, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2002, at A3. Fastow recently pled
guilty to two counts of conspiracy to commit fraud under an agreement providing
for a minimum 10-year prison sentence. Kurt Eichenwald, Couple Set to Plead
Guilty in Enron Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at Cl; Fastow Pleads Guilty,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 2004, at E2. In connection with the WorldCom scandal,
prosecutors have indicted former chief financial officer, Scott D. Sullivan, and
other high level executives. Carrie Johnson & Jonathan Krim, Ex-Finance Chief
Colleague Indicted, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2002, at Al (reporting indictment of
Sullivan along with Buford Yates, Jr., former director of general accounting).
Yates has since pleaded guilty. Robert F. Worth, Ex-Official of WorldCom Pleads
Guilty to Fraud, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2002, at C9. WorldCom former comptroller,
David Myers pled guilty to similar charges. Andrew Backover & Christine Du-
gas, WorldCom Plea Could Help Feds' Case, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2002, at B1.
Two additional WorldCom executives have since plead guilty as well. Carrie
Johnson, More Guilty Pleas from WorldCom Managers, WASH. POST, Oct. 11,
2002, at El (reporting pleas from Betty L. Vinson, former director of manage-
ment reporting, and Troy M. Normand, former director of legal entity
accounting).
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
6. Sarbanes-Oxley Act. § 101-109 ("Public Company Accounting Oversight Board");
§ 301-308 ("Corporate Responsibility"); §§ 401-409 ("Enhanced Financial Dis-
closures"); §§ 801-807 ("Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability"); §§ 901-
906 ("White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements"); § 1101-1107 ("Corporate
Fraud and Accountability").
7. Jonathan Karl, Cooking the Books Is an Old Recipe for Uncle Sam, WALL ST. J.,
July 22, 2002, at A14 (quoting Senator Dodd).
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beyond the temptations of affluence, protecting others instead of
themselves. Unfortunately, we must return to the people's House to-
day to investigate a stark and outrageous contrast to those ideals, and
yet another example of the decline of ethics in American culture dur-
ing the 1990's."8 Responding to the Enron scandal, Representative
W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, House Energy and Commerce Committee Chair,
commented that "[w]e have witnessed an incredible collection of not
only miscreants and potential criminal behavior, but a series of ac-
counting abuses ... of the American public."9
Yet, as some journalists and commentators were quick to point out,
Congress itself has been guilty of using accounting devices remarka-
bly similar to those used by Enron, WorldCom and others to "cook the
books" and to mislead the public with regard to government fi-
nances.l 0 Comparisons of federal and private accounting standards
are nothing new. As early as 1985, for example, Reagan Budget Direc-
tor David Stockman, said that "[wie have increasingly resorted to
squaring the circle through accounting gimmicks, evasions, half-
truths and downright dishonesty in our budget numbers . . . If the
SEC had jurisdiction over the executive branches, many of us would
be in jail."11
Private corporations, at least, bear the ultimate risk of bankruptcy
in cases of extreme accounting shenanigans. This risk presumably
provides some, however modest, check on corporate accounting gim-
micks. The United States government, on the other hand, cannot go
8. Wrong Numbers: The Accounting Problems at WorldCom: Hearings on H.R. 3763
Before the House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 154 (2002) (prepared
opening statement of Committee Chair, Rep. Michael Oxley).
9. John Maggs, Simply Shameless, NAT'L J., Sept. 28, 2002, at 2777 (quoting Repre-
sentative Tauzin). In a similar vein, Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle
asked, "[w]ho's watching out for the stockholders, and who's watching out for the
taxpayers?" Id.
10. See, e.g., Martin Sullivan, Now It's Time for Congress to Reform Its Own Account-
ing, TAX NOTES, July 29, 2002, at 629; Karl, supra note 7; Maggs, supra note 9;
Tom Raum, Enron, Government Accounting Similar in Some Ways; 'Weird Eco-
nomics': Relying on Overly Optimistic Projections Proves Faulty, TELEGRAPH HER-
ALD, Feb. 3, 2002; Tom Schatz, Congress Worse than Enron, SCRIPPS HOWARD
NEWS SERVICE, July 10, 2002; Lance Gay, Wanna See Shady Accounting Prac-
tices? Look at Congress, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 12, 2002.
11. Karl, supra note 7. The General Accounting Office (GAO), which regularly re-
ports on federal agency compliance with financial management systems and ac-
counting standard requirements pursuant to the FEDERAL FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996), has identified serious weaknesses and shortcomings. The GAO notes that
"[w]hile much more severe at some agencies than others, the nature and serious-
ness of the problems indicate that, generally, agency management does not yet
have the full range of information needed for accountability, performance report-
ing, and decision making." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO-03-
31, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: FFMIA IMPLEMENTATION NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE
ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter FFMIA REPORT].
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bankrupt. As a result, temptations for the government to engage in
creative accounting may be even greater than those in the private
sector.
Many budget commentators have complained about congressional
gimmicks used to misstate or misrepresent the true state of the fed-
eral budget. To my knowledge, however, none of them has made an
effort to compare the gimmicks used by Congress with those used by
private-sector firms. One of the questions raised in this Article is the
extent to which mere "gimmicks" in the hands of federal budget-mak-
ers might be considered accounting, tax, or securities fraud in the
hands of the private sector. Further, if the gimmicks would be so con-
sidered, is the double standard justified? This question takes on ad-
ded importance as Congress now seeks to hold the private sector to
higher standards through recent corporate accountability legislation
and as Congress considers proposals for budget reform.
The subject of federal accounting is complex and nuanced, requir-
ing an understanding of distinctions between financial and budget ac-
counting. Congress does, for example, require most federal agencies
to comply with specified financial accounting standards. 12 This type
of accounting for financial activities generally is a backward-looking
process in which the agency reports its spending and receipts over a
period of time, usually the preceding year. Congress also receives and
disperses funds for its operations, and financially accounts for its use
of federal funds. In contrast to federal agencies, however, Congress
does not hold itself to particular accounting standards for purposes of
these accounts. 13
For purposes of this Article, the primary focus is not on congres-
sional financial accounting for its day-to-day operations, but instead
on congressional budgeting.14 In contrast to financial accounting,
budget accounting is a forward-looking process in which entities make
plans regarding future receipts and expenditures. In the private sec-
tor, budget documents generally are internal and not subject to state
and federal public disclosure rules otherwise applicable to accounting
and tax documents. Government budget documents, on the other
hand, are matters of public legislative record.
Recent private sector accounting scandals involved backward-look-
ing financial accounting, whereas the congressional scandals on which
this Article focuses involve forward-looking budget accounting. One
might be tempted to object that this is effectively comparing apples to
oranges. Not so. For one thing, modern budgeting and accounting
12. See discussion infra notes 88-112 and accompanying text.
13. See discussion infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
14. While federal agencies also prepare budget reports, the focus of this Article is on
congressional, as opposed to agency, budgeting. For a brief discussion of agency
budgets, see infra notes 113-124 and accompanying text.
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have become increasingly intertwined. Some uniformity of accounting
practice is essential if one is to adequately assess and compare after-
the-fact economic performance with before-the-fact planning and pro-
jections. In fact, as budget expert Allen Schick notes, "[an increasing
number of state and local governments present their budgets on the
basis of generally accepted accounting principles, as do a number of
national governments. The United States government has not yet
moved in this direction, but under the impetus of recent financial
management reforms, it may do so."15 If budget information is to be
usefully compared with actual performance, budget and financial doc-
uments should speak the same language. One illustration of the po-
tential "disconnect" is the difficulty of comparing federal agency
accounts to the federal budget given that the agencies use one method
of accounting, while Congress uses another for purposes of federal
budgeting.
Let me stress here that I have no political agenda. For some, Con-
gress bashing has become an art, and many attacks on congressional
handling of tax and budget matters are undertaken in a highly
charged partisan atmosphere. I wish to distance myself from that en-
vironment. As in my prior writings, my concern is with what I label
the "democracy-oriented goals of the budget process," which include
enforceability, accountability, transparency, openness, and
durability.16
That Congress has adopted accounting standards applicable to
others but not to itself may not be overly surprising. After all, Con-
gress sometimes does make laws for others that it does not apply to
itself. Part II of this Article explores the extent to which Congress
might legitimately apply a double standard, using different account-
ing rules for itself in connection with the federal budget than those
applicable to the private sector in connection with financial account-
ing. Part III considers differences between financial and budget ac-
counting and provides analysis and comparison of accounting
standards applicable to the private sector, government agencies, and
to Congress itself.
Part IV contains the heart of the argument, comparing several ma-
jor congressional accounting gimmicks with those used in private-sec-
tor accounting. In addition, Part IV considers congressional
accounting gimmicks unavailable to the private sector. Among the
most egregious congressional tricks is directed-scorekeeping, a device
through which Congress simply ignores budget and revenue estimates
that it does not like.17 Using a big budget eraser, Congress uses di-
15. ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 261 (2000).
16. Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative
Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 900-904 (2002) [hereinafter Block, Pathologies].
17. See discussion infra notes 421-451 and accompanying text.
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rected-scorekeeping to sweep problems under the congressional bal-
ance sheet; it simply makes problems disappear with a wave of the
congressional magic wand. This is one area in which Congress out-
does the private sector, which has no such magic wand at its disposal.
In recent years, for example, Congress has avoided mandatory seques-
ter provisions that would otherwise have been triggered by violations
of budget procedures, simply declaring that the mandatory sequester
amounts should be set to zero.18 Democracy-oriented budget princi-
ples demand a careful examination of directed-scorekeeping.
Less obvious gimmicks can also have profound effects. For exam-
ple, Congress uses cash method accounting for purposes of the federal
budget even though generally accepted accounting practice calls for
use of the accrual method.19 The cash method takes only immediate
expenses into account and does not account for future expenses. Some
have argued that the disastrous savings and loan crisis of the 1980s
was exacerbated by cash-based budgeting under which costs were not
taken into account until banks had already failed and closed. 20
Most of the federal budget accounting gimmicks described in this
Article have been reported elsewhere. Many commentators, both in-
side and outside of Congress, have advocated changes and budget re-
forms addressing some of the federal budget accounting devices
highlighted and critiqued in this Article. On the other hand, I was
unable to find any comprehensive survey or analysis in the legal liter-
ature of particular federal budget accounting devices that distort the
true economic picture and mislead the public and policymakers alike.
One of the initial goals of this Article is to fill this gap by providing a
comprehensive survey of federal budget accounting gimmicks. Many
of these techniques closely parallel the corporate accounting gimmicks
of which Congress has been so critical.
At the present time, Congress is operating without many of its for-
mer budget process rules, which expired at the end of 2002.21 Con-
gress now must decide whether to extend previous budget discipline
procedures or to engage in more substantial budget reform. As it con-
siders such reform, Congress should be mindful of the recent account-
ing scandals in the private sector and of its recent legislative efforts to
combat such scandals. Congress itself can learn many lessons from
this recent history. While laudable, major overhauls of the budget
system and budget accounting procedures are not essential. As will be
18. These budget procedures are briefly considered at infra notes 132-135 and accom-
panying text. For a fuller analysis, see Block, Pathologies, supra note 16, at 882-
88.
19. See discussion infra notes 178-265 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the budget's contribution to the savings and loan crisis, see
infra notes 201-212 and accompanying text.
21. See discussion infra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 82:365
2003] CONGRESS AND ACCOUNTING SCANDALS 373
discussed throughout this Article, improvements through incremental
reform may be the appropriate first step towards future considera-
tions of broader reform.
II. Congressional Compliance with Its Own Laws
A. Historical Bacground
One major tenet of United States constitutional history is that the
laws made by Congress should be binding on everyone, including
members of the legislative branch themselves. Members of Congress
should not be above the law. Article I of the United States Constitu-
tion provides members of Congress with only two basic privileges: 1)
freedom from arrest, with the exception of treason, felony, or breach of
the peace cases; and 2) immunity from questioning about any speech
or debate in the House or Senate. 22 Thomas Jefferson contrasted
these two narrow privileges to the large number of privileges available
to British Parliament members. He speculated that the United States
framers' rationale for so dramatically limiting member privileges was
to "provide that the laws shall bind equally on all, and especially that
those who make them shall not exempt themselves from their
operation."23
Framers of the United States Constitution were especially con-
cerned that legislators might seek their own aggrandizement at the
expense of the masses. A requirement that the laws should bind
equally on all was among the structural checks designed by the Fram-
ers to prevent such degenerate oppressive measures. Thus, Federalist
Paper 57 observes that representatives
can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves and their
friends, as well as on the great mass of society. This has always been deemed
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 ("The Senators and Representatives ... shall in all
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they
shall not be questioned in any other Place."). The last part of clause 1 is gener-
ally referred to as the "Speech and Debate" clause. Although the constitutional
privilege itself is narrow, the Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of the
privilege rather broadly, noting that "throughout United States history, the privi-
lege has been recognized as an important protection of the independence and in-
tegrity of the legislature." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
Citing Madison's FEDERALIST 48 concerning the need for the practical security of
one branch against invasions from another, the Court in Johnson observed that
"[t]he legislative privilege, protecting against possible prosecution by an un-
friendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary, is one manifestation of
the 'practical security' for ensuring the independence of the legislature." Id. at
179 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1937).
23. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANuAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, reprinted in Consti-
tution, Jefferson's Manual and Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S.,
106th Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 106-320, at 121, 125 (2001) (emphasis added).
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one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and
the people together. It creates between them that communion of interests and
sympathy of sentiments, of which few governments have furnished examples;
but without which every government degenerates into tyranny.2 4
If the laws are to bind everyone, this constitutional legacy suggests
that Congress generally should not exempt itself from its laws.
While recognizing that the laws generally should be equally bind-
ing on all, the Framers also understood that "power is of an encroach-
ing nature, and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing
the limits assigned to it."25 Each of the three branches of government
is separate, but checks and balances were thought necessary to pro-
vide "some practical security for each, against the invasion of the
others."2 6 In order to preserve its independence and autonomy, the
legislative branch should be free of invasive actions of the other
branches. What emerges here is a tension between two conflicting
values. On the one hand, fear of individual legislator aggrandizement
at the expense of the people makes it important that the "laws shall
bind equally on all."27 On the other hand, independence and auton-
omy of the legislative branch is necessary to avoid encroachments by
other departments of government. From time to time, it may be nec-
essary for Congress to exempt itself from-some of the laws imposed on
others in order to preserve its independence and autonomy as a
branch of government.
Not surprisingly, Congress does impose numerous rules upon the
public and the executive branch that it does not impose upon itself. In
each case, an appropriate question is the extent to which such con-
gressional exemption can be justified by legislative branch needs for
independence and autonomy or other legitimate reasons. Until re-
cently, one of the most notorious of these congressional exemptions
related to employment and the workforce. Prior to the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995 (CAA),28 Congress exempted itself from
federal anti-discrimination and other workforce protection laws.
When Republicans took over control of the House in 1995, their first
legislative act was passage of the CAA.29 Quoting extensively from
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 373 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Edward
Mead Earle ed. 1937) (emphasis added).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 321 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed. 1937).
26. Id. (emphasis added)
27. JEFFERSON, supra note 23.
28. Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995) (codified as amended, at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-
1438).
29. The Act extends coverage of eleven federal workplace laws to Congress. These
include: The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, The Occu-
pational Health and Safety Act of 1970, Chapter 71 of Title 5 (relating to Federal
service labor-management relations), The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of
[Vol. 82:365
2003] CONGRESS AND ACCOUNTING SCANDALS 375
Federalist 57, Senator Grassley touted his own leadership in author-
ing the CAA and bringing this great congressional accomplishment to
reality. He boasted:
I hold a strong belief that we, in Congress, are merely representatives of
the people. We are not better than the people we represent and we are not, by
definition and determination, different from the people we represent. We are,
as representative government intends, the people themselves.
It is simply not fair, or good governance, for the Congress of the United
States to enact laws for the American people, while exempting itself from com-
pliance ... This is a democracy, and therefore, we make laws for the people,
and we, too, must follow these laws.3 0
Whether or not Congress should comply with its own laws is a com-
plex question, raising both constitutional and political issues. The
first major constitutional issue involves separation of powers. Laws
made applicable to Congress would be enforced against Congress by
the executive branch and reviewed by the judicial branch, arguably
involving an inappropriate exercise of power by the latter two
branches over the legislative branch.3 1 The second major constitu-
tional concern is that enforcement of federal laws against Congress
might unconstitutionally question immunized activity under the
speech and debate clause. 32
Demanding that Congress comply with its own laws also raises po-
litical issues. One dominant concern is that Congress might be espe-
1988, The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, The Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, and Chapter 43 of Title 38 (relating to veterans' employment
and reemployment). 2 U.S.C. §1302(a)(1)-(11) (1995).
30. Senator Charles Grassley & Jennifer Shaw Schmidt, Practicing What We Preach:
A Legislative History of Congressional Accountability, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 33,
34-35 (1998).
31. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Congressional Accountability and Denial: Speech or
Debate Clause and Conflict of Interest Challenges to Unionization of Congres-
sional Employees, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 6 (1999) ("Congressional reluctance to
extend existing laws as written reflected in part a concern that Executive Branch
enforcement and judicial review raised serious separation of powers issues."); see
also Christina L. Deneka, Note, Congressional Anti-Accountability and the Sepa-
ration of Powers: A Survey of the Congressional Accountability Act's Problems, 52
RUTGERS L. REV. 855, 860-70 (2000) (comparing functional and formalist separa-
tion of powers approaches to the CAA). In part, Congress addressed these sepa-
ration of powers concerns by creating a quasi-independent agency for purposes of
enforcing violations of workplace laws against Congress, 2 U.S.C. § 1381 (1996)
(establishing the Federal Office of Compliance), and by enacting special rules for
administrative and judicial disputes, 2 U.S.C. §§1401-1416 (1997).
32. See Brudney, supra note 31, at 21-56 (Section II: The CAA and Speech or Debate
Clause Immunity). A partial response to the speech and debate clause concern in
the CAA is that the respondent to a complaint and the defendant in a civil action
is the employing office rather than the individual member. 2 U.S.C. §§1405(a),
1408(b) (1997). Thus, individual members are not liable under the CAA. A more
detailed discussion of the particular constitutional issues raised by the speech
and debate clause as applied to the CAA is beyond the scope of this Article.
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cially vulnerable to politically motivated accusations.3 3 After all, the
executive branch is charged with enforcement or execution of the law.
Particularly in a split government where the President is from one
party and Congress is controlled by the other, the executive branch
might be inclined to overly enforce laws against an opposition Con-
gress. In addition, some have expressed concern that forcing congres-
sional compliance with public laws might unduly divert members'
attention away from public duties.34
In the end, deciding whether or not a particular species of laws
should apply to Congress may not be as simple as it first appears.
Constitutional constraints may prohibit the application of certain
laws to Congress. At the same time, political concerns may require an
assessment of costs and benefits to determine the extent to which Con-
gress should apply statutory rules to itself.
B. A Cost-Benefit Approach to Congressional Compliance
Determinations
1. General Framework
Legal literature addressing congressional compliance with its own
statutes is quite sparse. To date, most of the literature considers the
extent to which individual members of Congress may be held person-
ally liable for misconduct, focusing particularly on congressional com-
pliance with federal laws regulating the workplace and employees. 35
Most of these articles were written between 1995 and 2000 in re-
sponse to the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995.36
The leading article on congressional compliance was written by
Professor Harold Bruff in 1995.37 Professor Bruff developed both a
series of cost-benefit considerations and a constitutional typology to
assist in deciding when Congress should exempt itself from applica-
tion of its own laws. As with the other articles from this period,
Bruffs article largely focused on employment-related issues. Never-
33. See, e.g, Grassley & Schmidt, supra note 30, at 36.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 31; Deneka, supra note 31; Grassley & Schmidt,
supra note 30; James T. O'Reilly, Collision in the Congress: Congressional Ac-
countability, Workplace Conflict, and the Separation of Powers, 5 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1 (1996).
36. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. For considerations of the impact
of the CAA, see Brudney, supra note 31; Deneka, supra note 31; Grassley &
Schmidt, supra note 30; O'Reilly, supra note 35.
37. Harold H. Bruff, That the Laws Shall Bind Equally on All: Congressional and
Executive Roles in Applying Laws to Congress, 48 ARK. L. REV. 105 (1995). Un-
like many others, Professor Bruffs article does not focus on the Congressional
Accountability Act, which passed just as his article went to press. Instead, Pro-
fessor Bruff focuses on the larger picture, considering when Congress should or
should not exempt itself from the burdens of its statutes.
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theless, the analysis he adopts is useful in considering the wisdom of
applying other types of statutory rules to the Congress itself. The sec-
tions in this Part that follow a brief description of Professor Bruffs
general approach to congressional compliance issues will apply that
approach to congressional budget and accounting rules.
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Congressional Compliance
Early in our constitutional history, legislators tended to return to
private life after a reasonably brief term of public service. In this cli-
mate, there may have been less concern that members be subject to
the laws they enacted. After all, they would be subject to the laws
soon enough upon their return to private life. Constitutional framers
initially reasoned that representatives naturally would be discouraged
from imposing inappropriate or unnecessary burdens on the public,
because their return to private life would necessarily require them to
live under the same burdens.
Today's legislators are much more likely to be career politicians
serving for long periods of time in Congress. 38 Since those career
members are no longer as likely to personally experience the burdens
of their statutory demands, it is now more important that they experi-
ence those burdens during their tenure as members of Congress.
Thus, one advantage of congressional compliance is ensuring that
members live personally with and feel the impact of the laws they pro-
mulgate. If Congress is forced to "feel the force" of its laws, it will be
in a better position to understand and appreciate them directly.3 9
A related advantage of congressional compliance is that it pro-
motes higher levels of public confidence and morale. Surely, voters
will have more confidence in a legislature that must live within the
parameters of its laws than a legislature that exempts itself from such
laws. In addition, congressional compliance may increase morale of
executive branch officials and employees. Congress often imposes
statutory constraints and burdens, such as conflict of interest and dis-
closure requirements, on those in public service in the executive
branch. Failure to impose the same rules upon Congress itself may
create "resentment and diminished moral imperative to comply."4o If
statutory rules do not apply to Congress, for example, the courts as a
substitute might seek to create implied rights of action and to "at-
38. One indication of this trend is reflected in the increasing number of representa-
tives with over ten years seniority. From 1983 through 2001, for example, the
number of House members with more than ten years seniority increased from 127
to 235 and the number of Senators with such seniority increased from 34 to 53.
This data was derived from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 2002, ELECTIONS 247, tbl.382 (2002).
39. See Bruff, supra note 37, at 117.
40. Id. at 118-19.
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tempt correctives, including unwise ones."4 1 An advantage of apply-
ing otherwise inapplicable statutory provisions to Congress might be
to diminish this pressure.
If laws already apply to Congress, the executive and judicial
branches have little incentive to creatively impose similar rules and
correctives in unusual ways. This advantage, however, should be
carefully balanced against separation of powers concerns and the pos-
sibility that when laws do apply to Congress, enforcement by the exec-
utive branch will be politically motivated. Overzealous executive
officials or private parties might use litigation against Congress for
inappropriate political reasons.42
In addition to this separation of powers balance, advantages of con-
gressional compliance more generally must be balanced against vari-
ous disadvantages. One concern is that required compliance would
take significant time and effort away from important constitutional
and public duties.43 Another concern is that applications of laws to
Congress might cause it to forfeit some of its independence and to in-
stead develop an "unhealthy overcautiousness . . . due to overdeter-
rence."44 A final disadvantage of congressional compliance is that the
statute may be a "[1] egal [m]isfit;" the details of the statute written for
the general public may not be well-suited to the unique institution of
Congress.45
3. Classification of Congressional Actions
For purposes of analyzing the propriety of requiring Congress to
comply with otherwise private federal law, congressional activity can
be broken into three distinct functions: 1) constitutional; 2) quasi-con-
stitutional; and 3) proprietary.46 Core constitutional functions in-
clude those specifically and exclusively delegated to the legislative
branch. Most important among these, of course, is the legislative
41. Id. at 118.
42. See, e.g., Grassley & Schmidt, supra note 30, at 36 ("Members of Congress are
particularly vulnerable to baseless accusations for political purposes and ... ca-
reers can be hurt and even ended based on ill-timed charges."); Bruff, supra note
37, at 120 ("If Congress subjects itself to enforcement activities of the other
branches, an opportunity arises for one or both of them to harass members of
Congress in retribution for their unrelated conduct of office.").
43. See, e,g, Grassley & Schmidt, supra note 30, at 36 ("involvement in litigation and
other dispute resolution proceedings that might result from such liability would
detract from the time [members] had to spend on their public duties"); Bruff,
supra note 37, at 119 (discussing disadvantage of "[ilmpeding [plerformance of
[c]onstitutional [flunctions").
44. Bruff, supra note 37, at 120.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 120-23.
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power. 47 Also included in the constitutional category is punishing
members for misconduct in the course of legislative and related consti-
tutional activities. Quasi-constitutional functions include investiga-
tive activities, some of which occur through formal committee and
subcommittee hearings and others through more informal actions of
members and staff.48 Proprietary functions include housekeeping ac-
tivities, such as hiring and supervising employees, purchasing sup-
plies, and operating parking and cafeteria facilities.49 Such
proprietary activities are similar to those of private industry.
Rather than view constitutional, quasi-constitutional, and proprie-
tary functions as entirely distinct, however, it may be more useful to
think of a continuum, with constitutional activities at one end and
proprietary functions of Congress at the other. Bruff argues that
those "congressional functions nearest the constitutional core must be
policed by Congress itself, and ... activities far from that core may or
must be policed by the executive."50 Members engaged in core consti-
tutional functions are fully protected by the speech and debate clause.
In such cases, Congress generally should be free to adopt its own rules
and to exempt itself from statutes applicable to others. Such indepen-
dence is essential as a "practical security" to assure autonomy of the
legislative branch.51 Further removed from the constitutional core,
Congress still has some need for independence and autonomy, al-
though perhaps not as significant as in the case of the purely constitu-
tional functions.
Workplace and employment issues fall into the proprietary cate-
gory at the .other end of the continuum. "When Congress performs its
housekeeping functions of employment, police, and general services, it
resembles the other two federal branches of state governments and
private businesses."52 As a matter of fairness and in keeping with
cost-benefit analysis, Congress should not be exempted from adhering
to its own rules when it is engaged in proprietary activities. At the
same time, however, there may be constitutional separation of powers
issues regarding executive branch enforcement of congressional pro-
prietary functions.
At the end of the day, issues of congressional compliance arguably
have less to do with whether statutes should apply to Congress than
how they should apply.5 3 In general, Congress should not exempt it-
self from its statutes. The question is how to provide for compliance
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States").
48. Bruff, supra note 37, at 122.
49. Id. at 123.
50. Id. at 120-21.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 25.
52. Bruff, supra note 37, at 140.
53. Bruff, supra note 37, at 114.
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without creating constitutional separation of powers concerns. In
other words, the key concern is with giving enforcement authority to
the executive branch. In many cases, the answer may be to require
congressional compliance, but to avoid entanglement of the executive
branch by providing for enforcement through an independent regula-
tory commission.54
4. Cost-Benefit Approach to Compliance: Congressional
Budgeting and Accounting
To assess the extent to which Congress should apply its executive
branch accounting requirements to itself, one should first determine
where federal budgeting and accounting fall on the continuum from
core constitutional to proprietary functions. Federal budgeting surely
is not a proprietary activity at the private-resemblance end of the con-
tinuum. At the same time, it probably does not fall within the consti-
tutional category at the other end. As budget observer Allan Schick
notes:
The Constitution grants Congress the power to levy taxes and provides that
money may be spent only pursuant to appropriations made by law. It does not
specify how those powers are to be exercised, nor does it provide for a federal
budget.... In fact, the practice of budgeting was unknown when the Constitu-
tion was written.
5 5
Federal budgeting, then, arguably fits within the quasi-constitu-
tional category. Given this placement, the distinct nature of the con-
gressional enterprise should be recognized and respected. At the
same time, since the function is not at the constitutional core, we
should expect a higher degree of congressional compliance with the
standards Congress imposes on other entities.
The general advantages of congressional compliance discussed
above apply equally well, or perhaps even with greater force, in the
accounting context. Many legislators hold office for long periods of
time and do not personally experience the burdens imposed by their
statutory pronouncements. Having to live with their strict accounting
standards may cause members to think more carefully before impos-
ing overly burdensome regulations upon others.56 Moreover, mem-
bers of Congress will better understand the general strengths and
weaknesses of accounting rules that they are forced to live with
themselves.
Indeed, the case for congressional compliance with regard to
budget and accounting rules may be even stronger than it is for work-
54. The Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (1995), for
example, established an independent commission for purposes of enforcing work-
place and employment laws against Congress.
55. SCHICK, supra note 15, at 9-10 (emphasis added).
56. See discussion supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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place and employment rules. After all, accounting and budget rules
are designed to increase reliability, transparency, and accountability.
Financial investors are entitled to accurate accounting information
with respect to private sector companies in which they invest. Since
budget legislation determines overall amounts of government spend-
ing and receipts, the constituency of interested parties in budget legis-
lation includes not just investors, but all citizens. Moreover, given the
need for reliable and accurate empirical economic information neces-
sary for wise budget legislation, increased reliability and trans-
parency serves as a benefit to Congress itself. Assuming that
accounting rules are well designed to serve the goals of reliability,
transparency, and accountability, such rules should, a fortiori, apply
to Congress.
Another advantage to congressional compliance is the diminishing
pressure on the executive and judicial branches to overreach. When
Congress exempts itself from rules imposed on others, the other
branches might feel compelled to correct the legislative void in indi-
rect and inappropriate ways. 57 Congressional compliance would serve
prophylactically to avoid such potential overreaching. Given the ex-
isting tensions with the executive branch over budgeting, this benefit
may well carry more weight in the budget and accounting context
than in the workplace and employment setting.
With regard to costs, forcing congressional compliance with ac-
counting rules would not seem to take too much time away from other
public duties. After all, Congress must prepare a budget. If anything,
more rigid accounting requirements might eliminate certain time-con-
suming game playing with gimmicks and ultimately lead to a more
efficient process. To be sure, one must be concerned about
overzealousness on the part of the executive branch if it is given en-
forcement authority over Congress. Moreover, giving such enforce-
ment powers to the executive branch might violate constitutional
separation of powers requirements. A solution to this dilemma, how-
ever, would be the use of an independent agency to assure congres-
sional compliance with accounting standards.
A final concern is the question of "fit." If federal budgeting and
accounting is significantly different from public company, executive
department, or agency budgeting and accounting, then Congress
might well claim exemption from rules applicable to these other enti-
ties. To be sure, there will be some budgeting and accounting issues
that are unique to Congress. Perhaps Congress cannot simply extend
all public company or executive branch accounting and management
requirements to itself. Nevertheless, it should be possible to develop
57. See discussion supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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specialized rules for Congress based upon the same underlying princi-
ples that drive private accounting standards.
III. Accounting Rules
A. Introduction
1. Financial v. Budget Accounting
When most of us think of accounting rules we tend to think of the
financial accounting standards used by publicly-held companies to
prepare their financial statements. In general, such financial docu-
ments are prepared for the use of shareholders and other outside par-
ties concerned with the financial health of the business. One might
refer to these financial statements as external. Annual business en-
tity reports generally include three major financial statements. First,
the balance sheet provides a single snapshot of assets and liabilities at
a fixed moment in time, generally the close of the reporting year. Sec-
ond, the income statement reflects receipts and expenses from busi-
ness operations over the reporting year, resulting in a report of net
profit or loss. Finally, as its name suggests, the statement of cash
flows shows inflow and outflow of cash and cash-equivalent assets
over the reporting period. Outflows include expenses for operating ac-
tivities, interest on debt, and expenses for capital projects. 58 These
financial reports are all backward-looking assessments of an earlier
economic period in the life of the business entity.59
In the private sector, the forward-looking counterpart to financial
accounting is management accounting, which uses economic informa-
tion from the past in order to make business decisions for the future.
Unlike financial accounting information, which is subject to extensive
regulation and disclosure requirements, management accounting is
for internal use only. Standards for internal management accounting
are not generally regulated and "accounting information is generated
for internal use in whatever form, and in whatever quantity, is most
appropriate for the business."60 Moreover, private sector budget docu-
ments generally are not available to the investing public.
That said, however, private sector companies that use formal budg-
ets do tend to use generally accepted accounting principles in budget
preparation. Although they may not be required to do so, private com-
58. For a detailed discussion of the history and purposes of financial statements, see
DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS, 1-138 (3d
ed. 2001).
59. CATHERINE GOWTHORPE, BUSINESS & ACCOUNTING FINANCE FOR NON-SPECIALISTS,
398 (2003) ("Conventional financial statements report events in the past; they do
not tend to look forward into the future, and rarely contain any element of fore-
cast information.")
60. Id. at 399.
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panies also generally choose to use GAAP for budget purposes. This is
perfectly sensible. After all, beyond establishing business objectives,
one major function of a budget is to serve as a performance assess-
ment tool. Management compares budget projections with financial
statements to determine the extent to which business goals have been
met. Budget makers use economic information from past financial
statements to establish future business objectives. In order for a per-
formance assessment to have much meaning, financial and budget
documents ideally should use the same accounting principles.
Federal budget accounting is the public analogue to private man-
agement accounting. Like management accounting, federal budget
accounting is forward-looking. The federal budget reflects public pol-
icy goals and objectives and decisions about future spending and re-
ceipts. Yet, Congress has no consistent set of accounting standards for
purposes of preparing the federal budget. 6 1 If the public is to be in a
position to assess the success or failure of federal budget goals, it must
be able to compare the financial data from agencies with data in the
budget. Congress should not only adopt specific budget accounting
standards, but those standards should be consistent with the financial
accounting standards imposed upon federal agencies.
2. Need for Financial Accounting Standards
There is no single set of rules that can necessarily claim to be the
correct, or even the best way to account for the disclosure of financial
information about companies and their transactions. At the same
time, parties to economic transactions need to be able to rely upon
financial statements and be in a position to compare the statements of
one enterprise to another. Over time, the accounting profession has
agreed upon accounting conventions to assure that parties to financial
transactions generally speak the same language. These conventions
are referred to as "generally accepted accounting principles" (GAAP).
Despite this agreement on general conventions, "[flinancial account-
ing is not a science. It addresses many questions as to which the an-
swers are uncertain and is a 'process [that] involves continuous
judgments and estimates."' 6 2
Virtually all public accountants now use GAAP rules, most of
which are promulgated by the Federal Accounting Standards Board
(FASB).63 For companies regulated by the Securities and Exchange
61. See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
62. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995) (quoting R. KAY AND
D. SEARFOSS, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AuDITING, ch. 5, at 7-8 (2d ed.
1989)).
63. A detailed discussion of the history of the FASB and the development of GAAP
appears infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
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Commission (SEC), GAAP rules are mandatory. 64 Moreover, the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountant's (AICPA) Code of
Professional Conduct states that: "A member shall not ... express an
opinion or state affirmatively that the financial statements or other
financial data of any entity are presented in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles ... if such statements or data contain
any departure from an accounting principle promulgated by bodies
designated by the Council to establish such principles."6 5 Thus, certi-
fied public accountants (CPAs) are obliged to use GAAP under rules of
professional conduct, even for businesses not subject to SEC jurisdic-
tion. In any event, small private entities not subject to SEC jurisdic-
tion often will find that they must prepare financial statements in
accordance with GAAP in order to be eligible for bank loans or other
business programs.
B. Accounting Rules Applicable to Public and Private
Companies
1. Historical Development of Financial Accounting Standards
Accounting standards in the United States have been largely es-
tablished by a private standard-setter. 66 From 1939 until 1973, the
AICPA developed accounting principles for the private sector through
its own internal committees. 6 7 In 1972, an AICPA committee chaired
64. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. SEC rules and interpretive re-
leases supersede GAAP and FASB rules. In general, however, the SEC relies on
principles developed by FASB and rarely promulgates its own specific accounting
rules. See discussion infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
65. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 203-1. (American Inst. of Certified Public
Accountants 1988). For purposes of Rule 203, the AICPA "has designated the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as such a body and has resolved
that FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Standards, together with those
Accounting Research Bulletins and APB Opinions which are not superseded by
action of the FASB constitute [such] accounting principles." CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, ET 203.03 (American Inst. of Certified Public Accounts 1993).
For further discussion of the FASB, see infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
66. For a general critique of current accounting practices and an analysis of how pri-
vate standard-setting contributed to recent accounting scandals, see George
Mundstock, The Trouble With FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 813 (2003).
67. The AICPA created the Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) and the Com-
mittee on Accounting Terminology (CAT) in 1939 to develop formal accounting
principles. These early principles appeared in the form of Accounting Research
Bulletins (ARBs). In 1959, the AICPA replaced these committees with the Ac-
counting Principles Board (APB), which issued accounting pronouncements in
the form of APB Opinions. For a good general discussion of the historical devel-
opment of financial accounting principles, see HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note
58, at 152-54; Harold Dubroff, et al., Tax Accounting: The Relationship of Clear
Reflection of Income to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 47 ALB. L. REV.
354, 366-74 (1983); Deborah A. Geier, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a
Tax Value, 15 AM. J. TAx POL'Y 17, 75-84 (1998).
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by former SEC Commissioner Francis M. Wheat recommended that
accounting standards be promulgated by an independent and objective
entity with broad-based public participation.6S Hence, the FASB was
established in 1973, taking over responsibility from the AICPA for de-
veloping standards for financial accounting and reporting. A non-
profit organization, known as the Financial Accounting Foundation
(FAF), selects members of the FASB and its advisory council. Accord-
ing to its mission statement, the FASB "is to establish and improve
standards of financial accounting and reporting for the guidance and
education of the public, including issuers, auditors and users of finan-
cial information."6 9 FASB promulgates both general objectives in the
form of Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFACs) and
more specific Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFASs).
GAAP evolved over time from a variety of sources and now incorpo-
rates an intricate hierarchy for purposes of resolving conflicts among
the various sources of accounting rules.70 This combined hierarchy of
sources effectively creates a sort of accounting "common law." The
highest authority for GAAP rules is given to SFAS pronouncements by
the FASB71 and, if the FASB has not spoken on the issue, to the pro-
nouncements of its predecessors, including Accounting Research Bul-
letins (ARBs) and Accounting Principles Board Opinions (APBs).72
Next, GAAP rules look to pronouncements from groups of experts that
deliberate in public forums and whose operating rules provide for pub-
lic comment. For example, the AICPA may issue technical bulletins
on subjects not otherwise covered or inadequately addressed by other
sources. Third, GAAP rules include pronouncements from groups in
the second order category that would have been entitled to second-
order authority but for the absence of public comment mechanisms.
The fourth category includes knowledgeable application of generally
accepted pronouncements to specific circumstances 73 as well as recog-
nized and prevalent practices in the accounting industry. Finally,
68. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ESTABLISHING FINAN-
CIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS (1972).
69. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, FASB FACTS 1 (2002), available at
http://www.fasb.org/facts/index.html [hereinafter FASB Facts].
70. The following discussion of the five categories of sources for accounting principles
is based on HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 58, at 168-72.
71. The SFAS "sets forth the actual standards, the effective date and method of tran-
sition, background information, a brief summary of research done on the project
and the basis for the Board's conclusions, including the reasons for rejecting sig-
nificant alternative solutions. It also identifies members of the Board voting for
and against its issuance and includes reasons for any dissents." FASB FACTS,
supra note 69, 6 (2002).
72. See supra note 67.
73. Examples include AICPA accounting interpretations and FASB questions and
answers included in its implementation guides. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra
note 58, at 169.
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GAAP provisions incorporate other accounting literature such as
FASB concept papers and AICPA issue papers.
2. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Authority and
Rules
The Securities Act of 193374 and the Securities and Exchange Act
of 193475 both include reporting and disclosure requirements for busi-
nesses covered by the act.7 6 The SEC itself, established by the 1934
Act,77 has the authority to promulgate accounting rules and standards
for entities subject to its jurisdiction. 78 For example, for purposes of
initial offerings under the 1933 Act, the SEC is empowered to make
regulations as necessary, including regulations governing registration
statements and prospectuses. More specifically, the SEC has author-
ity "to prescribe the form or forms in which required information shall
be set forth . . . and the methods to be followed in the preparation of
accounts."79 The SEC has similar authority to regulate forms of fi-
nancial information and accounting principles for purposes of the 1934
Act.80
Despite this authority to promulgate its own accounting principles,
the SEC usually follows GAAP and generally defers to the private
rule-making of FASB. Under SEC rules, unless financial statements
are prepared in accordance with accounting practices for which there
is substantial authoritative support, they are presumed to be mislead-
ing.8 1 When the FASB was established in 1973, the SEC announced
that "principles, standards, and practices promulgated by the FASB in
its Statements and Interpretations will be considered by the Commis-
sion as having substantial authoritative support, and those contrary
to such FASB promulgations will be considered to have no such sup-
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1934).
76. The SEC's Regulation S-K integrates the disclosure requirements of both Acts,
covering forms and information required for annual, periodic, and continuous re-
porting. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-229.1016 (2003). Regulation S-B integrates an al-
ternative set of reduced disclosure requirements under both statutes for
qualifying small businesses. 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10-228.702 (2003). In general, the
1933 Act covers new issues of stock while the 1934 Act governs day-to-day trans-
actions in stock and the markets in which they occur.
77. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 885 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78d(a)) (1934).
78. Entities subject to SEC jurisdiction include "registrants" seeking to sell stock on
a listed exchange or in the over-the-counter market, and, more generally, any
"issuers" of stock. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) ("The term 'issuer' means any person who
issues or proposes to issue any security.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a).
80. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(1).
81. Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, Accounting Series Release No. 4,
11 Fed. Reg. 10,913 (Apr. 25, 1938).
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port."8 2 Explaining its rationale for deferring to the FASB, the SEC
observed that the FASB would:
provide an institutional framework which will permit prompt and responsible
actions flowing from research and consideration of varying viewpoints. The
collective experience and expertise of the members of the FASB and the indi-
viduals and professional organizations supporting it are substantial. Equally
important, the commitment of resources to the FASB is impressive evidence of
the willingness and intention of the private sector to support the FASB in
accomplishing its task. In view of these considerations, the Commission in-
tends to continue its policy of looking to the private sector for leadership in
establishing and improving accounting principles and standards through the
FASB with the expectation that the body's conclusions will promote the inter-
ests of investors.8 3
Although the SEC recognizes FASB as the authoritative source for
establishing accounting principles, it may decide not to accept the
FASB standard in rare cases.8 4 In addition, GAAP sometimes fails to
explicitly address accounting issues relevant to securities law disclo-
sure requirements. Thus, the SEC has adopted Regulation S-X,85
which focuses on the rare circumstances in which the SEC will not
follow GAAP and on filling in details where "GAAP standards are not
explicit and there is a need for an authoritative source."8 6 In many
such cases, the SEC enacts gap-filling rules, which the FASB later
adopts as its own.8 7
C. Accounting Rules Applicable to the Federal Government
1. Federal Government Financial Accounting
The federal government has its own set of financial accounting
rules. Although these rules tend to adopt generally accepted account-
ing principles, they also recognize and address particular issues
unique to the federal government. Federal accounting rules and stan-
dards have developed incrementally, beginning with the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921, which simply directed the Comptroller Gen-
eral to prescribe forms, systems, and procedures for appropriations
and accounting.SS Amendments to the 1921 budget legislation clari-
82. Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of Accounting Princi-
ples and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150, 39 Fed. Reg. 1260 (Dec.
20, 1973).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Accounting Series Release No. 280, 20 S.E.C. Docket 1356 (Sept. 2, 1980).
85. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01-210.12-29 (2002).
86. Accounting Series Release No. 280, supra note 84.
87. STANLEY SIEGEL & DAVID A. SIEGEL, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE: A
GUIDE TO BAsIc CONCEPTS 7 (1983) ("Often the SEC has acted as a gadfly, propos-
ing or disseminating regulations that were later withdrawn after the accounting
profession developed its own.")
88. Pub. L. No. 67-13, §309, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 31 U.S.C.).
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fled that agency heads should establish accounting procedures to as-
sure full disclosure, provide adequate financial information, and
control accountability for funds.8 9 The Comptroller General was ex-
plicitly directed to prescribe "principles, standards, and related re-
quirements for accounting to be observed by each executive agency."90
In 1949, the Comptroller General, the Treasury Secretary, and the Di-
rector of the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and
Budget), signed an agreement to create a joint program to improve
financial management of the federal government. 9 1 Statutory author-
ity for the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program
(JFMIP) was provided by the 1950 Budget Act. 92 Although standards
were developed pursuant to the 1950 Act, the government did not in-
sist on compliance and the standards were not uniformly used. 93
Beginning in the 1980's, Congress recognized the need to provide
for more effective and efficient management of federal government op-
erations and to provide greater accountability to the public. In re-
sponse to these concerns, Congress first passed the Federal Managers'
Financial Integrity Act of 1982 (FIA)94 to "strengthen internal con-
trols and accounting systems throughout the federal government."95
Pursuant to the 1982 Act, the Comptroller General promulgated its
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.96 Con-
gress subsequently passed the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of
1990,97 which provided for modernization of federal financial manage-
ment systems. This landmark legislation required specified federal
executive agencies to provide annual, audited financial statements 98
89. Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-784, §113(a), 64
Stat. 834, 836 (1950) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3511 (1982)) [hereinaf-
ter 1950 Budget Act].
90. Id. at § 112.
91. JOINT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
JFMIP, at http://www.jfmip.gov/jfmip/HISTORY.HTM (last visited Dec. 20,
2003).
92. 1950 Budget Act, supra note 89, at § 111(f) ("The Comptroller General, the Secre-
tary, and the President shall conduct a continuous program for improving ac-
counting and financial reporting in the Government.")
93. See S. REP. No. 104-339, § 2 (1996).
94. Pub. L. No. 97-255, 96 Stat. 814 (1982) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §3512(c),(d) (1982)).
95. FFMIA REPORT, supra note 11, at 6. The primary concern driving the amend-
ments was "fraud, waste and abuse in government programs and services." H.
REP. No. 97-38, at 2-3 (1982).
96. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Pus. No. GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1, Standards for In-
ternal Control in the Federal Government (Nov. 1999).
97. Pub. L. No. 101-576, 104 Stat. 2838 (1990).
98. 31 U.S.C. §3515 (1982) ("[T]he head of each executive agency identified in section.
901(b) of this title shall prepare and submit to Congress and the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget an audited financial statement for the preced-
ing fiscal year, covering all accounts and associated activities of each office, bu-
reau and activity of the agency.").
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and created a pilot program for auditing of overall agency operations.
The Government Performance and Results Act of 199399 made the pi-
lot programs permanent and made the CFO Act standards applicable
to twenty-four executive agencies and departments.10 0 The Comptrol-
ler General is also permitted to annually audit the consolidated finan-
cial statements of the entire executive branch.1O1
Private sector needs for uniform accounting rules had earlier led to
the adoption of GAAP and the creation of an independent FASB to
promulgate standards used in connection with GAAP.102 In 1990, the
Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, and the Comptroller General agreed to establish the Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB), an organization
parallel to the FASB, to promulgate uniform accounting standards for
the federal government.10 3 The AICPA formally recognizes standards
promulgated by the FASAB as generally accepted accounting prac-
tices for the federal government.
Despite the reforms adopted by the CFO, Congress returned to
agency financial and management issues in 1996. A key concern was
the absence of uniformity in federal accounting standards. The Com-
mittee on Governmental Affairs reported that
the financial management systems of the Federal government are inadequate
.... The CFO Act ... laid the groundwork for significant financial manage-
ment reform through the appointment of agency chief financial officers and
requirements for annual audited financial statements. Even with such re-
forms, however, federal agencies still lack many of the basic systems needed
to provide uniform and reliable financial information. Without such systems,
federal finances are still far from what American taxpayers have a right to
expect. 104
Building upon the CFO, Congress later enacted the Federal Finan-
cial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996.105 The FFMIA
99. Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993).
100. The covered agencies and departments are listed in 31 U.S.C. §901(b)(1990).
101. Pub. L. 103-356, 108 Stat. 3410, § 405(c) (1994) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§ 331 (e) (1), (2) (1994).
102. See discussion supra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
103. The FASAB was created as an advisory committee pursuant to the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 7, 86 Stat. 770 (1972). As described at
its creation, the "Board, as a part of the effort under the Joint Financial Manage-
ment Improvement Program to improve federal accounting and financial report-
ing, will consider and recommend accounting standards and principles to the
Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and
the Comptroller General." 55 Fed. Reg. 52,322 (Dec. 17, 1990). Since its incep-
tion in 1990, the FASAB charter has been consistently renewed according to Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act requirements, most recently in February, 2003.
Renewal of FASAB Charter, 68 Fed. Reg. 7,789 (Feb. 10, 2003).
104. S. REP. 104-339, at 2 (1996).
105. Pub. L. No. 104-208, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 3009-389 (1996) (codified as amended at
31 U.S.C. § 3512 (1997)).
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requires federal agencies covered by the Act to implement and main-
tain financial management systems that substantially comply with: 1)
federal financial management system requirements, 0 6 2) applicable
federal accounting standards, and 3) the U.S. Government Standard
General Ledger.O? In addition, FFMIA established audit require-
ments and provides for development of remediation plans for noncom-
plying agencies. Under FFMIA, federal agencies are expected to use
the generally accepted accounting principles promulgated by the
FASAB. 108
Despite efforts toward reform and accountability, many federal
agencies simply do not make the grade. In fact, twenty of the twenty-
four agencies required to account under the Chief Financial Officers
Act,109 report that they do not substantially comply with FFMIA re-
quirements.110 As the GAO reported:
Many agencies still do not have reliable, useful, and timely financial informa-
tion, including cost data, with which to make informed decisions and help en-
sure accountability on an ongoing basis. While agencies are undeniably
making progress in addressing their financial management systems weak-
nesses, most agency systems are still not substantially in compliance with
FFMIA's requirements. 1 1 1
A recent GAO Report on federal accountability included inadequate
reconciliation procedures, lack of accurate and timely recording of fi-
nancial information, and failure to adhere to federal accounting stan-
dards as primary reasons for noncompliance.112
2. Budget Preparation and Accounting
Although the formal budget process for any fiscal year begins with
the President's submission to Congress,113 the real budget process be-
gins approximately eight to ten months earlier.114 During those
106. Policies and standards are developed in OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, FINAN-
CIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, CIRCULAR No. A-127 (1993).
107. The Standard General Ledger was established in 1986 and published in the Trea-
sury Department Financial Manual. It "promotes consistency in financial trans-
action processing and reporting by providing a uniform chart of accounts and pro
forma transactions used to standardize federal agencies' financial information ac-
cumulation and processing throughout the year, enhance financial control, and
support budget and external reporting, including financial statement prepara-
tion." FFMIA Report supra note 11, at 11.
108. Pub. L. No. 104-208, supra note 105, at § 802(a)(6). See discussion of FASAB at
supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
110. FFMIA Report, supra note 11, at 2.
111. Id. at 15.
112. Id. at 17.
113. 31 U.S.C. §1105(a) (2000). This submission must be made no later than the first
Monday in February of the preceding year. Id.
114. For a discussion of the federal executive agency's role in developing the Presi-
dent's budget, see SCHICK, supra note 15, at 30-31, 81-90.
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months, individual agencies prepare their budget requests and submit
them to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is part of
the Executive Office of the President.115 Budget legislation requires
each agency head to prepare and submit an appropriation request, but
leaves to the President the form and timing of such agency
submissions.116
The government financial accounting standards discussed in the
previous section apply only to the backward-looking reports of prior
agency activities. Thus, while the FASAB promulgates accounting
standards for agency financial reporting purposes, its jurisdiction does
not extend to budgeting.117
For purposes of budget accounting, there is no consistent and de-
tailed set of accounting standards. Yet, agencies are instructed to fol-
low certain general principles. For example, budget legislation
requires agency appropriation requests to be developed from cost-
based budgets. 11s Agencies are further instructed to maintain their
accounts on an accrual basis in order to assist in preparing such cost-
based budgets." 9
Beyond this general instruction from Congress, agencies may de-
velop their budget proposals free of statutory requirements. The OMB
does, however, provide general budget preparation guidance to agen-
cies through its Circular A-11 and through more customized "spring
guidance memoranda."120 Although they provide for substantial regu-
lation of the budget preparation process, the guidelines offer a fair de-
gree of latitude. For example, agencies are warned that the OMB may
centrally calculate outyear policy estimates for long-term conse-
quences of proposed programs, but offers agencies the opportunity to
identify and justify deviations.121 In any event, OMB guidelines can
be changed at the whim of the executive, and executive budget ac-
counting may differ from congressional budget accounting.
As Allen Schick reports, financial management of the federal gov-
ernment is highly fragmented. He observes that "[flor decades, frag-
115. 31 U.S.C. § 501 (2000).
116. 31 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1) (2000).
117. FEDERAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BOARD, ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS,
STATEMENT OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 1: OBJECTIVES OF
FEDERAL FINANCIAL REPORTING, at 190 (2002) [hereinafter FASAB, CONCEPT
No. 1] ("The Board's authority does not extend to recommending budgetary stan-
dards or budgetary concepts, but the Board is committed to providing reliable
accounting information that supports budget planning and formulation.")
118. 31 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(1).
119. 31 U.S.C. § 3512(e) (2000).
120. As a general matter, see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESI-
DENT, CIRCULAR No. A-11, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE
BUDGET app. B, § 30.1 (2003) [hereinafter OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11], and more
specifically, 31 U.S.C. § 3512(e).
121. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11 app. B, at § 30.2.
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mentation resulted in weak coordination of budgeting and accounting,
with each operating in its own sphere and having its own way of
counting money."12 2 In the past, individual agencies, and even bu-
reaus within such individual agencies, used customized accounting
systems designed for their particular needs. Although financial man-
agement reforms, including the Chief Financial Officers' Act, have
made improvements,12 3 the primary focus has been on improving fi-
nancial management and agency performance. As Schick notes, the
CFO Act did not give those holding the new position of chief financial
officer a formal role in developing agency budgets.124
3. Unique Position of Congress
Just as federal agencies are required to provide financial reports,
Congress itself must provide its own financial report. In fact, the Con-
stitution requires that "a regular Statement and Account of Receipts
and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to
time."125 More specifically, legislation requires the Chief Administra-
tive Officer of the House and the Secretary of the Senate to submit
semi-annual financial reports to the House and Senate respectively
and make them available to the public.126 These financial reports
simply treat Congress as a distinct financial entity, providing informa-
tion regarding its expenses and receipts.
Although Congress demands that private companies and specified
executive agencies comply with rigorous financial accounting stan-
dards,127 it does not impose accounting standards upon itself.128 Con-
gress itself is not subject to FASAB federal government accounting
rules. Moreover, neither the President's budget proposal nor the con-
gressional budget resolution is prepared in accordance with GAAP.
At least with respect to budget accounting, the absence of stan-
dards might be explained by the distinct nature of budget as opposed
to financial accounting. After all, GAAP rules are generally accepted
accounting standards, not generally accepted budgeting standards.
Although wise management practice suggests use of GAAP principles
in preparing private sector budgets, such companies are not required
to use them.
122. SCHICK, supra note 15, at 256.
123. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
124. SCHICK, supra note 15, at 258.
125. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
126. 2 U.S.C. § 104a (2000).
127. Although private companies have done a reasonable job of complying, those fed-
eral agencies that are bound by the various federal accounting and management
requirements have failed to meet them. See discussion at supra notes 109-112.
128. Note, for example, that FFMIA accounting rules apply only to the 24 major de-
partments and agencies covered by the Act. Each of these entities has a CFO Act
agency inspector general (IG). See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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Even if one assumes that the financial v. budget information dis-
tinction justifies the preparation of private sector budget documents
without required adherence to generally accepted accounting princi-
ples, the same logic does not extend to government. Government
budget documents clearly serve a much more significant public func-
tion than private sector budget materials. Budget commentator Allen
Schick observes, "[i]n business, the budget is an internal document
that is not bound by accounting rules. In government, however, it is
one of the principal means of communicating with citizens."129 The
government budget is of critical importance to the public and receives
substantial public scrutiny. If the budget is to provide citizens with
information that they can understand, the information should be pro-
vided in accordance with some uniform accounting principles. 130
Moreover, if the budget is to provide useful information against which
to assess achievement of public policy objectives, the budget should be
written using similar accounting standards to those used for govern-
ment financial reports.
IV. Congressional Budget Accounting
A. Introduction
Although Congress holds itself to no particular set of formal ac-
counting standards and principles, it obviously uses some type of ac-
counting principle to prepare federal budget documents. An initial
concern then is identifying the accounting principles that Congress
does use for purposes of the federal budget. Once those principles
have been identified, one can compare the extent to which budget doc-
uments would differ if Congress used generally accepted accounting
principles. A second and corollary question is whether adoption of
generally accepted accounting principles would result in a better
budget.
129. SCHICK, supra note 15, at 259.
130. As Schick points out, "[an increasing number of state and local governments pre-
sent their budget on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles, as do a
number of national governments." Id. at 261. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §3-
115(b) (2003) ("Effective with the fiscal year commencing July 1, 2003, the Comp-
troller is authorized to implement the use of generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples .... with respect to the preparation of the annual budget of the state.");
IDAHO CODE § 67-1101 (2003) ("It shall be the duty of the state controller to adopt
and promulgate a uniform . . . classification of expenditures by function and ob-
ject, which classifications shall be conformable to modern standards of accounting
and reporting and shall be adapted to the requirements of the division of finan-
cial management for budget purposes."); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.88.037(1) (2003)
("The director of financial management shall devise and maintain a comprehen-
sive budgeting, accounting, and reporting system in conformance with generally
accepted accounting principles applicable to state governments . . ").
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Another major accounting issue relates to congressional compli-
ance. To the extent that Congress departs from generally accepted
accounting principles, it uses a different set of standards for itself
than those it imposes on private industry and on federal government
departments and agencies. This departure is inconsistent with the in-
creasing movement toward congressional compliance. 13 1 Here one
must assess whether the differences between the goals of financial ac-
counting as opposed to federal budgeting are sufficient to justify con-
gressional use of different accounting approaches from those that it
insists upon for others.
This question has added urgency for at least two reasons. First,
many of the budgetary fiscal constraints introduced by the Budget En-
forcement Act (BEA) in 1990 expired or "sunset" in 2002 for fiscal
years 2003 and thereafter.13 2 Under current budget procedure, the
modern federal budget falls into two major categories, 1) discretionary
spending, which requires annual appropriation and 2) mandatory
spending for permanent programs, which includes tax legislation and
entitlements.13 3 Corresponding to each of these two major budget do-
mains, the BEA previously imposed fiscal constraints. Spending caps
applied to the discretionary spending in the first category and PAYGO
restrictions applied to any new tax or entitlement legislation in the
second.1 34 Under PAYGO rules, any new legislation calling for an in-
crease in direct spending or tax cuts had to be offset by other new
legislation that decreased direct spending or increased taxes. Con-
gressional failure to meet spending caps or PAYGO requirements
131. See discussion supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
132. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 95-
177, 99 Stat. 1037, (providing for expiration of discretionary spending cap limits
and deficit target enforcement provisions as of Sept. 30, 1991); see also 2 U.S.C.
§ 902 (a), (b) (2000) (providing for application of mandatory sequestration rules
only to legislation enacted prior to Oct. 1, 2002). For sequestration purposes,
however, the PAYGO rules continue to apply through 2006. See U.S. GEN. Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET ISSUES: BUDGET ENFORCEMENT COMPLIANCE REPORT
11, GAO-02-794, at 11 (June 2002) [hereinafter GAO, 2002 BUDGET COMPLIANCE]
("Although BEA expires in 2002, the sequestration procedure applies though
2006 to eliminate any projected net costs stemming from PAYGO legislation en-
acted through fiscal year 2002."). For a detailed description of federal budget
process and the application of PAYGO rules, see Block, Pathologies, supra note
16 at 870-88. Discussion of the sunset provisions and expiration of PAYGO rules
appears in id. at 886-87.
133. See a description of the current budget structure in Elizabeth Garrett, Rethink-
ing the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARv. J.
ON LEGIS. 387, 388 (1998).
134. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. 1388-
573 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 902 (2000)). The President's 2005 budget
recently proposed reinstituting caps on discretionary spending through 2009. OF-
FICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRES., BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov-
ERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2005: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 215 (2004) [hereinafter
2005 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES].
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under the BEA triggered mandatory sequestration, which required
the OMB to impose across-the-board cuts in federal programs. 13 5
As the BEA fiscal disciplinary rules have sunset, Congress is left
rudderless and must consider major federal budget reform.136 More
than ever, now is the appropriate time for Congress to carefully ex-
amine major problems with its budget accounting procedures. Added
urgency also stems from recent accounting scandals in corporate
America, which inspired congressional wrath and led to numerous ac-
counting and securities law reforms.13 7 Congress is concerned that
many companies are using accounting practices and gimmicks that se-
verely distort the true financial picture portrayed to interested share-
holders. Particularly given such congressional accusations, the time
is right to examine the extent to which Congress itself may be using
similar accounting gimmicks that mislead the taxpayers. The follow-
ing sections of this Article address these major issues.
B. Cash v. Accrual Accounting in the Federal Budget
1. General Distinctions Between Cash and Accrual Accounting
Timing rules are among the major sources of federal budget ac-
counting gimmickry. To understand the potential for timing tricks,
one must first look at the underlying principles of cash and accrual
135. The OMB had official sequestration enforcement responsibility and kept a se-
quester scorecard based upon OMB budget figures. 2 U.S.C. § 902(b). Certain
programs were protected from mandatory cuts. For example, Social Security,
was exempt from PAYGO sequester and Medicare could not be reduced by more
than 4 percent. SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
PROCESS: AN EXPLANATION, S. REP. No. 105-67, at 57 (1998) [hereinafter SENATE
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET EXPLANATION].
136. Congress temporarily extended PAYGO, S. Res. 304, § 2(b), 107th Cong. (2002)
(enacted) (extending Senate PAYGO point-of-order rule to Apr. 15, 2003). The
Senate retained a modified and weakened version of its internal PAYGO point of
order rule in the Concurrent Budget Resolution for 2004. H.R. Con. Res. 95,
108th Cong., § 505 (2003). Senator Feingold subsequently proposed an amend-
ment to H.J. Res 51, a joint resolution to increase the United States statutory
debt limit, that would have extended statutory PAYGO and sequester rules, 149
CONG. REC. S7101-02 (daily ed. May 23, 2003). The PAYGO extension was re-
jected by the Senate. Id. at S7105. The President's 2004 budget indicated a will-
ingness to work within PAYGO restrictions. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PREs., BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2004: ANA-
LYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 315 (2003) [hereinafter 2004 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES].
In an unusual and, to my mind, troubling proposal, the President's 2005 budget
proposed "to extend the pay-as-you-go requirement for mandatory spending only.
Revenue legislation would not be subject to this requirement." 2005 ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIES, supra note 134, at 216 (emphasis added). Under this proposal,
any increase in entitlement programs would require an offsetting reduction in
other programs. On the other hand, decreased revenue from tax cuts would not
have to be "paid for" through increased revenue elsewhere in the budget.
137. See discussion supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
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accounting methods in general and as applied to the budget in particu-
lar. In general, accounting methods focus on timing. Whether one is
considering budget, finance, or tax, the essential accounting question
is when; that is, determining the proper accounting period for report-
ing income from receipts and subtracting expenses for liabilities.13S
Although there is nothing especially magical about the year, and one
might theoretically use some other time period for accounting pur-
poses, the general period used for income tax and accounting has his-
torically been the calendar year.139
The two most common methods of accounting for receipts and dis-
bursements are the cash and the accrual methods. Unfortunately,
these two methods of accounting do not have precise definitions. For
federal budget purposes, the General Accounting Office defines the
cash or cash-equivalent method as providing that "receipts are re-
corded when received and expenditures are recorded when paid, with-
out regard to the accounting period in which the receipts are earned or
the costs are incurred."140 For federal income tax purposes, the cash
method requires that "all items which constitute gross income ... are
to be included for the taxable year in which actually or constructively
received. Expenditures are to be deducted for the taxable year in
which actually made."141 Both GAO and Treasury Department defini-
tions reflect the idea that the cash method generally follows cash flow;
138. For example, the classic economic definition of personal income is "the algebraic
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change
in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the
period in question." HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINI-
TION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (1938) (emphasis added).
139. FRANK C. MINTER, ET AL., HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING A2-46 (2001)
("Precise financial information cannot be determined until a business has termi-
nated and all its transactions are complete, but reporting at annual intervals has
become accepted by custom and law because the users of financial information
have been willing to sacrifice some precision for the sake of currentness."). For
federal tax purposes, the Tax Code provides that income shall be computed on the
basis of the taxpayer's "taxable year." I.R.C. § 441(a) (2000). This is generally
the calendar year ending on December 31st, except that entities other than indi-
viduals may use a fiscal year. I.R.C. § 441(b) (2000). Since 1977, the federal gov-
ernment has operated on a fiscal year that begins on October 1 and ends on
September 30. SENATE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET EXPLANATION, supra note 135, at
55; see also STANLEY E. COLLENDER, THE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET FISCAL
2000, 203 (1999).
140. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL
BUDGET PROCESS: EXPOSURE DRAFT, 19, GAO/AFMD-2.1.1 (Jan. 1993). [hereinaf-
ter GAO, GLOSSARY] "'Cash' generally refers to payment by cash, checks, or elec-
tronic funds transfers. 'Cash equivalent' refers to the use of an instrument or
process that creates a substitute for cash. For example, when the government
issues a debt instrument of any kind in satisfaction of claims, the transaction is
recorded as simultaneous outlays and borrowing - the outlays when the debt in-
strument is issued, not when it is redeemed." Id.
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (2002).
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income is reported when cash is received and payments are reported
when cash is paid out. As one tax commentator notes, the cash
method "has the merit of simplicity ... [b]ookeeping and accounting
duties are minimized; indeed, for most cash method taxpayers, all 'ac-
counting' is done in the family checkbook."142 In its colorful opinion in
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit
describes the cash method as "simple, plodding, elemental - stands
firmly in the physical realm. It responds only through the physical
senses, recognizing only the tangible flow of currency. Money is in-
come when this raw beast actually feels the coin in its primal paw;
expenditures are made only when the beast can see that it has given
coins away." 14 3
In contrast to the cash method, GAO describes the accrual method
as "the basis whereby transactions and events are recognized when
they occur, regardless of when cash is received or paid." 144 For federal
tax purposes, regulations more specifically provide that "income is to
be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred
that fix the right to receive the income and ... a liability is incurred
• .. in the taxable year in which all the events have occurred that
established the fact of the liability ... and economic performance has
occurred with respect to the liability."145 Under either of these defini-
tions, the accrual method generally reflects items of income and ex-
pense at the moment when rights and obligations arise, rather than at
the time of cash inflow or output.146 The Eleventh Circuit compared
the cash method to the accrual method, which
moves in a more ethereal, mystical realm. The visionary prophet, it recog-
nizes the impact of the future on the present, and with grave foreboding or
ecstatic anticipation, announces the world to be. When it becomes sure
enough of its prophecies, it actually conducts life as if the new age has already
come to pass. Transactions producing income or deductions spring to life in
the eyes of the seer though nary a dollar has moved. 1 4 7
142. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 267 (9th ed. 2002).
143. 743 F.2d 781, 787 (11th Cir. 1984).
144. GAO, GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 19 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, the GAO
defines accrual-based budget measurement as recording "revenues and expenses
in the period the activity generating revenues, increasing liabilities or consuming
resources occurs, regardless of when associated cash is actually received or paid."
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCRUAL BUDGETING: EXPERIENCES OF OTHER NA-
TIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 31, GAO/AIMD-00-57 (Feb.
2000) [hereinafter GAO, ACCRUAL BUDGETING]
145. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2002).
146. For federal income tax purposes, however, Congress and the courts have de-
parted from traditional accrual accounting, instead requiring accrual method tax-
payers under some circumstances to defer the reporting of an expense until the
moment of "economic performance." This is but one of several examples illustrat-
ing the point that tax and financial accounting do not always follow the same
principles.
147. 743 F.2d at 787.
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2. Accrual Method Accounting
a) The Concept of Matching: Tax v. Financial Accounting
From an economic and accounting perspective, proper measure-
ment of income requires matching income for particular accounting
periods with the costs of generating that income attributable to the
same accounting periods. In fact, the "matching" concept is so central
to financial accounting that it is classified as a pervasive principle of
accounting. 148 By this measure, the cash method fails miserably; it
"makes no scientific effort either to 'time' or to 'match,' because under
it the recognition of revenue and expense turns largely on the acciden-
tal factor of receipt or disbursement."149 Cash method accounting is
inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles, which re-
quire use of the accrual method. For example, the FASB takes the
position that "[i]nformation about enterprise earnings and its compo-
nents measured by accrual accounting generally provides a better in-
dication of enterprise performance than information about current
cash receipts and payments." 150 As one major accounting handbook
explains,
[a] statement of cash receipts and disbursements alone is not a useful indica-
tor of future cash flows because it does not allow for relating current costs to
the future revenues that they may produce. Accrual accounting makes al-
lowances for the uneven timing of the actual payments and receipts of cash,
and better enables financial statement users to judge the future earning
power of the enterprise. 1 5 1
Historically, taxpayers have been given a choice with respect to
methods of accounting. According to the Tax Code, "[taxable income
shall be computed under the method of accounting on the basis of
which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his
books."152 The two key options available under the Tax Code are the
cash receipts and disbursements method and the accrual method.153
Here again, the Court in Knight-Ridder adds a note of humor, observ-
ing that the "Code is possessed of great wisdom and tolerance. It
knows that man must generally choose his own way. Therefore, it
148. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING PRINCI-
PLES BOARD, STATEMENT No. 4, BASIC CONCEPTS AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES UN-
DERLYING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, at 27 (1970)
(breaking accounting principles into three levels: 1) pervasive principles, 2) broad
operating principles, and 3) detailed principles).
149. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 142, at 275.
150. FEDERAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD CONCEPT No. 1, STATEMENT OF FINAN-
CIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 1: OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING BY BUSI-
NESS ENTERPRISES, at 44.
151. MINTER, supra note 139, at A2-24.
152. I.R.C. § 446(a) (2000).
153. I.R.C. § 446(c) (2000).
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leaves to the Taxpayer the original choice of which accounting method
to use."154
Taxpayer freedom to choose accounting methods under Internal
Revenue Code provision I.R.C. § 446 is burdened with restrictions,
however. For example, taxpayers engaged in the purchase and sale of
inventories are required to use the accrual method.155 In addition,
I.R.C. § 448156 prohibits use of the cash method for C corporations,
partnerships that have a C corporation as a partner, and tax shelters.
A 1984 Treasury Department report explained:
The cash method of accounting frequently fails to reflect the economic results
of a taxpayer's business over a taxable year. The cash method simply reflects
actual cash receipts and disbursements, which need not be related to economic
income. Obligations to pay and rights to receive payment are disregarded
under the cash method, even though they directly bear on whether the busi-
ness has generated an economic profit or loss. Because of its inadequacies, the
cash method of accounting is not considered to be in accord with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles and, therefore, is not permissible for financial ac-
counting purposes. 
1 5 7
For federal income tax purposes, Congress and commentators often
adopt the accounting profession's viewpoint that the accrual method
"matching" principle generally results in a more accurate reflection of
income. 158 The courts often express a similar preference for match-
ing. In its landmark opinion in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, for
example, the Supreme Court stated: "the Code endeavors to match ex-
penses with the revenues of the taxable period to which they are prop-
erly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation of
net income for tax purposes."159
154. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 743 F.2d 781, 788 (11th Cir.
1984).
155. I.R.C. § 471 (2000); Treas. Reg. §1.446-1(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 2002).
156. I.R.C. § 448(a) (2000).
157. U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, 2 TAX REFORM FOR SIMPLICITY, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROwTH 215-16 (1984) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 605
(1985); JOINT Comm. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
ACT OF 1986, 474-75 (Comm. Print 1987).
158. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENT OF
CONFORMITY OF TAX AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING (1971); B. Bernard Aidinoff &
Benjamin B. Lopota, Section 461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: The Treatment
of Liabilities Arising From Obligations to be Performed in the Future, 33 TAX
LAW. 789, 796-97 (1980); Abraham M. Stanger, et al., Prepaid Income and Esti-
mated Expenses: Financial Accounting Versus Tax Accounting Dichotomy, 33
TAX. LAw. 403, 404-07 (1980); Laurie L. Malman, Treatment of Prepaid Income -
Clear Reflection of Income or Muddied Waters, 37 TAX L. REV. 103, 146-47 (1981);
John S. Nolan, The Merit in Conformity of Tax to Financial Accounting, 50 Taxes
761 (1972); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION (Sept.
1970). Also, see a series of papers included in 2 Compendium of Papers on Broad-
ening the Tax Base submitted to House Comm. on Ways & Means, 86th Cong.
(1959).
159. 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). On the other hand, critics of the matching concept for
tax purposes stress differences between tax and financial accounting. While es-
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For individual taxpayers, the cash method seems to be a tolerable
second-best, offering the advantage of greater simplicity. In support
of the cash method for individual taxpayers, one might also add that
the ultimate measurement of income is unlikely to be substantially
different for individuals under either the cash or accrual method.
Most individual taxpayers receive the bulk of their income from salary
and generally do not have substantial amounts to be received in future
time periods. At the same time, other than obligations for home mort-
gages, most individual taxpayers do not incur liabilities for payments
to be made substantially in later time periods. Consequently, use of
the cash method by most individual taxpayers is unlikely to generate
major distortions. In contrast, the business financial picture often in-
cludes accounts receivable and accounts payable for future taxable
years. Thus, under GAAP, businesses must use the more accurate ac-
crual method.
Unlike tax accounting, financial accounting rules generally do not
offer freedom to choose between cash and accrual methods. Since the
accrual method is considered so superior as a measure of economic
income, GAAP does not offer the option to use the cash-flow ap-
proach.160 For purposes of financial accounting, for example, the SEC
requires that businesses subject to its jurisdiction use the accrual
method of accounting and otherwise comply with GAAP.161
In addition, the federal government itself adopts the accrual
method of accounting for purposes of reporting the financial income of
federal government departments and agencies. So, for example,
FASAB rules require federal entities to report accounts receivable as
income "when a federal entity establishes a claim to cash or other as-
sets against other entities."162 Moreover, liability is defined as a
sential for financial accounting purposes, these critics argue that the matching
concept does not always lead to appropriate policy results for tax accounting. See,
e.g., Geier, supra note 67; Alan Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal
of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REV. 1, 35 (1984) (arguing that "no one has ever
advanced a reason for believing that matching should play a role in tax cases").
160. See supra notes 148-151 and accompanying text.
161. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2002) ("Financial statements filed with the Commis-
sion which are not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles will be presumed to be misleading or inaccurate, despite footnote or
other disclosures, unless the Commission has otherwise provided.").
162. FEDERAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BOARD, ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS,
STATEMENT OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 1: ACCOUNTING
FOR SELECTED ASSETS AND LIABILITIES, at 41 (2002) (emphasis added) [hereinaf-
ter FASAB STANDARDS No. 11. Similarly, revenue from government sales of goods
and services, referred to for FASAB purposes as "exchange revenues," are re-
ported "when goods or services are provided to the public or another government
entity at a price." FEDERAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ADVISORY BOARD, STATE-
MENT OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 7: ACCOUNTING FOR
REVENUE AND Other Financial Sources and Concepts for Reconciling Budgetary
and Financial Accounting, 34 (2002) [hereinafter FASAB STANDARDS No. 7].
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"probable future outflow or other sacrifice or resource." 163
FASAB rules express their full support for accrual-based account-
ing as the most accurate measure for financial reporting purposes:
Accrual accounting recognizes the financial effects of transactions and events
when they occur, whether or not cash changes hands at that time. As it does
with respect to exchange revenue, full accrual accounting for nonexchange reve-
nue would enhance financial planning, control, and accountability. Full ac-
crual accounting could provide important data with respect to future cash
flows and tax policy and could improve the ability to evaluate the performance
of the collecting entities and the exercise of their custodial responsibilities. 1
6 4
Although FASAB rules for the federal government generally track
FASB and GAAP rules applicable to the private sector, there are some
inherent limitations of the accrual method as applied to certain gov-
ernment activities. Reluctantly, FASAB provisions acknowledge that
"the degree of accrual accounting that is practicable to perform for
taxes and duties is limited by difficulties in ascertaining the amount
of revenue arising from the underlying events and by the assessment
processes used to manage the collecting functions."16 5 Given the prac-
tical difficulties of reporting revenues from taxes and duties under the
accrual method, federal entities that collect such taxes or duties are
entitled to use a modified cash method for such revenues. 16 6 Even
these entities, however, are permitted to change to the accrual method
"and make other changes that would result in a fuller and more com-
plete application of accrual accounting. " 16 7
b) Present v. Face Value Accrual
Although accrual accounting generally is better than cash account-
ing at matching income with expenses, one major difficulty is defining
the precise moment at which rights and obligations arise and deter-
mining the proper amounts to be accrued. Under the accrual method,
the net present value of income to be received in future time periods is
less than the actual face amount of the receivable itself. Similarly, the
net present value of a future payable is less than the actual face
amount of the obligation itself. To most accurately reflect economic
income or loss, then, accrued income and expense should be reported
at its net discounted present value. This is the approach used for pur-
poses of financial accounting under generally accepted accounting
principles. While the concept of net present value itself is reasonably
straight-forward, choice of an appropriate interest rate for purposes of
163. FASAB STANDARDS No. 1, supra note 162, at 19 (emphasis added).
164. FASAB STANDARDS No. 7, supra note 162, at T1 168 (emphasis added).
165. Id. at 91 169.
166. Id. at 1 49.
167. Id.
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discounting present values can be difficult and speculative absent a
crystal ball displaying economic conditions into the future.16s
Partly in response to these difficulties, Congress has chosen not to
require accrual basis taxpayers to use traditional financial accrual ac-
counting for future liabilities. Taxpayers using the accrual method
historically have been permitted to deduct the full face value of future
liabilities as long as all events have occurred that establish the fact of
the liability and the amount of liability can be determined with rea-
sonable accuracy. 16 9 In cases where actual obligations are deferred
for many years, however, a full face value deduction can dramatically
overstate the taxpayer's deductible expense. The most egregious case
was that of Mooney Aircraft,17o in which the aircraft manufacturing
corporation issued $1000 "Mooney Bonds" to its aircraft purchasers.
Bearers of the bonds were entitled to a $1000 payment upon retire-
ment of the aircraft. In many cases, the aircraft were not likely to be
retired for twenty or more years. Nevertheless, under the "all events"
test for accrual accounting, Mooney Corporation argued that it had
accrued the liability and should be permitted to deduct the full face
value of the bonds at the time of issue. Unable to make a successful
case against immediate deduction under the "all events" test itself, the
government pulled out its next weapon. Under §446(b), the Commis-
sioner is entitled to challenge the taxpayer's regular method of ac-
counting if the Commissioner believes that the method used "does not
clearly reflect income." Holding for the Commissioner, the Fifth Cir-
cuit agreed that the period of time between incurring and paying the
obligation was simply too long.171 If taxpayers simply were required
to deduct the net discounted present value of future liabilities, as they
do for financial accounting purposes, the overstatement issue in cases
like Mooney would never arise.
By ignoring time value of money principles in connection with ac-
crual basis accounting, Congress and the courts had created a mon-
ster. 172 One obvious solution to the problem would have been to bring
168. GAAP standards do not have explicit rules for determining an interest rate to be
used for discounting to present value, instead requring the business enterprise to
discount "expected cash flows at an appropriate discount rate that allows for the
risk of the activities concerned." PAUL MUNTER & THOMAS A. RATCLIFFE, APPLY-
ING GAAP AND GAAS, PART II § 21.02 (2003).
169. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2002). The regulation mentions no
requirement that the liability amount deducted be discounted to net present
value.
170. Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1969).
171. 420 F.2d at 409-11. Another case in which the Commissioner successfully used
its § 446(b) authority to disallow a full face value deduction for a future liability
is Ford Motor Co. v. Comm'r. 102 T.C. 87 (1994).
172. The House Report accompanying statutory reforms explained that under the cur-
rent all events test, "an accrual basis taxpayer generally can deduct the face
amount of an accrued expense." H.R. REP. No. 98-432, at 1252 (1984); see also
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tax accounting more in line with financial accounting, thus requiring
accrual method taxpayers to reflect future liabilities at their net pre-
sent value. Concerns were raised, however, that moving to a present
value deduction approach for future liabilities would be too complex
and subject to manipulation. 173 Congress instead responded by ad-
ding a new provision, which simply disallows the accrual deduction
altogether until the moment of "economic performance."17 4 Critics
complained that, rather than improving the economic accuracy of tax
accounting, the new provision essentially turned accrual basis into
cash basis taxpayers only for purposes of deductions.175
Clearly, many tax accounting principles adopted by Congress are
inconsistent with accounting and financial notions of economic match-
ing. Rules such as the § 461(h) "economic performance" test prohibit
accrual taxpayers from deducting expenses so as to appropriately off-
set such prepayment income. As another example, taxpayers are re-
quired under tax accounting rules to report any prepayments of
income entirely in the year of receipt even though the receipts may be
attributable to income in future tax years. 176 For federal income tax
purposes, Congress has adopted an inconsistent and oddly hybrid as-
sortment of cash and accrual principles. Given these inconsistencies,
Congress should look to financial accounting standards rather than
JAMES S. EUSTICE, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984: A SELECTwE ANALYsIs 2.03[2]
(1984) ("[T]he courts had consistently allowed taxpayers to accrue a deduction
currently even if the liability was in fact incurred in the current taxable year
even though payment or performance would occur in the future. Since the courts
ignored time value [of money] principles and allowed the full amount of the liabil-
ity to be accrued, the deduction was economically overstated."); Noel B. Cunning-
ham, A Theoretical Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Future Costs, 40 TAX L. REV.
577, 577 (1985) (Cunningham describes a "congressional response to transactions
that were structured to take advantage of rules that did not properly account for
the time value of money. These transactions were perceived as abusive, and Con-
gress reacted with a vengeance.").
173. See Hearings Before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Oversight of the I.R.S.,
98th Cong. (1983) (statement of Robert G. Woodward, Acting Treas. Dep't Tax
Legis. Counsel) ("Because of uncertainty as to the proper discount rate to be em-
ployed in determining the present value of future liabilities, we are concerned
that a rule allowing deductions for the present value of future expenses could be
subject to manipulation."); see also Cunningham, supra note 172, at 588 ("Trea-
sury opposed adopting such a rule, however, because it thought the rule would be
an administrative nightmare. Since the proper amount of the deduction would
not be easily ascertainable, the rule would be plagued with uncertainty and com-
plexity, and would be an easy target for manipulation and abuse.").
174. I.R.C. § 461(h)(1) (2000), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
369, 98 Stat. 678, § 91(a) (1984) (providing that "the all events test shall not be
treated as met any earlier than when economic performance ... occurs.").
175. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 172, at 585.
176. Schlude v. Comm'r, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Automobile Assoc. v. United
States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club of Michigan v. United States, 353
U.S. 180 (1957).
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tax accounting standards for guidance in preparing the federal
budget. Unless otherwise indicated, future references to accrual basis
accounting in this Article will be to financial accrual rules as opposed
to tax accrual rules.
3. Federal Budget Accounting Methods: Cash and Obligation-
Based Budgeting with a Hint of Accrual
a) General Description of Federal Budget Accounting Rules
Although the choice of accounting for budget purposes may appear
to be a highly technical matter, the fact is that such choices "represent
much more than technical means of cost measurement; they reflect
fundamental choices about the uses and functions of the budget."17 7
As previously noted, cash and accrual are the two major alternative
approaches for tax and financial accounting. For budget accounting, a
third alternative is obligation-based budgeting. Under this approach,
"financial transactions involving the use of funds are recorded in the
accounts primarily when goods and services are ordered, regardless of
when the resources acquired are to be received or consumed."' 78 In
fairness, federal budget accounting is most accurately described as a
hybrid system using cash basis accounting as its background default
rule, but which sometimes uses obligation-based or accrual-based
methods. This is precisely the opposite of federal government finan-
cial accounting, which is perhaps most accurately described as a hy-
brid process with an accrual basis default rule.
Under the cash method, the cost of goods would be reflected when
payment for the goods was made. Recall that under the accrual
method, the same cost would generally be reflected when the liability
for the cost was established, most likely at the moment of delivery of
the goods, which often occurs before payment is made.179 In contrast,
cost of goods under the obligation-based method is reported when
goods are ordered. Of course, an order for goods will occur before ac-
tual payment is made and before delivery of the goods. Thus, obliga-
tion-based budgeting generally results in the most rapid up-front
reporting of the cost of goods purchased. Some contend that obliga-
177. GAO, ACCRUAL BUDGETING, supra note 144, at 31.
178. GAO, GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 19 (emphasis added); see also GAO, ACCRUAL
BUDGETING, supra note 144, at 32 ("[O]bligation-based budgeting focuses on the
legal obligations entered into during a period regardless of when cash is paid or
received and regardless of when resources acquired are to be received or
consumed.").
179. The Tax Code sometimes restricts accrual method taxpayers, requiring them to
wait to deduct expenses until "economic performance" occurs with respect to
those expenses. I.R.C. § 461(h) (2000). In such cases, the deduction for a cost
may be delayed until payment, thus effectively placing the taxpayer on the cash
method for purposes of deducting such expenses. See supra notes 174-175 and
accompanying text.
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tion-based budgeting is the best method for providing up-front control
over budget spending.1so
Despite general agreement that accrual methods of accounting
more accurately reflect financial income and despite the federal gov-
ernment's general adoption of accrual method accounting for federal
government department and agency financial reporting, 18 1 Congress
generally still uses the cash method for most government activities
reflected in the federal budget.1s2 Moreover, the bottom-line assess-
ment of deficit or surplus is determined based upon cash receipts and
outlays.' 8 3 Although Congress generally uses cash method budget ac-
counting, individual agency requests submitted to and included in the
President's budget generally are cost or accrual based. This unfortu-
nate discrepancy can lead to difficulty in interpreting government
budget information and performance.
Although cash accounting is the general default rule, some specific
government obligations and outlays are reflected in the federal budget
under obligation-based accounting.18 4 Thus, costs of goods purchased
may be reflected when the government enters into a legally binding
obligation to pay for them. Under this approach, costs generally are
reflected even sooner than they otherwise would be under the cash or
the accrual method. Under another exception to cash method account-
ing rules, Congress uses the accrual method for some budget items.
For example, the federal budget uses accrual accounting to record in-
terest on public debt.185 In 1990, Congress moved to accrual-based
federal budget accounting for federal credit program outlays.18 6
Under cash-flow budgeting, direct loan outlays had been reflected as
expenses, even though many of the loans were likely to be repaid and,
180. GAO, ACCRUAL BUDGETING, supra note 144, at 33 ("[Clontrol over spending is
greatest if the budget recognizes the complete cost at the time the decision is
made . ").
181. See discussion supra notes 148-151, 161-164, and accompanying text.
182. GAO, GLOSSARY, supra note 140, at 19 ("As a general rule, budget receipts and
outlays are on a cash or cash equivalent basis . . ").
183. GAO, ACCRUAL BUDGETING, supra note 144, at 32.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., 2004 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 136, at 302 ("Treasury se-
curities held by the public are measured as the par value less the unamortized
discount or premium . . . ."). see also, id. at 300, n.1; GAO, GLOSSARY, supra note
140, at 19; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET ISSUES: BUDGETING FOR FED-
ERAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS, GAO/AIMD-97-16, 22 n.1 (1997) [hereinafter GAO,
BUDGETING FOR FED. INSUR. PROGRAMS]
186. Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13201(a), 104 Stat.
1388-610 (1990) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 661 (2000). Military and civilian retire-
ment benefit costs are also now reflected in the federal budget on an accrual ba-
sis. Since the retirement benefit expense to the federal employer is paid into
government retirement trust funds, the accrual accounting issues for retirement
costs are different. They are discussed infra at notes 290-318 and accompanying
text.
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thus, did not reflect a real economic cost to the government. At the
same time, the cost of federal loan guarantee programs was not re-
flected in the budget until the government was called upon to make
payments in the event of the primary obligor's default. In connection
with its 1990 budget accounting reforms, Congress reported that the
cash method approach "overstates the real economic cost of direct loan
programs and understates the real economic cost of loan guarantee
programs in the year loans are made."1 8 7 Under the revised provi-
sions, "'cost' means the estimated long-term cost to the Government of
a direct loan or loan guarantee . . . calculated on a net present value
basis, excluding administrative costs and any incidental effects on
government receipts or outlays."1ss Thus, the federal budget now ac-
counts for estimated recoveries from borrowers and estimated ex-
penses from defaults on a present value accrual basis.
b) Prevalence of Cash Method Accounting in the Federal
Budget
If accrual method accounting is thought to result in the most accu-
rate reflection of economic income and if the private companies and
the federal government both use accrual accounting for financial pur-
poses, one might appropriately question why accrual basis accounting
is not generally used for budget purposes. The question is even more
appropriate given that cash method budget accounting seems to invite
timing gimmicks. Under the cash-flow method, for example, Congress
can authorize a new program with substantial long-term costs, but not
reflect those costs in the budget until payments are later made.18 9
These timing gimmicks can result in dramatic understatement of fed-
187. H.R. REP. No. 101-964 at 1161 (1990).
188. 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(A) (2000). Direct loan costs are now reflected in the budget
based upon the combined net present value of loan disbursements, repayments of
principal, and payments of interest "over the life of the loan after adjusting for
estimated defaults, prepayments, fees, penalties, and other recoveries." Id. Loan
guarantees are now reflected based upon the combined net present value of (i)
estimated payments by the Government to cover defaults and delinquencies, in-
terest subsidies, or other payments and (ii) the estimated payments to the Gov-
ernment including origination and other fees, penalties, and recoveries. Id.
189. See Block, Pathologies, supra note 16, at 864-65 ("With regard to accounting,
Congress uses cash-flow, rather than present value accounting. This permits
Congress not to take future costs into account until they are actually paid-out, as
opposed to assessing the present value of anticipated future costs."); Elizabeth
Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHIC. L. REV. 501, 527-28 (1998); Theodore P. Seto,
Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What it is Supposed
to Do (And No More), 106 YALE L. J. 1449, 1481 (1997) ("timing of cash flows can
easily be manipulated"); Id. at 1484 ("The potential for avoidance created by this
inaccuracy of the cash method arises any time the government incurs an obliga-
tion that it does not immediately pay.").
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eral budget deficits or an overstatement of surpluses, giving the public
a rosier economic picture than appropriate.i 90
One major objective of the budget process surely is to provide accu-
rate information of long-term budget impact.1 9 ' When the budget is
maintained on a cash-flow basis, huge future liabilities are not re-
flected, resulting in a highly inaccurate picture of the government's
financial health. As one commentator noted, "Congress may obligate
the government in ways that ensure financial catastrophe. As long as
no actual payment is made, however, the cash method will report that
all is well."' 9 2 In addition to this "information" objective, the federal
budget process should incorporate what I have earlier referred to as
the "democracy-oriented" goals of accountability and transparency. 193
By allowing distortion and manipulation, a federal budget based upon
cash method accounting arguably violates these principles. Reports
from other countries that have adopted accrual-based budgeting sug-
gest accountability and transparency advantages to the accrual ap-
proach. For example, proponents of the new accrual approach in New
Zealand report that private sector accrual accounting standards are
better accepted and understood by practitioners, thus "helping to en-
sure that the budget is understood and subject to greater public scru-
tiny than was possible when the budget was cash-based."194 Officials
in New Zealand and the United Kingdom also saw advantages in pro-
viding greater consistency between financial and budget accounting.
Under their previous cash-based budget systems, these officials noted
that "differing budgeting and reporting standards generally provided
conflicting signals to decision makers and could lead to the failure to
adequately focus on results and performance. They viewed the align-
ment of the basis of budgetary measurement with that used in finan-
cial accounting standards, i.e. accrual, as providing a consistent basis
with which to make comparisons."19 5
In fairness, one should observe that cash method budgeting does
offer some advantages. For one thing, it is easy to measure and easy
to track. As a practical matter, the GAO points out that the time be-
tween the underlying transaction and the cash flow for many govern-
ment activities, such as salary and grant payments, is relatively short
190. See discussion infra notes 201, 203, 226-34, 379-94 and accompanying text.
191. GAO, 2002 BUDGET COMPLIANCE, supra note 132, at 37.
192. Seto, supra note 189, at 1483. The most significant future government obligation
not now reflected in the budget is Social Security. Id. at 1484 ("The largest budg-
etary time bomb now waiting to go off is Social Security, which involves massive
future payments that Congress has obligated the government to make but which,
under the cash method, have no current budgetary impact."). For further discus-
sion of Social Security issues, see infra notes 292-312 and accompanying text.
193. Block, Pathologies, supra note 16, at 900-04.
194.. GAO, ACCRUAL BUDGETING, supra note 144, at 80.
195. Id.
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in any event.' 9 6 Consequently, results under accrual-based budgeting
for these activities would not significantly differ from those under
cash-based budgeting. Nor is there universal agreement that a move
to accrual-based budgeting would necessarily improve transparency.
Many accrual-based judgements require estimates, assumptions, and
projections that could make budget computations more complicated.
While there are admittedly some advantages to the cash method of
budgeting, the huge budget distortions resulting from the failure to
appropriately reflect future liabilities from activities such as employee
pension programs, retirement health programs, Social Security, and
environmental clean-up simply cry out for reform. Such calls for re-
form date at least back to a 1967 report of the presidential budget
commission, which recommended that "budget expenditures and re-
ceipts be reported on an accrual basis instead of the present cash ba-
sis. " 197 More recently, the Director for Federal Budget Analysis noted
that "[w]hile there are significant estimation and implementation
challenges, accrual-based budgeting has the potential to improve
budgetary information and incentives ... by providing more accurate
and timely recognition of the government's costs and improving the
information and incentives for managing insurance costs."198
As previously noted, until 1990, cash-flow approaches to federal
budgeting severely understated the costs of federal direct loan and
loan guarantee programs, resulting in a rosier budget picture than
would be reported under an accrual approach. Congress responded by
switching to accrual-based budgeting for such programs. 199 Precisely
the same concerns arise with respect to federal insurance programs,
including deposit insurance. As the GAO noted, the "mismatch is
most obvious for programs in which the government's commitment ex-
tends for many years into the future, such as for life insurance and
pension guarantees." 20 0 In fact, some have argued that the savings
and loan crisis in the 1980s was exacerbated by the shortcomings of
cash-flow budgeting.2O1 With respect to the savings and loan crisis,
the GAO noted that
196. Id. at 35.
197. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 7, 36-46 (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMIS-
SION REPORT].
198. Hearings Before the House Budget Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Su-
san J. Irving, Dir. for Fed. Budget Analysis).
199. See discussion supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
200. GAO, BUDGETING FOR FED. INSUR. PROGRAMS, supra note 185, at 7. The report
went on to observe that "[elven for programs in which the insurance commitment
is short term, cash-based reporting may not be adequate because some risks in-
sured by the government - e.g., flood and crop damage - result in losses that al-
though predictable are nevertheless variable on an annual basis." Id.
201. Id. at 3.
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corrective action was delayed and the government's ultimate cost increased.
The cash-based budget provided little incentive to address the growing prob-
lem because it did not recognize the costs until institutions were closed and
depositors paid. This delayed budget recognition obscured the program's, as
well as the government's, underlying fiscal condition and limited the budget
process as a means for the Congress to assess the problem.
2 0 2
The President's 1992 budget made similar observations:
Proper measurement of deposit insurance subsidies over the last decade
would have shown that thrifts and banks were depending more heavily on
deposit insurance guarantees. Without them, firms would quickly have lost
the ability to fund themselves and continue to operate. The costs of deposit
insurance thus would have been shown to be growing at an alarming rate.
Recording this increase in exposure as part of the budget might have en-
couraged more timely action to reform the system and limits losses. 2 0 3
Despite similar concerns for federal loan and federal insurance
program budget accounting, the 1990 switch to accrual accounting for
federal credit programs explicitly did not extend to federal insurance
programs. 20 4 Recognizing, however, that similar issues were at stake,
Congress directed the OMB and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to
study "whether the accounting for Federal deposit insurance pro-
grams should be on a cash basis on the same basis as loan guarantees,
or on a different basis."20 5 Reports generated pursuant to this con-
gressional study mandate concluded that federal deposit, life, pension,
and other insurance should be treated for budgetary purposes on an
accrual basis. 20 6 Despite several legislative proposals to switch to ac-
crual-based accounting for federal insurance programs, none has yet
been enacted. For example, a proposal included in President Bush's
Fiscal Year 1992 budget led to introduction of the Pension Security
Accounting Act, 207 which would have moved federal pension and re-
202. Id.
203. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
U.S. Gov, FISCAL YEAR 1992, 214-15 (1991)
204. 2 U.S.C. § 661e(a) (2000).
205. 2 U.S.C. §661e(b) (2000).
206. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF DEPOSIT INSUR-
ANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORM (May 1991); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
BUDGETING FOR DEPOSIT INSURANCE (June 1991); see also GAO, BUDGETING FOR
FED. INSUR. PROGRAMS, supra note 185 (1992 testimony of Comptroller General
and the CBO); Hearings Before the House Budget Comm., 108th Cong. (2002)
(statement of Susan J. Irving, Dir. for Fed. Budget Analysis, U.S. Gen. Account-
ing Office) (repeating that "in 1997 we reported that the current cash-based
budget generally provides incomplete information on the costs of federal insur-
ance programs. The ultimate costs to the federal government may not be appar-
ent up front because of time lags between the extension of the insurance, the
receipt of premiums, and the payment of claims. While there are significant esti-
mation and implementation challenges, accrual-based budgeting has the poten-
tial to improve budgetary information and incentives.., for managing insurance
costs.").
207. Enhanced Economic Growth and Job Creation Act of 1992, H.R. 4200, 102d
Cong., tit. 11 (1992).
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tirement benefit insurance programs to accrual-based budgeting simi-
lar to that adopted for federal direct loans and loan guarantees in
1990.208 The federal insurance issue resurfaced in the 105th Con-
gress, in which the Budget Committee formed the Task Force on
Budget Process Reform. 20 9 After Task Force hearings in 1998, Repre-
sentatives Nussle and Cardin introduced the Comprehensive Budget
Process Reform Act of 1998, which was referred to the Budget Com-
mittee, but never acted upon.2 10 They reintroduced a similar measure
in the 106th Congress as the Comprehensive Budget Process Reform
Act of 1999.211 Included among the proposed reforms was a provision
requiring Congress and the President to switch from cash to accrual-
based budgeting for federal insurance programs. 2 12
One explanation for the less than enthusiastic response to pro-
posed federal insurance budgeting reforms may be the tempered reac-
tion of expert witnesses testifying on the issue before the House
Budget Committee. Few would question that cash-based budgeting
for federal insurance programs provides a distorted and misleading
picture of the federal government's financial position.2 13 In fact, wit-
nesses before the Budget Committee all agreed that the cash-flow ap-
proach to federal insurance was fundamentally flawed. For example,
one witness testified that
cash-based budgeting for insurance programs presents several problems. Its
focus on single period cash flows can obscure the program's cost to the govern-
ment and thus may (1) distort the information and incentives presented to
policymakers, (2) skew the recognition of the program's economic impact, and
(3) cause fluctuations in the deficit unrelated to long-term fiscal balance. 2 1 4
208. While stating their general support for such a change, both the GAO and the
CBO objected to the administration's specific proposals in 1992, arguing in part
that the "selective application of the accrual concept reinforces the notion that
the change was proposed more for particular policy purposes rather than for im-
proved financial management." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCRUAL
BUDGETING, GAO/AFMD-92-49R, at 4 (Feb. 1992) (letter from Gen. Charles A.
Bowsher, Comptroller, to Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs with enclosed
letter from Robert D. Reischauer, Dir. of CBO to Senate Budget Comm.).
209. H.R. 105-844, Activities and Summary Report of the Comm. on the Budget dur-
ing the 105th Cong., at 15 (1999).
210. H.R. 4837, 105th Cong., tit. V (1998).
211. H.R. 853, 106th Cong., tit. V (1999).
212. Id. at § 603.
213. As a matter of terminology, the FASAB distinguishes between "financial posi-
tion" and "financial condition." The concept of financial position is a balance-
sheet type notion that provides "a 'point-in-time' snapshot of an entity's economic
resources and the claims on those resources." FASAB, CONCEPT No. 1, supra note
117, 177-82. "Financial condition," on the other hand, is "broader and more
forward-looking." For the U.S. government, the additional data could include fi-
nancial and nonfinancial information about current conditions and reasonable
expectations regarding the national and even the global society." Id. 180.
214. Hearings Before the House Budget Comm., 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter 1998
House Budget Hearings] (statement of Susan J. Irving, Assoc. Dir., Budget Is-
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Witnesses before the Budget Committee praised the 1990 budget re-
forms applicable to federal loans and loan guarantees and noted that
the same accounting issues are raised in the context of federal
insurance. 2 15
At the same time, however, the witnesses acknowledged major im-
plementation challenges to accrual-based budgeting for federal insur-
ance programs. Most important, they noted, were the difficulties in
estimating or forecasting future insured losses. In most instances of
federal government insurance protection, the private sector has re-
fused to provide insurance because of its inability to adequately assess
the probability of highly uncertain risks. Surely, the federal govern-
ment will face the same challenges as it attempts to estimate the ex-
tent of future liabilities. As Susan Irving observed, "when underlying
conditions are not fully understood, estimates are said to be made
under uncertainty. This is the case for most federal insurance pro-
grams due to the nature of the risks insured, program modifications,
and other changes in conditions that affect potential losses."2 16 In ad-
dition to obligations resulting from actual federal insurance programs,
the government sometimes is called upon to bailout state or local gov-
ernments, or even private industry, in cases of emergency. 2 17 Esti-
sues, GAO, Accounting and Information Mgmt. Div.); see also id. (statement of
Marvin Phaup, CBO Deputy Ass't Dir,. Spec. Studies Division) ("[Clurrent cash
basis of accounting used in the federal budget provides policymakers with neither
the information nor the incentives to control the cost of government insurance
programs."); id. (statement of Rudolph G. Penner, Senior Fellow, Urban Insti-
tute) (Budget accounting for federal government's insurance programs "can give a
totally misleading picture of the financial health of such programs."); see also
Hearing on H.R. 853 Before House Budget Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinaf-
ter 1999 House Budget Hearings] (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Dir., CBO) ("Al-
though [the] budgetary picture makes PBGC [Pension Guarantee Guaranty
Corporation] appear to be a moneymaker for the U.S. government, cash-based
accounting does not acknowledge the liabilities that the agency has accrued but
has yet to pay and does not address taxpayers exposure from the insurance com-
mitments."); Hearings Before the Comm. on Rules, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinaf-
ter 1999 House Rules Comm. Hearings](statement of Susan J. Irving, GAO Assoc.
Dir., Budget Issues, Accounting and Information Management Division) ("The
budget was not designed to and does not provide complete information on long-
term cost implications stemming from some of the government's commitments
when they are made. We have long advocated that policymakers need informa-
tion on the long-term cost consequences of today's commitments.").
215. See, e.g., 1998 House Budget Hearings, supra note 214 (statement of Rudolph G.
Penner) ("Although analysts also face formidable difficulties in making the esti-
mates necessary to implement the Credit Reform Act of 1990 (CRA), I believe
that it has been extremely successful.").
216. Id. (statement of Susan J. Irving).
217. See, e.g., Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185,
93 Stat. 1324 (1980); Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 92-70,
85 Stat. 178 (1971) (legislation motivated by financial problems of the Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation); New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-339, 92 Stat. 460 (1978; New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub.
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mates of such long-term risks are even more difficult than risk
estimates for formal programs such as deposit and pension insurance.
One can argue that the government confronts similar issues in es-
timating future costs from direct loans that will never be repaid and
loans that it is called upon to pay pursuant to a loan guarantee when
the obligor defaults. Despite these difficulties, Congress manages to
make reasonable estimates for accrual-based budgeting of loans and
loan guarantees. Yet, two differences arguably make the estimation
problems far more difficult in the context of federal insurance pro-
grams. First, although the probability of risk may be uncertain, at
least the amount of potential risk exposure is generally limited and
measurable in the context of federal government loans and loan guar-
antees. Second, since loans generally have fixed terms, the time pe-
riod of risk exposure generally is limited and measurable in the loan
context. 2 18 In contrast, the magnitude and timing of federal govern-
ment insurance programs, particularly for deposit insurance and pen-
sion guarantees is much more difficult to forecast. 2 19
A small, but significant, change in the 1999 proposal for switching
to accrual-based budgeting for federal insurance should have made
the proposal more palatable to those with administrative feasibility
concerns based on estimation challenges. The reform version intro-
duced in the 106th Congress would have delayed full implementation
of accrual budgeting until fiscal year 2006.220 In his testimony on the
provision, CBO Director Dan Crippen took the position that the
"lengthy transition is appropriate and would give agencies with oper-
ating responsibilities for insurance programs - as well as the OMB and
the CBO - some time to collect the relevant data, develop and test fi-
nancial models of those processes, and display the results in the
budget documents on a trial basis."2 2 1 At the same hearing, however,
another witness praised the delayed date for moving to the accrual-
based approach, but complained that the proposed legislation also pro-
vided for a sunset after only two years. This was viewed as problem-
atic because "the knowledge that the numbers would only be used in
the budget for two years could reduce the pressure to do the hard work
necessary to develop good estimates . . . and changing the basis of
budget numbers for only 2 years is likely to be both burdensome and
confusing."2 22
L. No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797 (1975). For a comprehensive discussion of the many
different types of federal bailouts, see Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts:
Developing a Public Bailout Policy, 67 IND. L. J. 951 (1992).
218. See 1998 House Budget Hearings, supra note 214 (statement of Marvin Phaup).
219. Estimates of risk exposure might be slightly less complicated in the case of
shorter-term programs, including federal flood and crop insurance.
220. H.R. 853, §§ 602-603, 106th Cong. (1999).
221. 1999 House Budget Hearings, supra note 214 (statement of Dan L. Crippen).
222. Id. (statement of Susan J. Irving).
[Vol. 82:365
2003] CONGRESS AND ACCOUNTING SCANDALS 413
The ti-e .a con a fo1-Congress finally to act. Caah-based budget
accounting for federal insurance programs results in substantial dis-
tortions. Given the greater accuracy of accrual accounting, Congress
now insists that taxpayers use the accrual method for inventories and
requires many businesses to adopt accrual-based accounting for tax
purposes. 223 Congress should similarly impose more accrual-based
rules upon itself. Despite an ongoing discussion of the problem and
repeated task force and departmental studies since at least 1992,224
little movement has occurred. All seem to be agreed that the switch to
accrual-based accounting must be made and that the sticking point is
establishing the appropriate methodology and resources for estimat-
ing future government obligations. A delayed switch without the two-
year sunset provision would put feet to the fire and perhaps move the
estimation methodology process along.
A compromise approach suggested by one witness was to make pre-
sent value estimates informational,
unless the gap between the present value of receipts and outlays on the stock
of outstanding insurance exceeded some threshold, say 5 percent of the pre-
sent value of premiums. At that point, an appropriation could be required to
create a sufficient reserve to bring the subsidy value under the threshold or
the law could require an increase in premiums or a reduction in benefits. This
approach would mean that the Congress would not be beholden to uncertain
estimates of present values each and every year, but would be forced to take
action if things were getting severely out of line. 2 2 5
Another compromise would be to move ahead with respect to those
federal insurance programs for which estimating techniques can be
developed more quickly. For example, better historical and actuarial
data is available with respect to flood and crop insurance than for de-
posit and pension insurance. Congress has already adopted a partial
and incremental approach toward accrual-based budget accounting by
providing for such accounting with respect to some items and not
others. Administrative problems regarding estimation for some fed-
eral insurance programs should not hinder the movement to accrual-
based accounting for other insurance programs with respect to which
estimation concerns are not as great.
c) Cash Method Budget Accounting - Potential for Timing
Gimmicks
(i) Delayed Outflows: Advance Appropriations and
Related Budget Devices
A rather crass motive unfortunately may explain the congressional
reluctance to switch to accrual-based budgeting for more budget
223. See discussion supra at notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
224. See discussion supra at notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
225. 1999 House Budget Hearings, supra note 214 (statement of Rudolph G. Penner).
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items. Cash method accounting offers many opportunities to manipu-
late the timing of receipts and expenses for budget purposes and such
budget gimmicks are often simply too difficult for legislators to resist.
One common congressional timing gimmick repeatedly used under
cash method budget accounting is to delay outflows until periods
outside the budget window.226 This technique was especially popular
in the world of spending caps and PAYGO budget limitations, which
required that spending increases be offset with increased revenue. 22 7
Budget expert, Allen Schick, notes that the "easiest way to remove a
spending increase from the score is to schedule it to take effect beyond
the period covered by the baseline" so that it will never be scored as a
spending increase. 2 28 Another observer similarly remarked that
"[fliddling with the fiscal year - either to put an expenditure in an
earlier or later accounting period, depending on which will help the
most - is a pure (if that word may be used) gimmick. Defense salaries
may be paid a day earlier or later, thus saving billions for the next
fiscal year. Medicare miraculously lived on an 11-month year in 1980
and 13-month year in 1981."229
One common method for delaying outflows is to provide for ad-
vance appropriations or to phase in program expansions over a period
of years beyond the budget window. Under budget scorekeeping rules,
advance appropriations are "scored as new budget authority in the fis-
cal year in which the funds become newly available for obligation, not
when the appropriations are enacted."23o Despite repeated efforts,
and some successes, in limiting advance appropriations, the technique
is still popular with congressional budget makers.231 Enron appar-
226. Historically, Congress has adopted a five-year window for purposes of federal
budgeting, the statutory minimum pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §632(a) (1974) ("The con-
current resolution shall set forth appropriate levels for the fiscal year beginning
on Oct. 1 . . . and for at least each of the 4 ensuing fiscal years . . . ."). More
recently, however, Congress has moved to a ten-year period. See discussion in
Block, Pathologies, supra note 16, at 875; see also Garrett, supra note 189, at 527.
President Bush's Fiscal Year 2004 budget, however, suggested a return to the
five-year budget window. 2004 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 136.
227. Spending caps and PAYGO rules of the Budget Enforcement Act recently expired.
See discussion supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text; see also Block,
Pathologies, supra note 16, at 868-69.
228. SCHICK, supra note 15, at 68.
229. AARON WILDAVSKY & NAOMI CAIDEN, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PRO-
CESS 121-22 (4th ed. 2001).
230. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 120, app. A, at para. 2 (2002). As Wildavsky
and Caiden discuss, this rule enabled Congress to make appropriations in one
year but to have money scored against the caps for a later year. WILDAVSKY &
CAIDEN, supra note 229, at 333-34.
231. In an apparent effort to curb advance appropriations, the President's 2004 budget
proposal argued that the advance appropriation practice "distorts the debate over
Government spending and misleads the public about spending levels .. " Thus,
it proposed freezing "all advance appropriations at their 2002 levels, except for
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ently engaged in similar activities, "using energy contracts called 'pre-
pays,' which provided Enron a large advance payment to deliver
natural gas or other energy products."2 32
Also under cash method budgeting, Congress can manipulate
budget figures by arbitrarily shifting the pay date from one fiscal year
to another. Using this technique, Congress takes advantage of the
distinction between budget authority and budget outlays. While Con-
gress votes to authorize appropriations for government activity, mea-
surement of the fiscal surplus or deficit is based upon actual
outlays.233 Thus, it can reduce this year's apparent deficit by simply
shifting outlays to a different fiscal year. As an example, this particu-
lar device saved just over $2 billion from the fiscal year 1999 budget
by simply moving the payday for substantial military salary from Sep-
tember 30, 2000 to October 1, 2000, thus moving the outlay into fiscal
year 2000.234
(ii) Delayed Revenue Losses: Phase-Ins and Sunsets
In a related technique known as "back-loading," tax cuts or other
loss producing programmatic changes can also be phased in over a
long period of time so that revenue losses occur outside of the budget
window, resulting in a rosier economic budget picture. Such phase-ins
were used on a massive scale in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 in order to push budget costs into subse-
quent years.2 35 Rather than implement an immediate, one-time tax
those that should be reduced or eliminated for programmatic reasons." 2004 AN-
ALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 136, at 317; see also SCHICK, supra note 15, at
66. In its recent fiscal year 2004 Concurrent Budget Resolution, Congress cre-
ated self-imposed restrictions on advance appropriations, but immediately ex-
empted itself with respect to certain accounts specifically labeled as "Accounts
Identified for Advance Appropriations." H. Con. Res. 95, 108th Cong., § 501
(2003).
232. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., 1 REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF
ENRON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COM-
PENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, JCS-3-03, at 70 (2003).
233. For a general discussion of the distinction between authorization and outlays, see
COLLENDER, supra note 139, at 2-5 and WILDAVSKY & CAIDEN, supra note 229, at
7-9.
234. Dept. of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501, tit. III, Fiscal
Year 2000 Offsets and Rescissions, § 305 (1999) (providing that "the basic pay
and allowances that accrues to members of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and
Air Force for the pay period ending on September 30, 2000 shall be paid .... no
earlier than October 1, 2000").
235. Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, § 101(a) (2001) (phased-in reduction in income
tax rates through 2006); id. at § 501 (delayed repeal of the estate and generation-
skipping transfer taxes until 2010); id. at § 511 (phased-in reduction of maximum
estate tax rates through 2009); id. at § 521 (phased-in increase of unified credit
exempt amount for estate tax purposes through 2010). Another example of the
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cut, Congress provided for a gradual reduction in rates to begin with a
retroactive rate reduction of the lowest bracket for the 2000 tax year
and a table of subsequent reductions for the remaining tax brackets to
occur from June 30, 2001 through January 1, 2006.236
On the flip side, by "front-loading," Congress sometimes deliber-
ately enacts tax breaks with expiration dates, anticipating that the
provision will be extended into future years once the initial provision
expires. The "sunset" clause reduces anticipated future costs of the
provision for budget purposes. Historically, sunset clauses were used
for relatively minor tax provisions as opposed to across-the-board
changes in tax rates. For example, Congress has authorized special
provisions for qualified research expense credits,23 7 work opportunity
credits, 238 and other similar business credits, with built-in automatic
expiration dates. Sometimes referred to as "extenders," these tax pro-
visions require legislation to extend their effective dates.2 39
The Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 ushered
in a new "sunsetting" era, for the first time using expiration dates for
sweeping general tax rate reductions. In addition to the phased-in
rate cuts effective through 2006, the Act included a bizarre expiration
date worthy of the Mad Hatter in Alice in Wonderland. First, the stat-
ute provides that all of its provisions expire after December 31,
2010.240 Thereafter, the Tax Code is to be applied as if the statute
"had never been enacted."24 1 In other words, in 2011 the tax rates are
to magically revert to their pre-2001 levels. Although Congress re-
cently accelerated the pace of the 2001 Act rate reductions, the statu-
tory amendments remain subject to the 2011 "sunset" provision.24 2
phase-in budget technique used to delay reflection of budget losses is the Tax-
payer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, § 501 (1997) (phased-
in increase of unified credit exempt amount for estate tax purposes through
2006).
236. The table provided that the then 28%, 31%, 36%, and 39.6% brackets would be
gradually reduced, respectively, to 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%. Pub. L. No. 107-16,
supra note 238, at § 501. See also supra note 233. Congress recently accelerated
the pace of the phased-in reductions so that the rates originally scheduled to take
effect in 2006 will be effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 2002.
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
117 Stat. 752, § 105(a) [hereinafter Jobs & Growth Act].
237. I.R.C. § 41 (2000).
238. I.R.C. § 51 (2000).
239. See, e.g., Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L.
No. 106-170, 113 Stat. 1031, tit. V, Tax Relief Extension Act of 1999 § 502(a)
(1999) (extending the research credit through 2004); see also Job Creation and
Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21, tit. VI, Exten-
sions of Certain Expiring Tax Provisions (2002).
240. Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38, tit. IX, § 901(a)(1) (2001).
241. Id. at § 901(b).
242. Jobs & Growth Act, supra note 236, at § 107 ("Each amendment made by this
title shall be subject to title IX of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconcilia-
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Such gimmickry was designed solely for the purpose of complying with
congressional budget procedures.243
Obvious gimmickry appears again in the recent 2003 Tax Act. For
example, the legislation accelerates expansion of the low ten-percent
bracket, but only for 2003 and 2004.244 From 2005 through 2008, the
income levels required for the 10-percent bracket revert to pre-2003
levels, to increase again in 2008, only to revert to pre-2001 levels in
2010.245 The 2003 Tax Act also reduced tax rates on "qualified divi-
dend income,"2 46 but provides that the reduction will expire or sunset
for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008.247 Former Con-
gressional Budget Director Robert Reischauer, refers to the 2003
amendments as '"Cinderella' provisions because seven of the bill's
eight tax cuts turn into pumpkins between 2004 and 2008."248 Most
troubling to many, the administration and others pretend "that tax
cuts it fully expects Congress to extend are just temporary."24 9 If, in
fact, the tax cuts simply are to be reenacted as soon as they expire, the
budget cost is obviously much greater than that reflected in the cur-
rent budget. The CBO recently concluded that "[i]f all expiring tax
provisions (except some related to the alternative minimum tax) were
extended and a Medicare prescription drug benefit was provided at
the cost assumed in the Congressional budget resolution, the baseline
budget outlook projected for 2013 would change from a surplus of $211
tion Act of 2001 to the same extent and in the same manner as the provision of
such Act to which such amendment relates.").
243. Under a special Senate budget procedural rule, popularly known as the "Byrd
Rule," Senators may raise a point of order against a provision "if it decreases, or
would decrease, revenues during a fiscal year after the fiscal years covered by...
[a] reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution, and such ... decreases ... are
greater than... revenue increases resulting from other provisions in such title in
such year. . ." 2 U.S.C. § 644(a)(1)(E) (2000). The 2001 budget resolution covered
a ten-year period. If the rate reductions in the 2001 Act had continued beyond
this ten-year period, they would have violated the Byrd Rule and thus been sub-
ject to a point of order. With a remarkable degree of candor, the Senate entitled
Title IX of the Act, providing for expiration of the tax cuts after ten years, "Com-
pliance with Congressional Budget Act," making it clear that the sunset provision
was entirely designed as a budget gimmick.
244. Jobs & Growth Act, supra note 236, at § 104; See also explanation in H.R. REP.
No. 108-126, at 11 (2003).
245. See Jobs & Growth Act, supra note 236, at § 104. The provision calling for ex-
pansion of the ten-percent bracket in 2008 and disappearance of the bracket ex-
pansion in 2010 were part of the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of
2001, see supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.
246. Jobs & Growth Act, supra note 236, at § 302(a).
247. Id. at § 303, ("Sunset of Title").
248. Steven Mufson, Of Sunsets and Pumpkins, WASH. POST, June 1, 2003, at B2
(quoting former Budget director, Robert Reischauer).
249. Id.; see also William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Sunsets in the Tax Code, 99 TAX
NOTES 1553, 1557 (2003) ("Policymakers supporting sunsets have every intention
of trying to make the policies permanent.").
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billion to a deficit of $324 billion."250 A former I.R.S. Commissioner
refers to the sunset provisions as a "joke," commenting on the "artifi-
cial sunset provisions designed by lawmakers to make the packages
appear less costly than they really are . . ."251 A study by the co-
directors of the Tax Policy Center at the Brookings Institution con-
cludes that:
[ulsing sunsets in this manner - to avoid the constraints imposed by the
budget rules and raise the underlying annual size of a tax cut within a given
multi-year budget total - is a serious problem. It pushes the nation farther
down an already unsustainable fiscal path. It elevates expectations that the
tax cuts will indeed be continued, even if they are ultimately unaffordable
given the nation's long-term fiscal gap. It is gapingly hypocritical and poorly
timed, given the crackdown on fraudulent corporate accounting practices.2 5 2
Going even further, another commentator observed that "the increas-
ing reliance on gimmicks is putting the federal budget on a path to-
ward 'Enron-style accounting,' in which the official budget projections
are 'universally seen as unreliable and even fraudulent because they
are based on assumptions everyone knows to be false, such as that
various major tax cuts will simply be allowed to expire."253 Congress
is in a poor position to be so vitriolic in its attack on corporate account-
ing scandals when Congress itself engages in similar budget account-
ing gimmicks.
(iii) Cash v. Accrual Accounting in the Tax Expenditure
Budget
When federal income tax provisions provide deductions or credits
to taxpayers for items that would not ordinarily be subtracted under
ideal economic measures of income, the foregone revenue is a type of
indirect federal spending. Beginning with the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Act of 1974,254 Congress recognized the need to ac-
count for this type of indirect spending by requiring the federal budget
to include information about lost revenue from tax expenditures. 255
250. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UP-
DATE (Aug. 2003). Another study estimated that "[i]f all the temporary provisions
in the conference agreement were extended, the total revenue loss through 2013
would amount to $1.09 trillion, more than three times the official $350 billion
revenue estimate." Gale & Orszag, supra note 249, at 1553.
251. Tom Herman, Tax Plan Takes Shape: Income, Dividend Effects of Tax Bill Come
Into Focus - House, Senate Bills Would Trim Marginal Rates, Life Child Credit
and Ease the 'Marriage Penalty, WALL ST. J., May 19, 2003, at C1 (quoting former
I.R.S. Commissioner, Mortimer Caplin).
252. Gale & Orszag, supra note 249, at 1557-58 (emphasis added).
253. Press Release, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Senate Appears Poised to
Approve Tax Cut with Actual Cost of $660 Billion (May 15, 2003) (available at
http://www.cbpp.org/5-15--3tax-pr.htm).
254. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 632(e)(2)(E) (1997)).
255. "Tax expenditures" are statutorily defined to include "those revenue losses attrib-
utable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, ex-
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Although the notion of a tax expenditure budget itself is not especially
controversial, disagreements can arise over which expenditures
should be included. Some deductions are designed to provide a more
refined or accurate reflection of taxpayers' true economic income.
Such deductions or credits should not be included in the tax expendi-
ture budget. On the other hand, other deductions or credits are de-
signed to provide tax breaks to particular economic activities or
incentives to stimulate particular kinds of economic or social behavior.
The latter types of deductions or credits should be incorporated into
the tax expenditure budget. Disagreements over items in the tax ex-
penditure budget generally stem from differing views on whether a
particular deduction or credit belongs in the former or the latter
category.
As a general rule, the tax expenditure budget uses the same cash-
based accounting approach that is used for the federal budget gener-
ally.25 6 As with the general budget, cash-based reporting presents a
distorted image of the real economic picture. The President's budget
concedes as much, stating that "[a]lthough [cash-based] estimates are
useful as a measure of cash flows into the Government, they do not
accurately reflect the true economic cost of these provisions."25 7 As a
complement to cash-basis estimates, the President's budget also re-
ports discounted present values for some provisions involving long-
term deferrals or revenue effects. The budget report noted that such
present value estimating was conceptually similar to the accrual-
based budgeting now used to report the budgetary effect of credit pro-
grams. 258 Interestingly, the provisions selected for present value
analysis include the revenue lost from the exclusion of employer-pro-
vided and other pension contributions, but not for the partial exclu-
sion of Social Security benefits from the tax base.259 Such selective
emption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a
preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability." 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2000).
The "tax expenditure budget" is simply "an enumeration of such tax expendi-
tures." Id.
256. For example, the President's budget for fiscal year 2004 reports that the "annual
value of tax expenditures is ... reported on a cash basis .... Cash-based esti-
mates reflect the difference between taxes deferred in the current year and in-
coming revenues that are received due to deferrals of taxes from prior years."
2004 ANALYTIcAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 136, at 102.
257. Id.
258. Id. ("Discounted present value estimates of revenue effects are presented in Table
6.4 for certain provisions that involve tax deferrals or other long-term revenue
effects. These estimates compliment the cash-based tax expenditure estimates
presented in other tables.") (emphasis added). Table 6-4 appears at id. at 112.
259. The cash-based estimates from Table 6-1 for employer, 401(k), IRAs, and Keogh
retirement contribution exclusions, id. at 104, total $128.2 billion as contrasted
with total present value estimates of $191.5 billion for the same expenditures in
Table 6-4, id. at 112. Clearly, the cash-based method severely understates the
cost of retirement tax expenditures.
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and inconsistent use of present value analysis may further distort the
tax expenditure budget and diminish its value.
Not only does the use of cash-based accounting distort the true eco-
nomic tax expenditure picture, but inconsistent applicability of the
cash method itself and inconsistent use of present value analysis re-
sults in yet further distortion. The methodology used to estimate cash
flows associated with pension plan tax expenditures 26 0 differs from
the methodology used to estimate cash flows from Social Security tax
expenditures. 26 1 The benefit-based cash flow method used to estimate
Social Security tax expenditure underestimates its true cost. 26 2 This
underestimation surely distorts policymakers views of Social Security
reform. In addition, however, the inconsistent methodology applied to
pensions and Social Security results in much higher tax expenditure
estimates for the former and often places pension-related tax benefits
near the top of the rank ordered list of the largest items in the tax
expenditure budget. 2 63
Reformers often look to the tax expenditure budget as evidence of
excessive tax breaks for certain privileged groups or activities. When
pressures build to increase the fairness and horizontal equity of the
Tax Code, reformers often look to the tax expenditure budget as a
place to broaden the tax base by eliminating special tax advantages.
Moreover, in the pre-2003 PAYGO budget world that required any de-
crease in revenues from tax cuts to be offset by increased revenues,
interest groups advocating new tax breaks became "funding
predators" looking for target programs to cut in exchange for new ben-
efits.264 Here again, the tax expenditure budget is the place that such
predators looked for victim programs. An estimation methodology
that places pension programs at the top of the list, while leaving So-
cial Security programs much lower further distorts the process. So,
260. See Dallas L. Salisbury, The Costs and Benefits of Pension Tax Expenditures in
PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TOMORROW 85, 88 (Dallas L.
Salisbury & Nora Super Jones eds., 1994).
261. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000-2004, JCS-13-99 (Comm. Print 1999).
262. For a good description of the difference in tax expenditure estimation methodol-
ogy and its implications, see Jonathan Barry Forman, Comparing Apples and
Oranges: Some Thoughts on the Pension and Social Security Tax Expenditures, 5
EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 297, 311-14 (2001).
263. For example, for fiscal year 2004, net exclusion of pension contributions and
earnings from employer plans ranked third on the list of largest federal tax ex-
penditures. 2004 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 136, at 110, tbl.6-3. For
fiscal years 2001 and 2002, employer pension plan provisions ranked first. OF-
FICE OF MGMT AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRES., BUDGET OF THE U.S. Gov-
ERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2002, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, at 117, tbl.5-3 (2001);
OFFICE OF MGMT AND BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRES., BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2001, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, at 71, tbl.5-3 (2000).
264. See Garrett, supra note 189, at 515-21; see also Block, Pathologies, supra note 16,
at 917-19.
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for example, one commentator notes that there is "more pressure to
curtail the special tax benefits for pensions and less pressure to curtail
the special tax benefits for Social Security."265
C. The "Off-Budget" Device
1. On v. Off Budget: Introduction
Pursuant to federal budget law, certain federal entities and pro-
grams have been excluded from the federal budget. Such an entity is
referred to as an "off-budget federal entity," defined to include "[a]ny
Federal fund or trust fund whose transactions are required by law to
be excluded from the totals of the President's budget submission and
Congress' budget resolution, despite the fact that these are part of the
government's total transactions."266 The Budget Enforcement Act of
1990, for example, explicitly provided that the budget should not in-
clude outlays and revenues from old age, survivors, and disability in-
surance programs under Title II of the Social Security Act in surplus
or revenue totals.26 7 In addition, receipts and disbursements of the
Postal Service are explicitly excluded from federal budget totals and
exempt from general budget limitations. 2 68 Congress noted that its
reason for severing its budgetary ties with the Postal Service was "to
ensure that the receipts and disbursements from the [Postal] Fund
cannot be used for purposes of artificially affecting the computations
of the federal budget deficit .. -269 Although such motivations are
laudable, the movement of items from on- to off-budget itself has po-
tential to game the system. As one key budget observer noted, "[t]here
is no standard list of reasons why a program is off budget; the decision
is almost always political and can be changed depending on the year
and situation."270
One obvious similarity between private sector and federal budget
accounting gimmicks is the use of off-budget activities. Enron and the
265. Forman, supra note 262, at 321.
266. SENATE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET EXPLANATION, supra note 135, at 56; see also
COLLENDER, supra note 139, at 206 (more simply defining "off-budget" as includ-
ing "[pirograms and agencies whose transactions have been excluded by law from
the unified federal budget."
267. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, § 13,301, tit. XIII (1990) (codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 632(a) (2000)); see also 2 U.S.C. § 655(a) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 911 (2000). For
further discussion of Social Security and related programs, see supra notes 288-
308 and accompanying text.
268. Congress created a revolving Postal Service Fund and declared that receipts and
disbursements from the fund would not be included in budget totals. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106, tit. IV,
Civil Service and Postal Service Programs, § 4001(a) (1989) (codified at 39 U.S.C.
§ 2009a (2000)).
269. H. REP. No. 101-247, at 873 (1989).
270. COLLENDER, supra note 139, at 12.
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federal government, for example, faced at least one common problem;
that is, large expenses for items not expected to generate significant
earnings over the short term.2 71 For Enron, the concern was substan-
tial losses on balance sheets relied upon by investors. For the U.S.
government, the related concern is substantial federal deficits that
can reduce public confidence in the economy. Both Enron and the fed-
eral government sometimes turned to a similar device - structuring
transactions to result in off-balance sheet treatment. 2 72 In some
cases, Enron created joint ventures. 27 3 In others, Enron used inde-
pendent special-purpose entities (SPEs).274 Enron's use of joint ven-
tures and off-budget SPEs parallels the federal government's use of
off-budget government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs).275
2. Trust Funds and Other Specially Earmarked Budget
Accounts
a) Budget Terminology
Use of the term "off-budget" can sometimes be inconsistent and
confusing. Technically speaking, the term "off-budget" is used to refer
only to the two Social Security programs and the postal service trust
fund that are statutorily excluded from the budget. The major signifi-
cance of declaring these items "off-budget" was to isolate and protect
them from the spending restrictions under the Budget Enforcement
Act.2 7 6 In addition to the formally designated off-budget entities, the
federal budget incorporates a tremendous number of accounts that are
earmarked for special purposes. These include trust funds and special
funds.277
271. For a description of Enron's concerns, see POWERS REPORT, supra note 2, at 36.
272. See id. at 37.
273. Id.
274. POwERS REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. Enron, however, did not properly follow ac-
counting rules for creating a legitimate SPE entitled to off-balance sheet treat-
ment. See id. at 7, 47-50. This, in part, led to Enron's downfall when it was
required to retroactively consolidate its balance sheets, thus showing a substan-
tial loss. Id. at 7.
275. See discussion infra notes 271-75 and accompanying text.
276. SCHICK, supra note 15, at 44-45.
277. The federal budget actually incorporates five types of funds in addition to the
general fund: special funds, public enterprise funds, intragovernmental funds,
nonrevolving trust funds, and revolving trust funds. U.S. GEN. ACOT. OFF., FED-
ERAL TRUST AND OTHER EARMARKED FUNDS: ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS, GAO-01-199SP, 8 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter GAO, EARMARKED FUNDS].
Nonrevolving trust funds and special funds are substantially similar. In both
cases, the entity is financed by specific tax receipts and other earmarked reve-
nues. Revolving trusts and public enterprise funds also are substantially similar.
These entities are both financed through their own business-type activity. Id. at
10. The GAO reports that even for similar kinds of programs, "there is no consis-
tency in whether they are funded by earmarked receipts or general fund appro-
priations." Id. In addition, the use of six different types of funds further
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Prior to 1969, the administrative federal budget excluded trust
funds from its computations. Beginning with the fiscal year 1969
budget, however, the President began to report a unified or consoli-
dated budget, 2 78 which included federal funds279 and the previously
excluded trust funds in its computation. 28 0 Congress followed suit by
requiring the report of a unified budget in the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.281 As currently used, the uni-
fied budget is the "form of the budget of the federal government in
which receipts and outlays from federal funds and trust funds are con-
solidated into a single total."282 Even though Social Security is tech-
nically considered an off-budget item, it is still included for purposes
of the unified budget.283 Despite the technical statutory definition of
off-budget, many administrators and legislators continue to loosely re-
fer to trust and special funds as "off-budget."
Adding to the complexity of the budget regime, the federal budget
uses at least three sets of figures for purposes of assessing the extent
of federal government deficit or surplus. In addition to the already
mentioned unified budget surplus or deficit, budget figures also in-
clude the on-budget surplus or deficit as well as the federal funds sur-
plus or deficit. The on-budget figures simply exclude the three
officially off-budget entities. 28 4 The federal funds budget is compara-
complicates an already enormously complicated budget process. The GAO sug-
gests that "transparency could be increased by recognizing the similarity between
non-revolving trust funds and special funds and between revolving trust funds
and public enterprise funds. Do we really need four fund types when two might
suffice?" Id. at 38-39.
278. Although "unified budget" is the term most frequently used to refer to the total
federal budget, the term "consolidated budget" is often used interchangeably. See
COLLENDER, supra note 139, at 86, n. 4.
279. See SCHICK, supra note 15, at 44-46.
280. The move to a unified budget was based upon concerns that budget reporting was
incomplete and inaccurate. The proposal originated with a recommendation from
a presidential budget commission. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 197.
281. Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, § 406 (1985) (amending Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 566(a)) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, budget authority, credit authority, and estimates of outlays and receipts for
activities of the Federal budget which are off-budget immediately prior to the
date of enactment of this section... shall be included in ... a concurrent resolu-
tion on the budget.")
282. COLLENDER, supra note 139, at 209.
283. Id.; see also 2004 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 136, at 475 ("The budget
combines the on- and off-budget totals to derive unified or consolidated totals for
Federal activity."); SENATE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET EXPLANATION, supra note
135, at 58 (defining the unified budget as "a comprehensive display of the Federal
budget. This display includes all revenues and all spending for all regular pro-
grams and trust funds."); SCHICK, supra note 15, at 45 ("Social Security is almost
always included in governmental and media reports on the budget.").
284. See discussion supra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.
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ble to the pre-1969 administrative budget, which excluded all trust
funds from the budget totals. 28 5
b) How Congress Uses Trust and Related Funds
Over the years, Congress has increasingly turned to the use of
trust funds and other earmarked funds for federal budgeting pur-
poses. In part, this trend can be explained by constituent pressures.
After all, a specially earmarked fund offers a level of comfort to those
interested in the particular federal government activity. Unfortu-
nately, however, the federal trust notion may lull the public into a
misguided sense of comfort since federal trust funds do not carry the
same fiduciary protections ordinarily provided by trusts in the private
sector. As the term is used for federal budget purposes, "the federal
government both owns the assets . . . and can, through legislation,
raise or lower the fund's collections or payments, or alter the purposes
of the trust fund."28 6
Perhaps more important, the increasing use of trust and other spe-
cially earmarked funds has enabled Congress to play additional games
with numbers and mask the true extent of federal deficits. To under-
stand the reason, it is important first to observe that, unlike other
federal budget accounts, the majority of earmarked funds take in more
than they currently need. Viewed as independent entities, they oper-
ate on a "surplus."28 7 Although the surpluses technically belong to
the special funds, the government can and does use the surplus to
fund other activities. For budget purposes, the surplus or "balance" is
reflected as an asset belonging to the earmarked fund, but a liability
from the perspective of the general fund. By way of these intragovern-
mental accounts, the general fund effectively becomes a borrower and
285. SCHICK, supra note 15, at 46.
286. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on Transp. &
Related Issues, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter 1999 Transportation Hearings]
(statement of Susan J. Irving, GAO Assoc. Dir., Budget Issues, Accounting and
Information Management Division); see also SCHICK, supra note 15, at 40-41;
GAO, EARMARKED FUNDS, supra note 277, at 14 ("Although for trust, special, and
public enterprise funds, the earmarking of receipts by law indicates the govern-
ment's intent to restrict the use of those funds to the specified purpose, the gov-
ernment can always change this restriction by changing the law.")
287. See GAO, EARMARKED FUNDS, supra note 277, at 16 ("The vast majority of
earmarked funds take in more than their current needs. On an annual basis, this
is often described as having a 'surplus."'). For example, virtually all earmarked
funds analyzed in the GAO report had a surplus for fiscal year 1999. Id. at 45-74
(App. II: Description of Selected Earmarked Funds); Id. at 75-87 (App. III: List of
Funds' Reserves, Gross Outlays, and Balances for Fiscal Year 1999). The CBO
cautions that the overall trust fund surplus "balance is somewhat misleading,
however, because trust funds receive much of their income in the form of trans-
fers from other parts of the budget." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE
BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2005 TO 2014, 22 (Jan. 2004)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter 2005-2014 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK].
[Vol. 82:365
2003] CONGRESS AND ACCOUNTING SCANDALS 425
the earmarked fund becomes a lender. This result is achieved through
the earmarked funds' investment in U.S. Treasury securities on which
the general fund is obligated to pay interest.2 s s The interest thus
credited to trust and special fund accounts is referred to as a "general
fund transfer." The special funds actually reflect additional income to
the earmarked funds. The additional income increases the trust fund
surplus and income can make a deficit appear smaller.28 9
In addition to whatever legitimate purposes they may serve, one
suspects that the President and Congress may increasingly turn to
specially earmarked funds as a way to mask the true extent of any
federal deficit. As one witness commented, trust and special fund sur-
pluses "are commingled with other revenues and used to finance other
governmental activities. While all of these general fund transfers
were instituted for a purpose - often to better allocate costs - the fact
remains that they are intragovernmental transfers. Without such
transfers, the trust funds as a whole would run a deficit."290
3. Social Security, Medicare, and Retirement Trust Funds
a) Introduction
Since federal Social Security, Medicare, and military and civilian
employee retirement programs are funded through federal trusts,
they raise many of the same issues raised in the preceding section
addressing trusts and other specially earmarked accounts. 2 9 1 Be-
cause of the size and political importance of these programs, however,
they have somewhat unique characteristics and raise additional
budget accounting issues, particularly regarding the projected size of
any surplus or deficit. As the baby boom generation in the United
States ages, the revenue demands upon the federal government for
Social Security and Medicare programs increase dramatically. Sub-
stantial economic and political controversy swells around questions of
the future health and solvency of these social programs. Potential re-
forms to address these questions appear to be constantly under discus-
sion. Despite the importance of such issues, this section of the Article
is limited to discussing specific issues related to federal budgeting ac-
288. For a description of the mechanics of this intragovernmental debt, see SCHICK,
supra note 15, at 41; see also GAO, EARMARKED FUNDS, supra note 277, at 18;
1999 Transportation Hearings, supra note 286 (statement of Susan J. Irving).
Further discussion of these transfers appears infra at notes 303-05, 317-22, and
accompanying text.
289. So, for example, CBO reports that trust fund surpluses can be "misleading...
because trust funds receive much of their income in the form of transfers from
other parts of the budget. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND Ec-
ONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2004-2013, 20 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter 2003
BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK].
290. 1999 Transportation Hearings, supra note 286 (statement of Susan J. Irving).
291. See discussion supra notes 276-85 and accompanying text.
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counting for Social Security and Medicare. As such, the ongoing de-
bate on general Social Security and Medicare reform is beyond the
scope of this Article, except to the extent that such issues overlap with
budget considerations.
b) Structure of Social Security and Medicare Programs
The Social Security system is made up of two accounts created on
the books of the Treasury entitled the "Federal Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance Trust Fund" and the "Federal Disability Insurance Trust
Fund."2 9 2 Both of these trusts are funded by special payroll contribu-
tions from employers and employees. 2 93 The Medicare program is
similarly made up of two nonrevolving trust accounts entitled the
"Federal Hospital Insurance Trust" (HI Trust) and the "Federal Sup-
plementary Medical Insurance Trust" (SMI Trust). Unlike the two So-
cial Security trusts, each of these Medicare trusts is funded
differently. Similar to the Social Security trusts, the HI Trust is
funded through special payroll tax contributions. 2 94 The SMI Trust,
on the other hand, is a voluntary program funded through premiums
paid by participants, with the remaining funds coming from general
federal revenues. 29 5 In addition to special trusts used to fund Social
Security and Medicare, the federal government maintains trusts to
fund retirement obligations to civilian and military employees. In-
cluded among these trusts are the "Thrift Savings Fund,"296 which
provides retirement benefits to civilian employees covered by either
the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS)297 or the Federal Em-
ployees' Retirement System (FERS)298 and the "Department of De-
fense Military Retirement Fund,"299 which provides similar benefits
to military retirees.
Although Social Security, Medicare, and federal employee retire-
ment accounts are referred to as "trusts" and are earmarked for spe-
cial purposes, there is no "trust" in the legal sense. There is no trustee
292. 42 U.S.C. § 401(a), (b) (2000). These are both nonrevolving trust accounts. GAO,
EARMARKED FUNDS, supra note 277, at 67.
293. Id. Individual employees are required to contribute 6.2% of wages, as defined in
26 U.S.C. §3121(a) (2000), and their employers are required to contribute an ad-
ditional 6.2% of wages, similarly defined, toward the payroll tax for old-age, sur-
vivors, and disability insurance. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (2000).
294. Individual employees are required to contribute an additional 1.45% of wages and
their employers are required to contribute another 1.45% of wages toward the
payroll tax for hospital insurance. 26 U.S.C. §§3101(b), 3111(b). The fund also
receives a portion of federal income taxes paid on Social Security benefits. See
GAO, EARMARKED FUNDS, supra note 277, at 57.
295. GAO, EARMARKED FUNDS, supra notes 277, at 58.
296. 5 U.S.C. § 8437 (2000).
297. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8331-8351 (2000).
298. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8401-8479 (2000).
299. 10 U.S.C. § 1461 (2000).
[Vol. 82:365
2003] CONGRESS AND ACCOUNTING SCANDALS 427
and there are no formal fiduciary obligations to manage the trust on
behalf of beneficiaries. Writing about the top ten myths of Social Se-
curity, Professor Richard Kaplan observes that
[tihere is probably no single, more enduring myth among Americans than the
existence of some separately constituted Social Security Trust fund ...
Rather, it is simply a bookkeeping entry, recording the fact that the federal
government has taken the currently generated surplus and has given obliga-
tions that are essentially tantamount to government IOU's."3 0 0
c) Social Security, Medicare, and the Budget
Consistent with the tendency for trust and earmarked accounts
generally to operate at a surplus, 30 1 the two Social Security trust
funds also are expected to run large and increasing annual surpluses
over at least the next ten years. 3 02 For bookkeeping purposes, these
surpluses belong to the Social Security trust funds. At the same time,
however, they are federal revenues that the government can tap for
alternate uses. Surpluses are thus effectively commingled with gen-
eral federal revenue and used to fund other federal government activ-
ity. 3 0 3 This is not to suggest that the federal government simply takes
these surpluses without accounting for them. Instead, the surpluses
are invested in nonmarketable U.S. Treasury securities.3O4 In effect,
the trust funds "lend" money to the general fund and, in return, gener-
ate interest income from the intragovernmental debt. As reported by
the GAO in 2001, this intragovernmental debt represents over a third
of gross federal debt. Moreover, the debt obligation "does not appear
on the government's consolidated financial statements because it rep-
300. Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Social Security, 3 ELDER L. J. 191, 192-93
(1995).
301. See GAO, EARMARKED FUNDS, supra note 277, at 16; see also discussion supra
notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
302. THE BD. OF TRUSTEES OF THE FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & DISABILITY INS.
TRUST FUNDS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2002). These figures are based upon an
"intermediate" set of demographic, economic, and program-specific assumptions.
See also id., at 11, tbl.LI.D. The Board used three alternative sets of assumptions
to show a range of possible outcomes, but believes that the intermediate set of
assumptions reflect the "'best estimates' of future experience." Id. at 1. The first
deficits for the Social Security funds under the intermediate assumptions are pro-
jected to begin in 2017. Id. at 12. The CBO projects that "federal spending for
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid combined... [will] increase (even under
moderate growth assumptions) by more than two-thirds as a share of the econ-
omy - from more than 8 percent of GDP in 2004 to over 14 percent in 2030 and
almost 18 percent in 2050." 2005-2014 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra
note 287, at 8.
303. See 1999 Transportation Hearings, supra note 286 (statement of Susan J. Irving).
304. Most trust funds are required to invest their surplus in such securities. See 31
U.S.C. § 9702 (2002) ("amounts held in trust by the United States Government
(including annual interest earned on the amounts) - (1) shall be invested in Gov-
ernment obligations; and (2) shall earn interest at an annual rate of at least 5
percent.").
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resents internal debt - amounts that one part of the government owes
to another part of the government."305
One major accounting concern with respect to Social Security is the
way in which its surpluses should be reflected in the federal budget.
Under a unified budget concept, which includes all trust funds in one
consolidated statement, the Social Security surplus can be large
enough to offset what would otherwise be a deficit in other federal
programs. Over the years, many raised concerns that "the availability
of the Social Security surpluses makes the unified budget deficit
smaller than it otherwise would appear. Thus, some accused policy-
makers of using Social Security surpluses to hide the true size of the
budget deficit."306 On three separate occasions, Congress responded
by enacting legislation to remove Social Security from the budget.307
The official budget rules now explicitly exclude receipts and dis-
bursements of the Social Security trust funds from presidential and
congressional budget totals3O8 and further provide that Social Secur-
ity outlays and revenues shall not be included in any surplus or deficit
totals.309 Under these rules, the unified budget should not use off-
budget surpluses from Social Security to offset on-budget deficits.
Nevertheless, both the President and Congress ignore these rules.
The President's budget routinely includes Social Security surpluses in
computing the unified budget. 3 10 For example, President Bush's fiscal
year 2004 budget documents explain that "[t]he unified budget deficit
in [20041 is $307 billion - a $482 billion on-budget deficit partly offset
by a $175 billion off-budget surplus. The off-budget surplus is virtu-
ally the same as the Social Security surplus."311 The President can
305. GAO, EARMARKED FUNDS, supra note 277, at 18.
306. William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 461, 479 (1996).
307. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65, § 346 (1983)
(removing Social Security and Medicare hospital fund from budget totals begin-
ning in fiscal year 1993); Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, tit. II, Part C (1985) (removing Social
Security from budget totals beginning in fiscal year 1986, but including Social
Security for purposes of estimating overall deficits); Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, § 13301 (1990) (codified at 2
U.S.C. §632 (2000) (taking Social Security off-budget for all calculations of budget
totals). For a discussion of these three attempts, see David STUART KOITZ, CON-
GRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET:
WHAT DOES SOCIAL SECURITY's BEING "OFF BUDGET" MEAN? C.RS. REP. No. 98-
422, at 2-3 (2001) [hereinafter KoITz REPORT]; see also Dauster, supra note 305,
at 489-96.
308. 42 U.S.C. § 911 (2000).
309. 2 U.S.C. § 632(a) (2000).
310. See, e.g., 2004 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 136, at 30, tbl.2-4; id. at 301,
tbl.13-2 (President Bush's fiscal year 2004 prominently features unified budget
totals, which include off-budget Social Security figures.).
311. Id. at 400.
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get away with violating the off-budget rules regarding Social Security
since the President may constitutionally submit any messages to Con-
gress that he or she judges necessary or expedient. 3 12 Although the
President may have the constitutional freedom to include off-budget
Social Security figures in his or her budget message, one would expect
Congress itself to abide by its budget rules. The off-budget rules have
simply complicated the process, resulting in budget documents that
showed unified totals as well as on-budget and off-budget totals.
Dual and conflicting concerns may explain Congress' schizophrenic
treatment of off-budget items. On the one hand, Congress wants to
appear to protect the Social Security surplus, which is of tremendous
political concern to constituents. At the same time, the temptation to
use the Social Security surplus to reduce the deficit and otherwise pay
for programs is almost irresistible in difficult economic times. With
multiple sets of books, Congress can effectively have it both ways. In
addition to these conflicting policy considerations, a Congressional Re-
search Service report adds that:
The continued reflection of aggregate budget figures in [budget] documents is
largely driven by economic considerations. Those who are interested in the
aggregate financial flows on the Treasury and the impact those flows have on
the economy ... continue to examine the financial affairs of the government
on a unified budget basis, which means they count Social Security in comput-
ing revenue and spending totals. It is the difference between the govern-
ment's total receipts and total spending, including Social Security's, that
determines how much the government needs to borrow from the markets or
can repay.
3 1 3
In addition to the specific statutory provisions taking Social Secur-
ity off-budget, Congress provided in the Social Security Amendments
of 1983 that the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund should also be
excluded from the federal budget.3 14 Here again, Congress often in-
cludes the HI Trust in budget totals and fails to provide a separate
report of off-budget Medicare HI trust balances, simply ignoring its
own budgetary rules. As one commentator notes, "[allthough this
presentation may have the virtue of simplicity, it shows little respect
for the Social Security Act or the philosophy of separate treatment of
Medicare that it embodied." 3 15 As Congress points fingers at the pri-
vate sector for using "off-budget" entities and transactions to dupe in-
vestors, it should consider the extent to which current budget
accounting rules for "off-budget" Social Security and trust and
earmarked fund surpluses have similar potential to mislead the
public.
312. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3; see also Dauster, supra note 306, at 495.
313. KoIMz REPORT, supra note 307, at 3.
314. Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65, § 710 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 911(a)(1),
amended by Pub. L. No. 105-33 (1997) (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 911
(2000)).
315. Dauster, supra note 306, at 496-97.
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d) Federal Employee Retirement Trusts
Despite many similarities, Social Security and Medicare differ in
many respects from federal employee retirement trust funds. Perhaps
most important, the latter have not been statutorily excluded from the
budget. In addition, Social Security and Medicare represent general
federal government obligations to taxpayers whereas the retirement
trusts represent federal government obligations to its own employees.
Some might argue that the use of "on-budget" federal employee retire-
ment fund surpluses as an offset against deficits elsewhere in the
budget is less objectionable than similar use of "off-budget" Social Se-
curity and Medicare surpluses. The opportunities for playing games
with budget numbers may not appear to be as great with federal em-
ployee retirement trust funds as they are with Social Security and
Medicare. Nevertheless, if for no other reason, the sheer size of these
funds and their potential budget impact suggest that policymakers
should be careful to adopt consistent budget accounting rules for fed-
eral employee trusts that more accurately reflect the true economic
status of these funds.316
In general, federal trust and other earmarked account administra-
tors invest fund "surpluses" in U.S. Treasury securities, thus effec-
tively "lending" the surplus back to the general fund and earning
interest on the securities.3 17 Since this intragovernment transfer is
viewed as "borrowing" that must be repaid by the general fund, the
budget does not reflect any income or expense to the general fund. At
the same time, however, the trusts will actually increase their "sur-
plus" by the interest income paid on the Treasury securities. Since the
funds are "on-budget," these artificial surpluses can more readily be
used to distort the true economic picture. In this respect, the federal
employee retirement trust funds are similar to other federal trusts
and earmarked funds.
Despite some apparent improvements in budget accounting for re-
tirement, federal retirement trust-type intragovernment transfers
still present a particularly stark illustration of budget distortions that
may result from such transfers. When a government agency or de-
partment makes retirement contributions, it transfers funds from its
agency or department account to the appropriate federal employee re-
tirement trust fund. In a sense, the government simply moves funds
from its left-hand to its right-hand pocket. The agency or depart-
ment's financial statements will "deduct" this intragovernment trans-
fer as an expense, and the trust's financial statements will include the
316. The civilian and retirement trust funds are, by far, the largest of the federal trust
funds after Social Security and Medicare. See 2003 BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUT-
LOOK, supra note 289, at 19 (Table 1-5).
317. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 82:365
2003] CONGRESS AND ACCOUNTING SCANDALS 431
same amount as income. 3 18 This financial accounting makes sense,
and may even improve the accuracy of financial accounting and alloca-
tion of budget resources for the federal government in the aggregate.
Perhaps more significant, the government has switched to accrual-
based budget accounting at the department or agency level for most
civilian and military retirement expenses. 3 19 This too makes sense
and is consistent with reforms moving slowly in the direction of ac-
crual-based budgeting. 32 0 The more accurate reflection of retirement
costs provided by accrual accounting arguably gives the public a far
more accurate picture of the government's financial health, since the
budget reflects department-level expense for federal employers' retire-
ment obligations at their discounted net present values.
Nevertheless, current budget accounting methods continue to dis-
tort the true economic picture and allow Congress to play budget num-
ber games. First, while the accrual-method may make the
department-level deficit appear deeper, the intragovernment transfer
simultaneously makes the retirement trust's "surplus" appear larger
to the same extent. This extra surplus expands the opportunity to
play the "lending game," in which the trust purchases U.S. Treasury
securities, which in turn provide interest income to the trust.3 2 1 Sec-
ond, and more important, even though the department-level budget
uses accrual-based reporting, the federal government still uses cash
method accounting for the trust funds themselves. Thus, the "on-
budget" trust funds will show the actual payments to retirees on a
cash basis.322 In the end, although the original intragovernment
transfer from the agency or department increased the trust's income
by the full net present value of all future retirement expenses, the
trust's income is only decreased for the current payments to retirees.
In general, accrual-based budgeting is thought to increase the eco-
318. FASAB, CONCEPT No. 1, supra note 117, at STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AccouNT-
ING CONCEPTS No. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR LIABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
91T 56-78. For financial accounting purposes, both the employing agency and the
trust fund use accrual method accounting with respect to the transfer. Id. at 1
64, 71.
319. GAO, ACCRUAL BUDGETING, supra note 144, at 40 ("[I]n 1985, budgeting for mili-
tary retirement costs was moved to an accrual basis at the program level by re-
flecting the government's expected costs for retirement benefits as they are
earned. Similarly, since 1987, accruing retirement costs not covered by employee
contributions have been charged to employing agencies for civilian employees
covered by the Federal Employees Retirement System.") (emphasis added)
320. See supra notes 186-88 for a discussion of the flaws of cash-based budgeting and
description of accrual-based reforms regarding federal loan and loan guarantees.
See also supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text.
322. See, e.g., GAO, ACCRUAL BUDGETING, supra note 144, at 40 ("because the retire-
ment systems themselves are within the budget, total outlays, and thus the defi-
cit/surplus, include only cash outlays to current retirees.").
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nomic accuracy of the budget. In this case, however, it may be that
the switch to accrual accounting at the department level actually ex-
acerbated the problem. Cash method accounting at the trust level
only for actual payments to retirees rather than the full discounted
present value of the total expected payments dramatically reduces the
apparent government retirement obligation and artificially improves
the budget bottom line.3 23 There is danger in the selective use of ac-
crual budget accounting.
4. Federal Budgetary Use of Corporations
a) Categories of Government Corporations
Government corporations typically fall into one of three major
structural patterns: wholly-owned, mixed-ownership, and government
sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Unlike the first two categories, govern-
ment-sponsored corporations, commonly referred to as GSEs, are en-
tirely privately owned. This section will consider the first two
categories of government corporation, leaving discussion of the pri-
vately-owned GSEs for separate treatment in subsequent sections. 32 4
b) Wholly-Owned Government Corporations
From its inception, the U.S. Congress has chartered government
corporations to serve special public needs.3 25 Simply put, government
corporations "are generally federally chartered entities created to
serve a public function of a predominantly business nature."326 By
the end of World War II, the use of government corporations had pro-
liferated without appropriate standards for federal control and ac-
countability, thus leading Congress to enact the Government
323. Although the parallels are not precise, there are some similarities here to Enron's
controversial accounting for non-qualified employee stock options through which
Enron took an up-front tax deduction for the "bargain element" of the option, but
did not reflect the costs on its financial statements, thus artificially improving its
bottom line. For a brief discussion of the stock option issues, see Anthony J. Lup-
pino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-Tax Ac-
counting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L.REv. 35, 87-108 (2003).
324. See discussion infra notes 364-78 and accompanying text.
325. The earliest government corporations were national banks. The first government
corporation, the Bank of North America, was chartered by the Continental Con-
gress in 1871. See LAWRENCE LEWIS, JR., A HISTORY OF THE BANK OF NORTH
AMERICA (1882). For a good discussion of general and constitutional history of
government corporations, see A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government
Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 549-57, 561-77.
326. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS: PROFILES OF Ex-
ISTING GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, GAO/GGD-96-14, at 1 (Dec. 1995) [hereinaf-
ter GAO, 1995 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS].
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Corporation Control Act.327 In addition to incorporating new audit
and budgetary control mechanisms, the Control Act required termina-
tion of government corporations unless reincorporated by Congress
before June 30, 1948.328 President Truman's 1948 Budget Message to
Congress clearly expressed his views regarding the appropriate use of
such government entities:
While the general role of the Government corporation has been accepted in
the laws of this country for more than 30 years, the standards for use of this
instrument are not fully developed and will be subject to many refinements.
Experience indicates that the corporate form of organization is peculiarly
adapted to the administration of governmental programs which are predomi-
nantly of a commercial character-those which are revenue producing, are at
least potentially self-sustaining, and involve a large number of business-type
transactions with the public.
In their business operations such programs require greater flexibility than
the customary type of appropriation budget ordinarily permits. As a rule the
usefulness of a corporation lies in its ability to deal with the public in the
manner employed by private business for similar work. 3 2 9
Today, government corporations are still generally considered appro-
priate for commercial, self-sustaining activities that, while important
to the public interest, might be more efficiently run through corporate
form rather than a government agency. 330 To permit the greater oper-
ational flexibility that President Truman was referring to, most gov-
ernment corporations enjoy freedoms denied to regular federal
agencies. For example, they may be exempt from civil service rules,
federal procurement requirements, "use it or lose it" budgetary con-
straints, and other contract and budget restrictions. 33 1
Although there are no precise statutory definitions, the National
Academy of Public Administration defines a wholly-owned govern-
ment corporation as "a corporation pursuing a government mission as-
signed in its enabling statute, financed by appropriation, with assets
owned by the government and controlled by board members or an ad-
ministrator appointed by the President or a department secretary."332
Wholly-owned government corporations 3 33 are subject to reasonably
327. Pub. L. No. 79-248, 59 Stat. 597 (1945) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1105, 9101-9109
(2000)).
328. Id. at § 304(b), 59 Stat. at 602.
329. President Truman's Budget Message to Congress, 1947 U.S.C.S. 1750, 1788 (em-
phasis added).
330. See, e.g., GAO, 1995 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, supra note 326, at 3.
331. For an overview of the mix of powers granted to government corporations, see
Froomkin, supra note 325, at 553-54.
332. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, REPORT ON GOVERNMENT CORPO-
RATIONS (1981) [hereinafter NAPA REPORT] (describing the wholly-owned corpo-
ration as one in which "the federal government holds 100% of the equity and
exercises 100% of the votes on the board of directors or other governing body").
333. Examples of wholly-owned government corporations include: Commodity Credit
Corp., 15 U.S.C. § 714 et. seq., 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(A) (2000); Federal Crop Insur-
ance Corp., 7 U.S.C. § 1503 et. seq., 31 U.S.C. § 9101 (3)(D); Pension Benefit
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:365
strict controls and are included within the presidential and congres-
sional budget.334 In many respects, they operate like federal agencies.
Even though wholly-owned corporations are technically part of the
federal budget, their financial information cannot be effectively incor-
porated with regular budget schedules because they adopt commercial
accounting standards as opposed to the financial standards used for
federal agencies pursuant to FASAB rules.3 3 5
c) Mixed-Ownership Government Corporations and Related
Entities
A mixed-ownership government corporation is "a corporation with
both government and private equity, with assets owned and controlled
by board members selected by both the President and private stock-
holders, usually intended for transition into the private sector."336
Mixed-ownership government corporations are less accountable to
Congress than agencies and wholly-owned corporations. 33 7 Moreover,
they are not included with the federal budget. 3 38
Wholly-owned and mixed-ownership government corporations gen-
erally are authorized by an explicit act of Congress. More recently,
however, certain federal agencies have been granted authority to
enter into public/private ventures without further explicit Congres-
sional approval. One major example is the privatization initiative on
military housing. Under Congressional authority granted in 1996, the
Defense Department may "make investments in an eligible entity car-
rying out projects for the acquisition or construction of housing units
suitable for use as military ... housing."33 9
Guaranty Corp., 29 U.S.C. § 1301 et. seq., 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(J); Tennessee Val-
ley Authority, 16 U.S.C. § 831 eq seq., 31 U.S.C. § 9101(3)(N).
334. 31 U.S.C. §§ 9103, 9104 (2000).
335. See discussion in SCHICK, supra note 15, at 42.
336. NAPA REPORT, supra note 332; see also Froomkin, supra note 325 (defining a
mixed-ownership entity slightly differently suggesting that the government does
not necessarily have a direct equity interest in every mixed-ownership govern-
ment corporation); id. at 555 ("In mixed-ownership federal corporations ... the
United States may own some or none of the equity. [Its] charter often guarantees
that the President will appoint at least a minority of the directors even if the
federal government does not own any shares.").
337. Examples of mixed-ownership corporations include: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp., 31 U.S.C. § 9101(2)(B) (2000); Federal Home Loan Banks, id. § 9101(2)(C);
Financing Corp., id. § 9101(2)(I); Resolution Trust Corp., id. § 9101(2)(J).
338. See Froomkin, supra note 325, at 559 & n. 81.
339. 10 U.S.C. § 2875(a) (2000). This provision was included along with a number of
others designed to provide broad general authority to the Defense Department to
privatize acquisition and construction of military housing. National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §§ 2801-2802, 110 Stat.
544, tit. XXVIII, subtit. A (Military Housing Privatization Initiative).
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Proper budget treatment of Defense Department expenses in con-
nection with its public/private housing ventures has been a matter of
dispute. Since such ventures do not require explicit legislative au-
thority, "[ciongressional scoring plays a limited role in determining
the budgetary treatment of individual public/private ventures.34o
Under OMB guidelines, the Defense Department is able to record each
individual contractual provision as a separate transaction without
taking the overall government commitment into account. According to
a recent CBO report, the Defense Department is thus able "to obtain
on-base family housing without recording large budgetary obligations
up front."34 1
The CBO report expresses concern that:
A growing number of public/private ventures and leases are being structured
to avoid the requirement for recognizing the costs of government investments
up front. That trend could reduce the budget's ability to encourage cost-effec-
tive investment decisions and to make agencies' commitments visible to the
Congress and the public. In some cases, those commitments could challenge
Congressional control over federal finances.
3 4 2
Budgetary accounting procedures for wholly-owned and mixed-
ownership government corporations and related public/private ven-
tures cry out for reform. Although the federal budget makes informa-
tion about wholly-owned government corporations available, the
information is difficult to assess and use since such entities do not use
FASAB government accounting standards. Any major budget reform
should address these inconsistencies. Far worse, federal expenses re-
lated to mixed-ownership government corporations generally are not
reflected in the budget at all. Changes should be made to require
some accounting for such enterprises in the federal budget. Finally,
by failing to account for many expenses up front, budget accounting
for many public/private ventures vastly understates the extent of the
government's financial commitment to such enterprises.
d) Special Purpose and Related Entities
(i) Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)
A third type of entity used to conduct governmental activities is the
government-sponsored enterprise. Each GSE is created by Congress
through a federal charter, but Congress has not provided a precise
statutory definition of GSE. Although technically private, their fed-
340. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., THE BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF
LEASES AND PUBLIC/PRIVATE VENTURES 39 (Feb. 2003) [hereinafter CBO, BUDGET-
ARY TREATMENT OF LEASE].
341. Id. For example, CBO reports that budgetary treatment of an Army limited part-
nership interest with a private partner for housing at Fort Hood will reflect an
up-front budget obligation of only $52 million for on-base housing units worth
approximately $273 million. Id. at 42.
342. Id. at 49.
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eral charters provide GSEs certain privileges and subject them to cer-
tain limitations that do not apply to the ordinary privately-owned
corporation. The GAO explains that "Congress established GSEs as
federally chartered, but privately owned and operated corporations,
limited their activities to certain economic sectors deemed worthy of
public support, and gave them certain advantages to help accomplish
their public purposes."34 3
Although each GSE federal charter may differ, GSEs tend to share
a number of important characteristics. They are all 1) federally
chartered for a particular public purpose; 2) privately owned and oper-
ated; 3) subject to restrictions and obligations that would not ordina-
rily apply to a private corporation; 34 4 4) offered advantages, such as
tax exemption, exemption from SEC registration requirements, and
access to Treasury Department lines of credit, that would not ordina-
rily be available to a private corporation;3 45 and 5) benefitted by in-
vestor perceptions of federal government guarantee in the event of
default on their obligations. 3 46
Of these characteristics, the most controversial and difficult to
measure are the benefits that a GSE receives by virtue of the explicit
tax exemption, preferred lines of credit, and the like, as well as the
implicit advantage from investor perceptions that the government is
prepared to bailout the failed enterprise. These benefits and advan-
tages effectively provide the GSE with federal subsidies at taxpayer
expense. Perhaps the most well-known GSEs are those engaged in
housing and mortgage lending activities, including Fannie Mae, Fred-
343. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GSEs: RECENT TRENDS AND POLICY, GAO/T-OCE/
GGD-97-76, at 1 (July 1997). In its report on government corporations, the GAO
distinguishes GSEs from wholly-owned and mixed-ownership entities. "GSEs are
federally established, privately owned corporations designed to increase the flow
of credit to specific economic sectors. GSEs typically receive their financing from
private investment .... GSEs issue capital stock and short-and long-term debt
instruments, issue mortgage-backed securities, fund designated activities, and
collect fees for guarantees and other services. GSEs generally do not receive gov-
ernment appropriations." GAO, 1995 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS, supra note
326, at 4 n.9.
344. For example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are housing GSEs, whose charter lim-
its their activities primarily to the financing of conforming mortgages. CONGRES-
SIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND THE HOUSING GSEs
10 (May 2001) [hereinafter CBO, HOUSING GSEs STUDY].
345. GSEs may also receive additional advantages from court rulings holding that cer-
tain GSEs have sovereign immunity and promissory estoppel against claims
based upon employee conduct. See, e.g., Mendrala v. Crown Mortgage Co., 955
F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1992); McCauley v. Thygerson, 732 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
346. This list of common characteristics is derived from GAO Testimony: Hearings on
the Growing Role of GSEs in the Nation's Credit Markets Before the House Sub-
comm. on Capital Markets, Securities, and Gov't. Sponsored Enterprises, Comm.
on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong. 7-30 (1997) (statement of James
L. Bothwell, GAO, Chief Economist).
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die Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank. These housing GSEs
were "created to provide liquidity and stability in the home mortgage
market, thereby increasing the flow of funds available to mortgage
borrowers."3 47
In a careful study, the CBO attempted to quantify the extent of
federal subsidies provided to housing GSEs through direct and indi-
rect government benefits. For example, the CBO estimated a com-
bined value of about $1.2 billion for the year 2000 from exemptions
from state and local income taxes, exemption from SEC registration,
and the lower cost of credit rating for debt and mortgage-backed se-
curities.3 48 These estimates quantify direct monetary saving from
special legal status given to housing GSEs, but not offered to other
shareholder-owned corporations. Additional direct government costs
arise from contingent liabilities in the event that the federal govern-
ment ultimately decides to bailout a GSE. Even though statutory dis-
claimers and disclosures on the typical GSE prospectus state that its
obligations are not backed by the U.S. government, 349 investor percep-
tion of an implicit federal government guarantee is hard to break.3 5o
Such perceptions certainly were bolstered by the 1987 bailout of the
Farm Credit System, a GSE for which the federal government had not
formally provided its backing or a guarantee.3 5 1 Another potential di-
rect cost to the federal government arises because, "treasury borrow-
ing costs may increase due to the perception that GSE debt is a
relatively good substitute (substitution cost)."3 5 2
347. CBO, HOUSING GSEs STUDY, supra note 344, at 1. This report is an update, re-
quested by the House Committee on Financial Services, of an earlier CBO study.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., ASSESSING THE PUBLIC COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC (May 1996).
348. CBO, HOUSING GSEs STUDY, supra note 344, at 15-16. Although potentially sub-
stantial, the CBO did not attempt to directly estimate the value of additional
savings to housing GSEs from special legal provisions permitting them to use the
Federal Reserve as a fiscal agent or giving them special Treasury Department
lines of credit. Id.
349. See, e.g., description of typical Fannie Mae prospectus disclosure in CBO, HOUS-
ING GSEs STUDY, supra note 344, at 14, n. 2.
350. Some have even observed that GSEs "are regarded by most people who lend them
money as the government in disguise." MARCIA STIGUM, THE MONEY MARKET 358
(1990) (emphasis added). Others have observed that even the statutory dis-
claimer of government backing itself, see, e.g. 12 U.S.C. § 4503 (2000), is written
in neutral language that seems to hint at the special federal relationship. Thus,
the disclaimer fails to impress investors who continue to behave as if such gov-
ernment backing does exist. See Richard Scott Carnell, Federal Deposit Insur-
ance and Federal Sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: The Structure of
Subsidy, in SERVING Two MASTERS, YET Our OF CONTROL: FANNIE MAE AND FRED-
DIE MAC 56, 75 n.5 (Peter J. Wallison, ed., 2001) [hereinafter WALLISON, SERVING
Two MASTERS].
351. Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988).
352. Froomkin, supra note 325, at 599-600.
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According to the CBO, the largest part of the federal government
subsidy to GSEs is the "reduction in borrowing rates on the GSEs gen-
eral obligation debt securities." Investors are prepared to accept lower
rates of interest from GSEs based on their stubborn perception of an
implicit guarantee from the federal government. The CBO estimated
the value of this aspect of federal subsidy to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and FHLBs at $8.8 billion for the year 2000.353 Another subsidy
stemming from implicit federal government backing is the advantage
to GSE mortgage-backed securities from reduced costs for providing
credit guarantees. The CBO notes that "the market requires greater
capital backing for a fully private guarantee, and providing that capi-
tal is costly to private firms. Consequently, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac have the latitude to charge fees in excess of guarantee costs." 35 4
The CBO here estimated the value of the federal subsidy to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac for the year 2000 at $3.6 billion.35 5 In the end,
the CBO estimated that total direct and indirect federal subsidies to
the three housing GSEs amounted to $13.6 billion for the year
2000.356 Moreover, the CBO concluded that a substantial portion of
the federal subsidy actually is passed on to GSE shareholders and
stakeholders. 3 57 In other words, the federal government is providing
these benefits to private shareholders at taxpayer expense.3 58
GSEs are completely excluded from the presidential budget and
the congressional budget resolution; they simply are not reported in
353. CBO, HOUSING GSEs STUDY, supra note 344, at 21 tbl.5 (including estimates for
the years 1995 through 2000).
354. Id. at 22.
355. Id. at tbl.6 (providing estimates for years 1995 through 2000).
356. Id. at 24.
357. Id. at 25.
358. To be sure, the CBO findings were controversial and challenged by the GSEs
themselves. See, e.g., FANNIE MAE, SETrING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: AN ANALYSIS
OF CBO's 2001 REPORT ON FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC (2001); JAMES C.
MILLER & JAMES E. PEARCE, FREDDIE MAC, RESPONSE TO CBO's DRAFT REPORT:
FEDERAL SUBSIDIES AND HOUSING GSEs (2001); see also Robert Van Order, The
Economics of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in WALLISON, SERVING Two MASTERS,
supra note 348, at 41 ("Whether the GSEs get a subsidy has been a source of
controversy.... The size of the gross benefit has been [overstated]."). Robert Van
Order was chief economist at Freddie Mac. Id. at ix. On the other hand, Robert
Seiler, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Manager of Policy Analy-
sis, concluded that, if anything, the CBO study had understated federal subsidies
to housing GSEs. Robert S. Seiler, Jr. Estimating the Value and Allocation of
Federal Subsidies in WALLISON, SERVING Two MASTERS, supra note 348, at 8, 33.
Defending itself against claims of flawed methodology, the CBO argues that
"[d]espite the fact the GSEs claim our analytical framework is fundamentally
'flawed,' it is only the GSEs and their paid consultants who make that assertion.
This methodology has been widely reviewed in and out of government, including
by participants in 'the market.'" Letter from Dan L. Crippen, Dir., CBO, to Rich-
ard H. Baker, Chair, U.S. House Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government Sponsored Enterprises 1 (July 11, 2001).
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either the on-budget or the off-budget figures.35 9 Although GSEs were
originally designed to serve a public purpose, they can easily be used
as a budget accounting gimmick to reduce the size of apparent deficits.
As one commentator notes, "a few GSEs were created as little more
than accounting devices designed to allow the federal government to
borrow funds without appearing to increase the deficit."360 Although
the early vision of a GSE was a commercial entity that could be self-
sustaining,3 6 1 an economic reporter with the Wall Street Journal in
1989 complained that the later GSEs were not necessarily expected to
earn profits. Instead, he then argued, "GSEs could become the budget
gimmick of the 1990s."362 Just as Enron used off-budget entities as
an accounting gimmick to mask the true nature of its economic situa-
tion, Congress uses completely off-budget GSEs to enlarge surpluses
or mask the true size of deficits. To make matters worse, since GSEs
are private, they are not subject to lobbying restrictions that apply to
federal agencies and wholly-owned federal corporations. Thus, special
interest groups that benefit from federal advantages granted to the
GSE can protect their positions. Opposition from competing interest
groups may be muted since the federal subsidies and taxpayer costs
with respect to GSEs are not reflected in the federal budget.36 3
(ii) Private Sector Special-Purpose Enterprises (SPEs) as
a Parallel to Public Sector GSEs
Government use of GSEs to keep certain activities off-budget for
federal budget purposes is strikingly parallel to private sector use of
special-purpose enterprises (SPEs) to keep certain activities off pri-
vate entity consolidated financial statements. Enron, for example, ex-
tensively used such SPEs in order to keep certain investment
359. For example, the President's budget for fiscal year 2004 reports that "[n]either
the on-budget nor the off-budget totals include transactions of Government-spon-
sored enterprises, such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie
Mae)." 2004 ANALYTicAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 136, at 463. Nevertheless,
the President concedes the importance of GSEs to the government and its fi-
nances. The budget statement goes on to note that "[Iflederal laws established
these enterprises for public policy purposes, but they are privately owned and
operated corporations. Because of their close relationship to the Government, the
budget discusses them and reports their financial data in the Appendix to the
budget and in some detailed tables." Id.
360. Froomkin, supra note 325, at 559. Froomkin cites the Federal Financing Bank as
an example of an entity with a deficit from borrowing that was counted on the
federal books as an account receivable asset. "[B]ecause the Bank is off-budget,
... [the deficit] is not considered part of the national debt - instead the 'asset'
reduces the national debt." Id. at 559 n.83.
361. See discussion supra notes 325-31 and accompanying text.
362. William G. Gale, The Budget Gimmick of the 1990s?, WALL ST. J., May 3, 1989, at
A18.
363. See, e.g., discussion in Froomkin, supra note 325, at 596.
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activities "off-balance sheet" and "to present itself more attractively as
measured by the ratios favored by Wall Street analysts and rating
agencies."3 64 Just as there is no precise statutory definition for GSEs
used by the federal government, there also is "no generally accepted
definition of SPEs to distinguish them from other legal entities."36 5
The notion of an SPE, however, is an independent entity in which the
investor has a substantial interest and whose "activities and powers
are significantly limited by their charter or other contractual
arrangement."3 6 6
Corporations often will isolate a particular business or investment
activity in a separate corporation in which they hold a controlling in-
terest. The controlled corporation, usually referred to as a subsidiary,
is considered part of the larger corporate family controlled by the par-
ent corporation. For tax accounting purposes, the parent corporation
may elect to file a consolidated tax return in lieu of separate returns
for each business entity within the corporate group.3 6 7 For financial
accounting purposes, on the other hand, consolidated statements are
usually required. In fact, FASB Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51
has established a presumption that consolidated financial statements
are more meaningful than separate statements. 368
Under this presumptive financial consolidation rule, if a business
uses multiple distinct entities to conduct its activities, its financial
statement should reflect the aggregate profit and loss from all related
entities. Without such a rule, the business could "isolate" loss activi-
ties in one entity, making the others appear more profitable. One
challenge presented by the consolidation rule is defining which enti-
ties are sufficiently "related" as to require their inclusion in an aggre-
gate statement. For corporate entities, the challenge is reasonably
easy to meet. A corporation is related to another if it owns more than
a specified percentage of the other corporation's stock.3 69
For many SPEs, however, the investor's interest does not take the
form of traditional voting stock, but instead involves contractual
agreements regarding the sharing of assets, liabilities, and the risk of
loss. Depending upon the contractual arrangement, an investor might
well bear the same risk of loss that a controlling shareholder would
otherwise bear. Under prior financial accounting rules, an investor
was required to include the SPE's activities in its consolidated finan-
cial statement under the presumptive consolidation rule only if the
364. POWERS REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.
365. Id. See supra notes 346-48 (describing the common characteristics of GSEs).
366. POWERs REPORT, supra note 2, at 37-38.
367. 26 U.S.C. § 1501-1563 (2000) (Consolidated Returns).
368. Federal Accounting Standards Board, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51, Con-
solidated Financial Statements (1959) [hereinafter FASB Bulletin No. 51].
369. For example, the benchmark used for tax purposes generally is 80%. I.R.C.
§ 1504(a) (definition of affiliated group for purposes of consolidated reporting).
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SPE was a subsidiary in which the investor had a controlling financial
interest, usually interpreted to mean a majority voting interest. 37 0 An
SPE investor could overcome the presumption if another independent
owner or owners of the SPE made a substantial capital investment
and that investment had substantive risks and rewards of owner-
ship.3 7 1 In addition, the independent owner or owners had to exercise
some control over the SPE.372 In other words, an investor could avoid
including an investment on its own consolidated financial statement
as long as there was another independent investor with some signifi-
cant interest in the SPE. Through several investments in limited
partnerships, Enron Corporation clearly took advantage of the loose
nature of these accounting requirements to keep losses from SPE in-
vestments off of its balance sheets.3 73
In response to Enron accounting scandals, the FASB reconsidered
its accounting rules regarding the proper treatment of SPEs, issuing
new rules in January, 2003. The new FASB rule now refers to special-
purpose and related entities as "variable interest entities" (VIEs).374
According to the FASB, previous rules were "fragmented and incom-
plete" since they generally required consolidation for controlled sub-
sidiaries, but not for VIEs with which the investor has a similar
relationship. 3 75 New FASB rules require existing unconsolidated va-
riable interest entities to be consolidated by their primary benefi-
ciaries if the entities do not effectively disperse risks among parties
involved.376 In other words, if the other parties do not bear a substan-
370. FASB Bulletin No. 51, supra note 366, at 2.
371. At least according to SEC interpretation, this independent investor could have as
little as 3% of total capital. See discussion in PowERs REPORT, supra note 2, at 39.
372. The notion of control was a subjective standard, not solely based upon voting
interests. Id.
373. See, e.g., discussion of Enron's relationship with Chewco Investments L.P. in
PowERs REPORT, supra note 2, at 41-67. In fairness, some attribute a large mea-
sure of the blame for misleading financial statements to lax FASB accounting
standards. See, e.g., William H. Beaver, Symposium, Enron: Lessons and Impli-
cations: What Have We Learned From the Recent Corporate Scandals That We
Did Not Already Know? 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 155, 164 (2002) ("Recent events
have triggered a number of criticisms of financial reporting standards and have
raised concerns that the current standards may be a part of the problem ....
Certainly, the accounting for Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) that was at the
heart of the problems with Enron's financial reporting is being revisited and
rightly so.").
374. See Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities: An Interpretation of ARB No. 51,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SERIES: FASB INTERPRETATION No. 46 (2003) [hereinafter
FASB INTERPRETATION No. 46].
375. Id.
376. FASB INTERPRETATION No. 46, supra note 374. The new FASB interpretation has
been controversial and the FASB has both delayed its effective date and proposed
modifying the interpretation itself. Exposure Draft Proposed Interpretation: Con-
solidation of Variable Interest Entities: A Modification of FASB Interpretation No.
46. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING SERIES: FASB INTERPRETATION No. 46 (2003) (Finan-
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tial risk, the primary investor must report SPE activities on its own
financial statements. United States financial accounting standards
have historically tended to be rule-oriented, leaving open possibilities
for exploitation of the rules. Some analysts suggest "an approach
placing greater emphasis on meeting the spirit of key budgetary prin-
ciples and less emphasis on satisfying specific quantitative crite-
ria."3 7 7 The new FASB rules for VIEs adopt a more principles-based
approach, thus moving closer to international accounting stan-
dards.3 78 As the FASB tightens its rules to require that more related-
entity activities be brought "on-budget," the federal government
should similarly tighten its own rules.
D. Long-Term Leasing
1. Budgetary Treatment of Government Leases
An increasingly common technique used to avoid up-front budget-
ary reporting of government expenses for capital assets and to keep
such expenses effectively "off-budget" is the government lease. Since
the government does not actually own the property, the budget will
not reflect the full capital expense. A recent CBO report found that
the current budget treatment of leases and public/private ventures is
inconsistent with two fundamental budget principles: 1) recognizing
financial commitments when they are made; and 2) providing a com-
prehensive budget that captures all federal government finances. 3 79
More than simply misleading the public, the current budget treatment
of government leases may actually encourage federal managers to
make inefficient choices regarding major government expenses, thus
spending unnecessary taxpayer dollars. As the CBO reports,
A budgetary treatment inconsistent with those principles could deny the Con-
gress and the Administration the information needed to over-see federal
spending. Moreover, unless the costs of asset purchases financed through
leases and public/private ventures appear up front in the federal budget, in
the same way as the costs of assets purchased directly by the government,
federal managers will be more likely to rely on such financing techniques even
though they are inherently more costly. 3 8 0
Prior to 1991, government leases were scored for budget purposes
on an annual basis with each year's budget reflecting only the annual
lease payment for that year. Concerns were raised that this type of
cial Accounting Standards Board of the Financial Accounting Foundation, Nor-
walk, Conn.). The details of the new VIE rules will not be considered in this
Article.
377. CBO, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF LEASES, supra note 340, at 52.
378. Id.; see also Jenny Wiggins, Markets Assess Impact of FASB: New Rules Could
Hamper the Strtuctured Finance Business, FINANcIAL TIMES (London), Jan. 21,
2003, at 30.
379. CBO, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF LEASES, supra note 340, at vii-viii.
380. Id. at viii.
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budget treatment for long-term leases was flawed in numerous ways
beyond the simple failure to adequately reflect the government's over-
all financial commitment to the enterprise. 3 8 1 When the federal gov-
ernment engages in a direct acquisition of a capital asset, the budget
immediately reflects the full cost of the asset purchased. Under prior
budget controls, such capital spending was subject to deficit limits and
spending caps. 3 8 2 If only a small portion of the expense of the capital
asset was reflected in the budget year, such budget controls were eas-
ier to satisfy. Thus, many federal agencies turned to long-term leases
as a device to avoid the impact of budget controls. In addition, report-
ing only a portion of the expense in a given budget year allowed agen-
cies to avoid facing the full cost, thus providing a potential incentive to
make acquisitions that were not cost-effective. Moreover, the overall
costs of a lease-purchase following a long-term lease were often far
higher than the cost of a direct purchase. The budget treatment of
long-term leases thus actually raised the costs of some government
investments .383
Responding directly to these concerns, new guidelines for the
budget treatment of government leases were developed in 1991
through a joint effort of the House and Senate Budget Committees,
the CBO and the OMB. These guidelines break government leases
into three major categories: 1) capital leases; 2) lease-purchases; and
3) operating leases. 3 84
Capital leases and lease-purchases both effectively provide the
government with ownership of the asset being leased. In the case of a
capital lease, the lease term is so long that the government consumes
the value of the lease property over the lease term, leaving little or no
value at the end of the term to be returned to the lessor. In the case of
a lease-purchase, the government actually purchases the property at
the end of the lease term.38 5 Both capital leases and lease-purchases
clearly are substitutes for direct acquisition. Consequently, the 1991
guidelines require that "budget authority will be scored in the year in
which the authority is first made available in the amount of the net
381. For a general discussion of these concerns, see CBO, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF
LEASES, supra note 340, at ix, 14-15.
382. For a discussion of these budget controls see supra notes 132-136 and accompany-
ing text.
383. "For example, according to a 1990 internal CBO analysis of the lease-purchase of
the Federal Judiciary Building and of the National Archives facility, in each case
the approach was about 10 percent more costly, in present discounted terms,
than a direct purchase would have been." CBO, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF
LEASES, supra note 340, at 15.
384. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 120, at para. 3.
385. A lease-purchase is defined as "a type of lease in which ownership of the asset is
transferred to the government at or shortly after the end of the lease term." Id.;
see also discussion of lease types in CBO, Budgetary Treatment of Leases, supra
note 340, at viii.
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present value of the Government's total estimated legal obligations
over the life of the contract."38 6 In contrast to capital leases and lease-
purchases, an operating lease provides government access to the
leased property for a limited time and is not tantamount to a
purchase.38 7 Under the new guidelines, only such operating leases
are eligible for annual scoring of budget authority as lease payments
are made.38 8 From a federal agency's perspective, an operating lease
can be appealing since the full up-front costs expected to be incurred
over the lease term need not be reflected in the budget. In order to
assure that only the proper types of leases are treated under the an-
nual as opposed to up-front scoring rules, OMB guidelines include
strict criteria that an operating lease must meet.38 9
Unfortunately, rather than improving the budget treatment of gov-
ernment leases, the 1991 scoring guidelines for government leases
simply provided impetus to federal managers to find new and creative
techniques to bypass or avoid the guidelines. The CBO recently re-
ported that such techniques have become prevalent. For example, the
General Services Administration is increasingly substituting the
short-term operating lease method for acquiring federal office space
over direct purchase and lease-purchase.390 Federal government ex-
386. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 120, app. B, at para. 1.
387. CBO, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF LEASES, supra note 340, at viii.
388. Id.; OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 120, at app. B, para. 1.
389. Such criteria include the following: 1) ownership of the asset must remain with
the lessor and not be transferred to the government; 2) the lease must not have a
bargain-purchase option; 3) the lease term must not exceed 75% of the estimated
economic life of the asset; 4) the present value of the minimum lease payments
must not exceed 90% of the fair market value of the asset; 5) the asset must be a
general purpose asset not built to unique government specification; 6) there must
be a private sector market for the asset. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note
120, at app. B, para. 3 (defining the term "operating lease"). These criteria are
strikingly similar to those adopted by the FASB for private venture leases. Fi-
NANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
No. 13, ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES, 7 (1976) [hereinafter FASB, STANDARD No.
13] (defining the term "capital lease" using the mirror image of the OMB "operat-
ing lease" criteria). Further discussion of private sector leases appears at infra
notes 394-412 and accompanying text.
390. CBO, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF LEASES, supra note 340, at 19-20. A report con-
cerning the extent to which this reliance on short-term leases was increasing
costs and hampering GSA's ability to fund other important programs was incon-
clusive. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGET SCORING: SCORING AFFECTS
SOME LEASE TERMS BUT THE FULL EXTENT IS UNCERTAIN, GAO-01-929 (Aug.
2001). A similar earlier report found that "[a]lthough construction was almost
always estimated by GSA to be the least costly approach for meeting long-term
space needs, it was not always the approach proposed." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION: COMPARISON OF SPACE ACQUISITION
ALTERNATIVES-LEASING TO LEASE-PURCHASE AND LEASING TO CONSTRUCTION,
GAO/GGD-99-49R, at 1 (Mar. 12, 1999). The GAO reported budget scorekeeping
rules as the major non-economic factor influencing the acquisition decision. Id. at
2.
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pense for short-term lease of an asset may well be greater than the
expense of acquiring access to that asset through direct purchase,
long-term lease, or lease-purchase. Thus, government reliance on
short-term leases may result in more expense and higher deficits. 3 9 1
An additional device used to bypass the lease scoring guidelines is to
contract out capital-intensive tasks and simply to postpone acquisition
of needed capital assets.3 92 In addition, CBO reports that federal
managers are responding to the lease scoring guidelines by increas-
ingly resorting to incremental budgeting in which "Congress appropri-
ates funds for part of a project even though that part has no value as a
stand-alone project" and advance appropriations in which "Congress
authorizes and appropriates funds for an entire project, but the appro-
priations do not become available for obligation until later."39 3 Both
of these techniques decrease transparency of the budget by reducing
the visibility of government costs.
2. Private Sector Synthetic Leasing as a Parallel to Government
Leasing
Both the federal government and private industry have generally
used separate entities, such as GSEs and SPEs, as devices to keep
certain activities off-budget, thus masking the true extent of govern-
ment or business expenses. 3 94 The long-term lease technique is simi-
lar. A purchase of property results in large up-front expenditures,
which are reflected in the federal budget or private enterprise's finan-
cial statements. In contrast, a long-term lease of the same property
may serve as an effective equivalent to actual ownership and, at the
same time, mask the true financial picture shown to taxpayers and
investors. Although the federal government has made some improve-
ments with its scoring guidelines for lease transactions, loopholes re-
main and the long-term lease technique survives.3 95
In the private sector, the parallel to long-term government leasing
is synthetic leasing, which offers business entities the best of two
worlds. In a carefully structured transaction, a business may be
treated as the owner of property for tax purposes and still be regarded
391. For example, the CBO provided an assessment in 2002 of alternative methods for
modernizing the Air Force's tanker aircraft fleet. It concluded that the overall
costs of pursuing a ten-year operating lease option would well exceed the cost of a
direct purchase. See Letter from Dan L. Crippen, Dir., CBO, to Sen. John Mc-
Cain (May 7, 2002). For further discussion of the Air Force leasing controversy,
see infra notes 402-12 and accompanying text.
392. CBO, BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF LEASES, supra note 340, at 20-22.
393. Id. at 22. For a discussion of the use of advance appropriations as a budget gim-
mick, see supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text
394. See supra notes 343-78 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 386-93 and accompanying text.
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as the lessee for book or financial purposes. 39 6 If a business lease
meets the definition of an "operating lease" for financial accounting
purposes, acquisition of the property is not included on the business's
balance sheet.3 97 The business often will create an SPE for purposes
of the lease transaction and arrange for the SPE to buy the property.
The SPE, in turn, leases the property back to the business. A major
advantage of this classification is that
the corporation need not charge annual depreciation expenses against its fi-
nancial statement earnings for any buildings constructed on the property un-
derlying the lease. Certainly, a stronger bottom line, or at least the
impression thereof, tends to boost the investment profile of publicly traded
companies, which face intense daily scrutiny from Wall Street analysts and
investors.
Thus, the business can simultaneously show a stronger bottom line for
investors and decrease federal tax liability.398
Regardless of the lease-like form of the transaction, a lease will be
treated as a mortgage for tax purposes if the economic substance sug-
gests that the nominal lessee has an ownership-like interest.3 99 If a
business is viewed as an owner for tax purposes, its purported "rental"
payments will be treated as debt service in connection with a
purchase. As owner, the taxpayer is entitled to deductions for the por-
tion of the "rent" attributable to interest on the mortgage and for de-
preciation on buildings on the property.
One synthetic lease that received significant attention in connec-
tion with recent accounting and tax scandals involved Enron, which
purchased its Houston headquarters building through an SPE created
for purposes of the acquisition and then leased the headquarters from
the SPE .400 Although it was not the primary focus of congressional
396. For good a description and discussion of synthetic leasing, see Luppino,
supra note 323, at 49-68; H. Peter Nesvold, What Are You Trying to Hide? Syn-
thetic Leases, Financial Disclosure, and the Information Mosaic, 4 STAN. J. L.
Bus. & FIN. 83 (1999); Donald J. Weidner, Synthetic Leases: Structured Finance,
Financial Accounting and Tax Ownership, 25 J. CORP. L. 445 (2000). The "tax-
sheltering" opportunities presented by such leasing are usefully and succinctly
described in George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and Control-
ling Income Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 685-86 (1985).
397. FASB, STANDARD No. 13, supra note 389. This FASB standard provides criteria
used to define a "capital lease" that would not result in generally favorable off-
balance financial treatment. The parallel budget scoring guidelines, which un-
doubtedly were derived from FASB Standard No. 13, use the mirror image of
these criteria to define an "ordinary lease" that would effectively lead to off-
budget treatment. See supra note 389.
398. Nesvold, supra note 396, at 93.
399. For a good discussion of this federal tax law "substance over form" doctrine as
applied to synthetic lease transactions, see Weidner, supra note 396, at 465-88.
400. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 2, at 37; see also Diana B. Henriques, The Brick
Stood Up Before. But Now?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, §3, at 1 (describing SPE
set up by Enron to purchase the company's Houston headquarters and lease it
back to the company).
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activity, synthetic lease abuse did receive some attention at hearings
leading up to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.4 01
Despite congressional and public concern over the misuse of syn-
thetic leases to artificially improve the bottom line, the federal govern-
ment continues to try the same off-budget special-entity lease
gimmick used by the private sector. A recent and controversial illus-
tration is the arrangement through which the Air Force has proposed
to use a newly created special-purpose entity to lease aerial refueling
aircraft from Boeing.4 02 Congress first provided authority for the Sec-
retary of the Air Force to establish a "multi-year program for leasing
general purpose Boeing . . . aircraft."403 The Air Force itself lobbied
rather heavily for this authority and was clearly motivated, at least in
part, by its desire to acquire the aircraft without having to include the
full up-front acquisition cost in the budget. 404 To get this preferred
budget treatment, Congress required the Air Force to lease the air-
craft in a transaction that would meet OMB criteria for "operating
lease" classification.405 The stakes here are high. The CBO concluded
that if the originally proposed lease of 100 aircraft
401. See supra notes 5-6; see, e.g. Hearings Before the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, 107th Cong. (2002) (prepared statement of Bala G. Dharan, Professor
of Accounting, Rice Univ.) (describing synthetic lease transactions as designed to
.jtructure the purchase or use in such a way that it does not result in a financial
liability on the balance sheet"); Hearings Before the Senate Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs Committee, 107th Cong. (2002) (prepared statement of Lynn
Turner, Chief Accountant, United States Securities and Exchange Commission)
(structured transactions permit "hundreds of billions of dollars in synthetic lease
financing off balance sheet liabilities to be hid from the eyes of investors; ...
permit companies to avoid consolidation of special purpose entities . . . They are
better described as a chapter from Grimm's Fairy Tales.").
402. Senator John McCain, for example, described the special entity created for pur-
poses of the lease transaction as "an Enron entity run by the Air Force" and com-
plained that the government would be "asking the taxpayers to pay $5 million in
additional funds with a shell game Enron-like entity, funneling the money
through..." The Proposed Lease of 100 KC-767 Aerial Refueling Tanker Aircraft
by the Air Force: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 108th
Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Proposed Lease Hearings] (remarks of Senator
McCain).
403. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recov-
ery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the U.S. Act, 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-117, §8159, 115 Stat. 2230, 2284 (2002) (not formally codified, but referenced
at 10 U.S.C.A. §2401a (West Supp. 2003) (Historical and Statutory Notes)) [here-
inafter 2002 Defense Appropriations Act].
404. See Proposed Lease Hearings, supra note 402 (statement of James Roche, Sec. of
the Air Force) ("The dominant reason for proposing a lease is the advantage it
affords for quickly delivering needed tankers ... without requiring significant up-
front funding.") (emphasis added).
405. 2002 Defense Appropriations Act, supra note 403, at §8159(c)(5). The Act further
required the Air Force to report to Congress on the terms and conditions of pro-
posed leasing contracts and to describe the savings, if any, of a lease as compared
with an outright purchase program. Id. at §8159(c)(7). Subsequent legislation
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
is recorded as a purchase, budget authority over the first five years would
total $17.3 billion, and outlays would sum to $10.1 billion. If the transaction
is recorded as an operating lease, only $1.5 billion in budget authority would
be shown over the first five years, and outlays during that period would also
total only $1.5 billion, because most of the aircraft would not be available for
leasing until 2009.406
After reaching an agreement with Boeing in May 2003, the Air
Force reported to Congress that the proposed lease transaction would
qualify as an operating lease under OMB criteria. While conceding
that the lease option would cost more than an outright purchase, the
Air Force still held to its view that leasing was the preferred ap-
proach.4o7 The CBO disagreed with the Air Force's classification of
the lease and concluded that the Air Force had dramatically underes-
timated the extra cost of leasing as opposed to outright purchase of the
aircraft. In contrast to the Air Force estimate of $150 million in extra
cost, the CBO concluded that the lease proposal would cost $1.3 to $2
billion more than the purchase alternative. 40 8 One suspects that Air
Force efforts to avoid up-front budget reporting of the full aircraft cost
resulted in a substantially inefficient choice regarding a major govern-
ment expenditure. 4 09
Conceding that "the proposal is right at the margin," the executive
branch of the OMB nevertheless sided with the Air Force and agreed
to classify the lease as an operating lease under its guidelines. Justi-
fying this conclusion, the OMB observed: "fiun light of the Air Force's
conviction that these planes are needed to meet an urgent military
need and in light of clear congressional intent to support a lease, as
expressed in legislation, the OMB believed it appropriate to resolve
ambiguities in favor of classifying this transaction as an operating
lease."4 1
0
further mandated that the Air Force not enter into any lease pursuant to §8159
without first submitting a report to Congress and receiving authorization and
appropriation of funds or new start reprogramming notification for necessary
funds. Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub.
L. No. 107-314, 116 Stat. 2608, div. A, tit. 1, §133 (not formally codified, but refer-
enced at 10 U.S.C.A. §2401a (West Supp. 2003)(Historical and Statutory Notes).
The OMB criteria for "operating lease" classification are listed at supra note 389.
406. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ASSESSMENT OF THE AIR FORCE'S PLAN TO Ac-
QUIRE 100 BOEING TANKER AIRCRAFT 6 (2003) [hereinafter CBO, AIR FORCE
ASSESSMENT]
407. See Proposed Lease Hearings, supra note 402 (statement of James Roche).
408. The CBO presented its findings to Congress in testimony before several commit-
tees. See, e.g., Proposed Lease Hearings, supra note 402 (statement of Robert A.
Sunshine, Ass't Dir. for Budget Analysis).
409. For a discussion of the inefficient choice problem with regard to government leas-
ing in general, see supra notes 380-83 and accompanying text.
410. Proposed Lease Hearings, supra note 402 (remarks of Joel Kaplan, Deputy Dir.,
OMB).
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Over the institutionally more neutral CBO objections, Congress
sided with the Air Force and the OMB, authorizing the Air Force to go
forward with its multi-year lease contract for no more than twenty
tanker aircraft.4 11 In the end, the Air Force deal with Boeing was
placed on hold pending investigation of wrongdoing against Boeing in
connection with bidding for the contract and conflict of interest claims
regarding Boeing's alleged employment offers to federal employees in-
volved in negotiating the lease transaction. 4 12 The ongoing debate
over the Air Force lease deal with Boeing simply highlights the extent
to which Congress continues to play the same games with numbers
that it finds so troubling in the private sector. This budget games-
manship goes on even in the post-Gramm-Rudman world that no
longer includes formal discretionary spending caps and PAYGO
budget restrictions. As the Boeing investigation proceeds, Congress
should use the opportunity to consider provisions that would limit pri-
vate entity attmepts to reduce taxes while simultaneously improving
the financial bottom line. Congress should also use this opportunity to
look inward and consider provisions restricting its own use of special
entities and long-term leases to improve the budget bottom line. Gov-
ernment use of these devices is especially egregious when transactions
result in far greater overall expenditure of taxpayer dollars than an
outright purchase or more straight-forward transaction structure.
E. Declaration of Emergencies That Aren't
Under the Budget Enforcement Act, any discretionary spending or
new direct spending or receipts legislation declared as an emergency
by the President and Congress was exempt from spending caps for ap-
propriations and PAYGO restrictions for new tax and entitlement leg-
islation.413 With regard to appropriations, Congress can provide
emergency funding through regular annual appropriations, contin-
gent emergency appropriations, or emergency supplemental appropri-
ations. 4 14 The GAO reports that Congress increasingly has been
411. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, div. A, tit. 1, §135, Pub.
L. No. 108-136, 117 Stat. 1392 (2004) (Procurement of Tanker Aircraft). Con-
gress even provided authority to initiate or continue a multiyear lease "for any
fiscal year for which sufficient funds are available to pay the costs of such con-
tract for that fiscal year, without regard to whether funds are available to pay the
costs of such contract for any subsequent fiscal year." Id. at §135(b)(4) (emphasis
added).
412. See David Bowermaster, Stonecipher Puts New Twist on the Status of Tanker
Deal, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 7, 2004, at C1.
413. 2 U.S.C. § 901(b)(2) (2000) (discretionary spending cap emergencies); 2 U.S.C.
§ 902(e) (2000) (PAYGO emergencies).
414. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BUDGETING FOR EMERGENCIES: STATE PRACTICES
AND FEDERAL IMPLICATIONS, GAO/AIMD-99-250, at 6 (1999) [hereinafter GAO,
BUDGETING FOR EMERGENCIES].
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using emergency spending designations as a strategy to exceed spend-
ing limitations.415 More significantly, emergency appropriations in-
creasingly are being used for "broader purposes."416 This is simply
the GAO's polite way of saying that Congress has been taking advan-
tage of the emergency designation under the Budget Enforcement Act
to bypass budget enforcement. Perhaps the most extreme example is
the emergency declaration of $4.5 billion in the fiscal year 2000
budget for Census preparation, surely an anticipated expenditure that
few would be seriously willing to label as an emergency appropria-
tion.4 17 Not only were emergency classifications loopholes permitting
Congress to avoid pre-2003 spending caps, but they also arguably
caused Congress to provide inadequate insurance or otherwise at-
tempt to reduce the potential costs of future disasters. 4 18
Unfortunately, the statute itself, however, offers no definition of
emergency, leading one witness to testify before the House Budget
Committee that "[u]nder current procedures . . ., emergency spending
is whatever the Congress and the President deem it to be."4 19 Re-
sponding to a request from Congress that it propose guidelines for
classifying "emergencies," the OMB in 1991 proposed five criteria:
(1) the expenditure was "necessary,"
(2) the situation requiring the emergency appropriations was "sudden,"
(3) the situation was "unforeseen,"
(4) the need for emergency appropriations was "urgent," and
(5) the situation requiring the emergency appropriations was "not
permanent."
4 2 0
Despite several proposed bills, Congress has yet to codify the OMB
guidelines.
415. GAO, 2002 BUDGET COMPLIANCE, supra note 132, at 34.
416. Id.
417. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999).
418. CBO Testimony on Budgeting for Emergency Spending: Hearing Before the House
Task Force on Budget Process, Comm. on the Budget, 105th Cong. 12 (1998)
(statement of James L. Blum, Deputy Dir., CBO) ("Some also claim that excessive
emergency aid discourages the purchase of adequate insurance or the incentive to
take actions that would mitigate the cost of natural disasters.").
419. Id., at 2; see also SENATE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET EXPLANATION, supra note 135,
at 55.
420. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REPORT ON COSTS
OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND ON THE THREATS POSED BY
THE KUWAITI OIL FIRES (June 1991), cited in GAO, BUDGETING FOR EMERGENCIES,
supra note 414, at 22-23 & n. 30. The President recently included these proposals
in his 2005 budget. 2005 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 134, at 217.
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F. Directed Scoring and Directed Scorekeeping
1. Directed Scoring
Perhaps the most egregious form of playing games with numbers is
the use of directed scoring and directed scorekeeping. The term "di-
rected scoring" is used with some frequency and can be found in the
budget literature.421 Directed scoring as a phenomenon is made pos-
sible by the existence of multiple federal budget scorekeepers. Within
the executive branch, the OMB is responsible for providing budget es-
timates for the President's budget and for purposes of applying budget
sequester rules under pre-2003 discretionary spending cap and
PAYGO budget limitations of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.422
Congress, on the other hand, established the CBO in 1974 to generate
a separate set of estimates for congressional use in preparation of the
concurrent budget resolution.423 In addition to the CBO, Congress
gave authority to yet another entity, the Joint Tax Committee (JTC),
to provide revenue estimates and distributional effect information for
any pending or enacted revenue legislation enacted by Congress.
The staffs of the three different scoring entities do not always
agree on working assumptions or methodology. As a result, the same
budget proposals or programs may be given three different scores. 42 4
As would be expected, Congress generally relies upon its own CBO
figures in preparing its concurrent budget resolution and considering
the impact of any new legislation. Periodically, however, Congress de-
cides that the CBO figures do not suit its purposes; they simply direct
the CBO to adopt OMB figures instead of its own. As Schick reports,
Congress sometimes "picks and chooses between OMB and CBO as-
sumptions, taking from each those that score its appropriations as less
costly."425 "Directed scoring" is the term generally used to refer to
this particular congressional budget committee direction to the CBO
to use OMB figures. 4 2 6 For fiscal year 2000, for example, the CBO
421. See, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 15, at 63.
422. See discussion supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text; see also Block,
Pathologies, supra note 16, at 885-86.
423. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297 (1974). The CBO is responsible for providing Congress with its own
set of general budget numbers and baselines. 2 U.S.C. § 601(f) (2000). As budget
expert, Allen Schick explains, both the "OMB and CBO prepare baseline projec-
tions for budget aggregates .... particular categories of the budget, and for partic-
ular programs or accounts." SCHICK, supra note 15, at 57. Schick further reports
that the "CBO tends to use more cautious assumptions than [the] OMB." Id. at
63
424. For an excellent discussion of the different scoring and estimating techniques
used by the CBO, JCT, and OMB, see Michael J. Graetz, Paint By Numbers Tax
Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1995).
425. SCHICK, supra note 15, at 63.
426. On the one hand, some will loosely use the terms "directed scoring" and "directed
scorekeeping" interchangeably. Some use the term "directed scorekeeping" to re-
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reported that it was directed by Congress to use estimates approxi-
mating OMB's calculations for defense, receipts from the auction of
spectrum licenses, and student loans.4 27 Based upon CBO estimates,
the congressional budget resolution for fiscal year 2000 would have
violated the 1990 Budget Act spending cap restrictions, thus trigger-
ing the mandatory sequester rules.42s House Armed Services Com-
mittee Chairman Floyd Spence was quite open about using directed
scoring with respect to the defense appropriation budget for fiscal year
2000. Forced to choose between directed scoring and spending reduc-
tions, he would clearly choose the former. As he noted, "[i]f it becomes
necessary, I [sic] recommend a similar solution this year, and could
not support any solution to an outlay-scoring problem that requires a
reduction to the President's defense budget request."429
Congress can use this directed scoring to play games with the num-
bers, choosing to use its own figures when such figures work to its
advantage and turning to the executive department numbers at whim
when the latter make the budget figures come out better. This ran-
dom application of scoring rules seems inconsistent with the tone of
corporate accountability that Congress has recently taken with re-
spect to private business enterprises. In fairness to Congress, how-
ever, it is conceivable that there are occasions when it might make
policy sense to depart from CBO estimates. On such unusual occa-
sions, Congress should carefully explain its rationale for rejecting
CBO in favor of OMB estimates and should not be free to simply
choose the score it likes best.
fer to what most budget treatises and what I prefer to call "directed scoring." See,
e.g., David Baumann, Begin the Endgame, 15 NAT'L J. 1126, 1126-27 (2000) (re-
ferring to House and Senate Budget Committee directions to CBO to adopt OMB
scoring as "directed scorekeeping"); James P. Lucier, Candidates Clash; Congress
Toils, 16 INSIGHT MAG., Mar. 27, 2000, at 8, 9 (referring to Republican's use of
"OMB's fuzzier numbers because they looked better" as "directed scorekeeping").
On the other hand, some use the term "direct scoring" to refer to what really
should be called "directed scorekeeping." See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S12,341 (daily
ed. Dec. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. Domenici) ("Don't ask the Congressional
Budget Office and then say, regardless of their answer, which we are supposed to
follow, we are going to determine and declare that we are not going to follow it.
That is called directed scoring - telling them how to score things contrary to the
rules, contrary to reality, and contrary to the way we have been doing it."); see
also discussion, infra notes 411-412 and accompanying text for an attempt to
clarify the two terms.
427. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUT-
LOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2001-2010, 77 (2000).
428. For a brief discussion of these budget rules, see supra notes 135-137 and accom-
panying text. For a fuller discussion, see Block, Pathologies, supra note 16, at
882-88.
429. Baumann, supra note 426, at 1127 (quoting Senator Spence).
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2. Directed Scorekeeping
"Directed scorekeeping," unlike "directed scoring," does not appear
to be a common term. Although federal budget process experts often
use the phrase, one cannot find it in the index to any of the major
treatises on the budget process. 430 Unfortunately, to the extent that
the term is applied, it is often used interchangeably with "directed
scoring," thus leading to the impression that the two concepts are one
and the same. One of the objectives in this Article is to raise aware-
ness of the distinction between directed scoring and directed
scorekeeping and to make sure that "directed scorekeeping" does not
remain the dirty little secret of budget experts on Capitol Hill. In ad-
dition, this Article urges the terms be used accurately to describe two
different types of scoring adjustments.
In the case of directed scoring, Congress chooses a set of budget
figures from two possible sets, both of which presumably were pre-
pared by experts. To be sure, estimating economic baseline projec-
tions and other relevant budget figures is a complex process about
which reasonable minds may differ. When Congress chooses to use
OMB numbers rather than its own, it is at least choosing plausible
figures prepared by expert economists and policymakers. When Con-
gress uses what I refer to as "directed scorekeeping," on the other
hand, it simply directs the CBO to use figures other than the CBO's
own estimates. 4 3 1 Since the CBO is the official scorekeeper for Con-
gress, Congress departs from its own budget practices when it re-
quests "scoring adjustments" from the CBO. This might be referred to
as internal directed scorekeeping. Gaming the numbers in this way
arguably permits politicians to be dishonest, particularly about the ex-
tent to which Congress is borrowing from the Social Security surplus
in order to fund other federal government activities. As at least one
reporter observed in 1999, in order to avoid appearing to steal money
from the Social Security surplus, Congress simply directed the CBO to
recompute its calculations and, "this time, to subtract several billion
dollars from the result so that the numbers would come out right.
(This is called 'directed scorekeeping; essentially, Congress has the le-
430. See, e.g., COLLENDER, supra note 139; SCHICK, supra note 15; WILDAVSKY &
CAIDEN, supra note 229.
431. Another possible way to distinguish directed scoring and directed scorekeeping
would be to say that the former applies to internal directions from Congress for
CBO to use figures other than its own. Directed scorekeeping, on the other hand,
might be said to refer to congressional instructions to the OMB to use figures
other than its own for enforcement purposes. This usage gives the terms slightly
different meanings from those that I adopt in the text. From my perspective, the
better distinction is one used in the text.
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gal right to make the CBO do anything it wants, even if that means
pretending certain budget items do not really exist)."43 2
If one looks closely at CBO computations of on-budget surplus, for
example, one can find an entry somewhat euphemistically labeled
"scoring adjustment."43 3 When asked to explain, CBO Director Dan
Crippen routinely answered, "we include the effects of various
scorekeeping directives and adjustments made by the budget commit-
tees, which would have the effect of reducing outlays attributed to ap-
propriations bills . . . In total, these adjustments come to about $17
billion for the House and $16 billion for the Senate."434 Professional
CBO economists work hard to provide reasonable and accurate budget
figures for Congress. Yet, as one journalist reports, "these number-
crunchers live in two budgetary worlds: the real one, based on the
CBO's generally respected economic projections, and the fake one,
based on politicians' fantasies, a little like the bits of cake in 'Alice in
Wonderland' that magically make things shrink or grow." 43 5
One recent example of controversial directed scorekeeping involves
the Railroad Retirement and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001.436
The Act increased retirement benefits for railroad employees, reduced
payroll taxes previously used to finance those benefits, and generally
restructured the railroad retirement system.4 3 7 One of the major re-
structuring devices was to create a new National Railroad Retirement
Investment Trust (RRIT) as a privately-owned government-sponsored
enterprise.43 8 Unlike regular government trusts, this new railroad re-
tirement trust is authorized to invest in non-federal assets; it is not
limited to investing its surplus in U.S. Treasury obligations. In the
process of restructuring, the balance held in the old Rail Industry Pen-
sion Fund was transferred to the new RRIT, which would be author-
ized to invest the balance in a diversified portfolio, including corporate
432. Jonathan Chait, The GOP Gets One Right, Sort Of, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 22,
1999, at 16, 17.
433. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COMPUTATION OF ON-BUDGET SURPLUS FOR Fis-
CAL YEAR 2000. CBO Senior Analyst, Susan Tanaka, reported that "by defini-
tion," if CBO labels something as a "scoring adjustment," it means that CBO does
not agree with it. Ann Scott Tyson, The Numerical Wizardry Behind the Budget,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1999, at 1.
434. Letter from Dan L. Crippen, Dir. CBO, to Rep. John M. Spratt, Jr., Ranking Dem.
Member, House Budget Comm. (Aug. 26, 1999), reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY
177 (1999).
435. Tyson, supra note 433, at 1.
436. Pub. L. No. 107-90, 115 Stat. 878, 887 (2001) [hereinafter Railroad Retirement
Act of 2001].
437. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, REPORT ON THE LEGISLATIVE AND OVERSIGHT
ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS DURING THE 107TH CON-
GRESS, H. R. REP. 107-801, at 3-4, 56-57 (2003) (description of Railroad Retire-
ment and Survivors' Improvement Act of 2001).
438. Railroad Retirement Act of 2001, supra note 436, at § 105(a), 115 Stat. at 882-86
(codified at 45 U.S.C. § 231n(j) (2003)).
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stocks and bonds.4 39 In what might appear on the surface as a reason-
ably innocuous provision, Congress included a financing detail provid-
ing that for purposes of budget computations and federal financial
accounting, "the purchase or sale of non-Federal assets... by the Na-
tional Railroad Retirement Investment Trust shall be treated as a
means of financing."4 40
The significance of this declaration was to effectively declare, con-
trary to CBO estimates and GAO practice, that the transfer of federal
funds to the RRIT was not a budget outlay. The CBO had estimated a
total cost of $14.9 billion for the measure over the years 2001-2010.
On the Senate floor, Senator Nickles stated that he was embarrassed
and horrified that the Senate could incorporate such a provision. He
complained: "Hocus pocus-write a check, and it doesn't count. That
really bothers me."44 1 Concerned about the selective use of directed
scorekeeping and the troubling precedent that it might establish in
the context of Social Security, Senator Domenici proposed a floor
amendment to strike the direct scorekeeping provision.44 2 Describing
the directed scorekeeping as "pathetic," Senator Domenici pleaded
with his colleagues not to ask for CBO cost estimates "and then say,
regardless of their answer, which we are supposed to follow, we are
going to determine and declare that we are not going to follow it."443
He further commented that bending the rules in the private sector
"creates confusion for the same reason [and] we should not bend the
accounting rules of the Federal Government to suit our purpose. Do-
ing so reduces transparency and misleads the public."444
To be fair, even the CBO acknowledged that the proper budget
treatment of trust fund investments in non-Federal assets was unset-
tled.4 45 Under conventional budget treatment, the transfer of funds to
RRIT should be treated as an outlay, since cash is physically leaving
the Treasury. On the other hand, since the outlay is invested in secur-
ities, as opposed to other goods and services, an argument might be
made that the outlay should simply be viewed as a non-scoreable
means of financing.446
439. See description in H.R. REP. No. 106-777, pt. 1, at 16-17 (2000).
440. Railroad Retirement Act of 2001, supra note 436, § 105(c), 115 Stat. at 887 (refer-
enced at 45 U.S.C.A. § 231n(e) (West Supp. 2003) (Historical and Statutory
Notes)).
441. 147 CONG. REC. S12,118 (daily ed. . Nov. 29, 2001) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
442. Amendment No. 2202 to amend. No. 2170 to H.R. 10, 107th Cong., 147 CONG.
REC. S12,340 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2001) (amendment to strike provision related to
directed scorekeeping).
443. 147 CONG. REC. S12,341 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 2001) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
444. Id.
445. H.R. REP. 106-777, supra note 439, pt. 2, at 20-23.
446. The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure considered both al-
ternatives as applied to the new railroad retirement trust fund and concluded,
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Congress has also turned to a broader form of directed scorekeep-
ing in recent years in order to bypass pre-2003 mandatory sequestra-
tion that would otherwise have resulted from PAYGO violations. For
purposes of enforcing fiscal restraints imposed by the Budget Enforce-
ment Act, the OMB was required to impose mandatory sequestration
of certain federal programmatic funds. The OMB maintained its own
PAYGO scorecard for purposes of this sequestration enforcement.
When Congress directs the OMB to ignore the OMB scorecard and in-
stead to substitute a figure created by Congress, it engages in directed
scorekeeping. This type of external directed scorekeeping, however, is
quite different from the informal process used when congressional
budget committees simply direct CBO to substitute alternate budget
figures of Congress' choosing.
Unlike internal directed scorekeeping through congressional direc-
tives to CBO, external directed scorekeeping must be done by statute.
Remarkably, for fiscal years 2000 through 2002, Congress directed the
OMB to set its PAYGO scorecard to zero, thus avoiding mandatory
sequestration. 44 7 The OMB has complied with these directed
scorekeeping directives from Congress. For example, in response to
the fiscal year 2001 directive, the OMB's sequester report simply ends
with: "NOTE: Pursuant to P.L. 106-554, the pay-as-you-go balances
that would result in a sequester for FY 2001 will be set to zero."4 48
One must wonder how Congress could simply tell the OMB to erase
whatever PAYGO figures it had on its scorecard and substitute a
zero.4 49 Alice in Wonderland immediately comes to mind. One won-
ders also whether this can possibly be constitutionally appropriate.
Why did the OMB not raise separation of powers objections?45o Per-
contrary to CBO, that the "alternative budget treatment is more appropriate
than the conventional budget treatment." Id., pt. 1, at 17.
447. Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recov-
ery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-117, div. C, § 102, 115 Stat. 2230, 2342-43 (2001) (setting PAYGO se-
quester to zero for 2001 and 2002); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub.
L. No. 106-554, § 2(b), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763-64 (2000) (setting PAYGO sequester
to zero for 2001); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
§ 1001(c), 113 Stat. 1501, 1537 (1999) (setting PAYGO sequester to zero for 2000).
For an interesting case study regarding the evolution of fiscal year 2002 directed
scorekeeping to the OMB, see Block, Pathologies, supra note 16, at 888-98.
448. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB COST ESTI-
MATE FOR PAY-AS-YOU-GO CALCULATIONS, OMB REP. No. 550 (Jan. 12, 2001).
449. Without success, Congress has tried to discipline itself with regard to directed
scorekeeping. For example, the 2001 fiscal year budget included a provision
making it out of order in the House "to consider any reported bill or joint resolu-
tion, or amendment thereto or conference report thereon, that contains a directed
scoreekeeping provision." H.R. Cong. Res. 290, 106th Cong. § 31, at 53-54 (2000)
(enacted).
450. Former OMB Director, Richard Darman, at least hinted of separation of powers
concerns in 1991 testimony before the House Budget Committee, After noting
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haps the explanation is that Congress itself created the mandatory
sequester process through the Budget Enforcement Act, giving the
OMB its sequestration powers in the first place. Since the direction to
the OMB took the form of a statute, duly enacted and signed by the
President, one might say that Congress simply repealed the Budget
Act sequestration provision, at least for that particular year. Consti-
tutional considerations aside, the directed scorekeeping technique is
surely a gimmick largely hidden from public view. Although Congress
may not have violated the Constitution, to my mind, it surely has vio-
lated transparency and accountability, democratically-oriented princi-
ples that should drive the federal budget process. 45 1 For the moment,
the directed scorekeeping aimed at the OMB is no longer an issue,
given the recent sunset of spending caps, PAYGO, and sequesters.
The issue will re-emerge, however, if such budget constraints are re-
enacted. Either way, the external directed scorekeeping examples
above provide dramatic illustration of the extent to which Congress
plays games with numbers.
V. Conclusion
Congress has spent considerable time over the past several years
focusing on issues of corporate accountability - and rightly so. Public
confidence in the economy and the stock market has been severely
eroded by the seemingly endless reports of major U.S. corporate ac-
counting, tax, and financial scandals. Coincidentally, the past year
also happens to be the year in which budgetary fiscal constraints built
into the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 expired. Sadly, Congress it-
self is guilty of using accounting and financial gimmicks to comply
with budget procedural rules, to reduce the apparent federal deficit
and to paint a rosier picture of the economy to the American public.
Unless Congress cleans up. its own house, public confidence in the
economy and the stock market will suffer.
Although I think that Congress should do so, this Article has not
focused upon the policy question of whether Congress should extend
recently expired Budget Enforcement Act discretionary spending caps
and PAYGO procedures. Surely, Congress must address these issues
as it considers budget reform. For the moment, however, my concern
is narrower, focusing particularly on the accounting rules that Con-
gress uses for purposes of the federal budget. Far from being simply a
that congressional directed scorekeeping violates the enforcement provisions of
the BEA, he stated that "these sections of the BEA designate OMB as the
'scorekeeper' of the budget effect of legislation for purposes of calculating whether
a spending limit has been exceeded or the pay-as-you-go requirement has been
violated." Hearings Before the House Budget Comm., 103d Cong. 8 (July 17,
1991) (statement of Richard G. Darman, Dir. OMB).
451. See Block, Pathologies, supra note 16, at 898-904.
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technical matter, budget accounting has a dramatic impact not only
on budget formation and budget policy, but also on public policy more
generally. If Congress now limits its budget reform debate to address-
ing just the fiscal discipline issues, it will have lost a precious
opportunity.
From time to time, proposals have emerged regarding one budget
gimmick or accounting device or another. Now is the time for Con-
gress to take a careful look at the entire budget picture and review all
of its major budget accounting provisions. Perhaps the first task
should be for Congress to prepare a comprehensive set of federal
budget accounting rules comparable to the FASB rules applicable to
the private sector and the FASAB rules applicable to federal govern-
ment agencies and departments. Much of congressional budget ac-
counting is considered in a piecemeal fashion and there are many
inconsistencies as approaches have developed incrementally over
time. Although a complete move to accrual-based accounting may be
premature, Congress at a minimum should address the inconsistent
use of accrual-based methods in the current budget. The logic that
moved Congress to adopt accrual-based budgeting with respect to fed-
eral credit programs as well as some civilian federal and military em-
ployee retirement programs should similarly move Congress to adopt
accrual-based budgeting for other retirement programs and activities
with similar long-term cost implications.
Over the years, the number of off-budget mixed-ownership and
government-sponsored enterprises has proliferated. Particularly as it
slings arrows at the off-budget entities used by Enron and others to
disguise financial information, Congress must assess its use of off-
budget government corporations and develop a consistent policy re-
garding appropriate use of such enterprises. Once and for all, Con-
gress also needs to stop being schizophrenic about its treatment of
Social Security. There certainly are reasonable arguments for and
against the off-budget status of Social Security, but Congress cannot
have it both ways. Whatever budget accounting position Congress
chooses should be consistently applied. Many federal programs, in-
cluding Medicare, have similar policy underpinnings and budgetary
concerns. Although Social Security is among the largest of these pro-
grams, whatever treatment Congress decides upon for Social Security
should be extended to other comparable programs.
Over the past decade, Congress has displayed an increasing com-
mitment to the notion that the laws shall bind equally on all. The
Congressional Accountability Act of 1995 showed a willingness on the
part of Congress to subject itself to the same workplace and employ-
ment regulations that it imposed on the private sector. To make the
provision work, Congress had to be somewhat creative in overcoming
logistical and procedural hurdles. Separation of powers concerns, for
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example, made it impossible to simply extend the private sector rules
to Congress. Instead, Congress had to devise an enforcement struc-
ture that would not involve the executive branch in enforcing employ-
ment laws against the legislative branch. Similarly, Congress cannot
simply vote to apply the same accounting rules for federal budget pur-
poses that it imposes on the private sector. Congress recently created
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to oversee account-
ing and auditing practices in the private sector. 45 2 Past experience
shows that, despite the best of intentions, Congress has considerable
difficulty sticking to its guns when it comes to budget discipline. Per-
haps one solution would be for Congress to create its own independent
oversight board.
To be sure, federal budget accounting has unique objectives and
may require different rules than those used for purposes of private
sector financial accounting. At the same time, it also might not be
sensible for Congress to simply extend to itself the federal government
financial accounting rules that it imposes on federal agencies and de-
partments. Surely, Congress must also recognize the unique issues
relevant to budget as opposed to financial accounting. That said, how-
ever, Congress should come closer than it has to date to adopting fed-
eral budget accounting standards that conform to private sector and
federal government accounting principles. When Congress departs
from those principles, it has an obligation to explain more fully the
grounds for its departure. Absent such an explanation, the public may
be justified in accusing Congress of a double standard. When Con-
gress accuses the private sector of accounting gimmickry and fraud,
the pot may well be calling the kettle black.
452. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 5, at § 101(a).
